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this	 remains	 the	 most	 serious	 issue	 in	 Turkey	 today.	 In	 so	 doing,	 this	 study	 places	
emphasis	 on	 the	 experiences/challenges	 of	 Kurdish	 pupils	 in	 the	 eastern	 and	 south-
eastern	 regions	of	 Turkey.	 Furthermore,	 teachers’	 perception	of	 the	Kurdish	Question	
and	 the	 educational	 issues	 are	 also	 one	 of	 the	 main	 focusses	 of	 this	 research,	 since	
teachers	are	considered	to	be	powerful	actors	in	this	study.	Apart	from	this,	in	order	to	
understand	 the	 challenges	 facing	 Kurdish	 pupils	 and	 the	 educational	 issues	 leading	 to	
the	 exclusion	 of	 non-Turks	 more	 generally,	 critical	 analysis	 of	 textbooks	 and	 policy	
documents	is	also	undertaken.	The	findings	of	the	research	show	that	there	is	a	serious	
issue	 of	 exclusion	 and	 even	 assimilation	 facing	 pupils	 within	 the	 existing	 education	
system,	something	which	also	affects	their	success	and	the	reproduction	of	their	culture.	
Furthermore,	 linguistic	 issues	 and	 the	 nationalist/ideological	 characteristics	 of	 the	
Turkish	 education	 have	 a	 huge	 effect	 on	 Kurdish	 pupils.	 Specifically,	 students	 starting	
school	 with	 no	 or	 little	 Turkish	 struggle	 to	 adapt,	 and	 their	 lives	 are	 ruined	 in	 the	
schooling	 system.	 Results	 also	 show	 that	 young	 teachers	 are	 courageous	 actors	 who	
attempt	to	bring	a	 level	of	 flexibility	to	the	educational	system	so	as	to	help	students,	
despite	 the	 education	 system	 remaining	 strictly	 centralised.	 Lastly,	 critical	 analysis	 of	
textbooks	 reveals	 that	 the	 Turkish	 education	 system	 indoctrinates	 students	 by	
promoting	the	Kemalist	ideology	and	Turkish	nationalism.	The	findings	can	contribute	to	
a	 better	 understanding	 of	 the	 struggle	 facing	 the	 Kurdish	 minority	 in	 Turkey.	 This	
research,	 therefore,	 provides	 a	 timely	 and	 necessary	 study	 of	 the	 national	 education	
system	which	is	believed	to	lie	behind	many	social	problems	existing	in	society.	
 





































































































































































































This	 thesis	 scrutinises	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 nationalist	 characteristics	 of	 the	
ideology-driven	Turkish	educational	system	and	Turkey’s	Kurdish	Question	by	analysing	
the	effects	of	the	education	system	on	Kurdish	pupils	from	the	perspective	of	teachers	
coming	 from	 different	 ethnic,	 religious	 and	 political	 backgrounds.	 Based	 on	 teachers’	
perceptions,	current	policy	documents,	and	official	textbooks	used	in	civic	education,	it	






Republic.	 With	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 Kurdistan	 Worker’s	 Party	 (Partiya	 Karkerên	
Kurdistanê,	PKK)	and	the	start	of	armed	conflict	between	Kurdish	insurgents	and	Turkish	
security	 forces,	 the	Kurdish	 issue	 in	Turkey	has	 taken	a	new	turn	 in	a	conflict	 that	has	
cost	more	than	40.000	lives	since	the	1980s	(Ince,	2015).	One	of	the	implications	of	this	






state	 for	 decades,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 promising	 development	 in	 the	 past	 few	 years	
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regarding	the	recognition	of	the	issue	as	being	multi-dimensional	in	its	nature,	especially	
after	the	Justice	and	Development	Party	(Adâlet	ve	Kalkınma	Partisi,	Ak	Party)	began	a	
new	 initiative	aimed	at	ending	 the	 conflict,	 something	which	has	been	officially	 called	
the	 ‘Kurdish	Opening’.	Having	said	that,	 the	attempts	made	 in	order	to	solve	the	 issue	
have	always	been	lacking	an	educational	perspective	on	the	matter.	Although	very	few	
reforms	 have	 recently	 been	 implemented	 in	 the	 field	 of	 education,	 the	 reformation	
process	 in	 education	 remained	 superficial,	 and	 the	 exclusionist	 characteristic	 of	 the	
Turkish	educational	system	prevails	in	many	ways.	
	
Turkey	 has	 an	 educational	 system	 that	 is	 generating	 controversy	 for	 its	 heavily	
ideological	nature	as	well	as	its	bias	relating	to	particular	issues.	This	is	because	national	
education	in	Turkey	is	still	primarily	based	upon	the	Kemalist	ideals	and	principles.	It	 is	
also	 ethno-centric,	 with	 a	 particular	 focus	 on	 Turkish	 nationalism	 promoting	 the	
Kemalist	 interpretation	 of	 Turkish	 nationalism	 and	 the	 idea	 of	 ‘Turkishness’.	 What	 is	
more,	 the	educational	system	in	Turkey	 is	also	militarised,	with	military	 jargon	used	 in	
school	 textbooks,	 even	 though	 textbooks	 and	 educational	 attainments	 have	 recently	
been	revised	and	democratised	as	a	result	of	a	comprehensive	reform	implemented	as	
part	 of	 the	 country’s	 European	 Union	 accession	 program,	 especially	 after	 2005.	
Textbooks,	for	example,	have	shown	a	trend	towards	a	reduction	in	the	use	of	military	
jargon	since	2005	(see	Kancı	and	Altınay,	2007,	Çayır,	2011,	Çayır,	2014);	however,	the	




same	 way	 as	 before,	 as	 the	 Turkish	 state	 uses	 it	 as	 a	 mechanism	 to	 impose	 the	




the	 hegemonic	 Turkish	 culture	 (e.g.	 see	 Çayır,	 2015),	which	 appears	 to	 be	 one	 of	 the	
main	 issues	 leading	 to	 problems	 in	 society,	 and	 especially	 regarding	 the	 Kurdish	
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Question.	 The	 promotion	 and	 even	 exaggeration	 of	 the	 characteristics	 of	 a	 particular	
nation	–the	Turks-	somewhat	stigmatises	other	ethnicities	existing	in	society,	as	they	are	
automatically	 otherised	 by	 the	 educational	 system	 against	 the	 “glorified	 nation”	 (the	
Turkish	nation).	However,	despite	the	significance	of	these	issues	and	the	seriousness	of	
the	possible	 implications,	educators,	pedagogues	and	researchers	 in	Turkey	are	mainly	
interested	 in	 the	 achievements	 of	 pupils	 in	 both	 school	 and	 national	 exams	 without	




Therefore,	 along	 with	 a	 lack	 of	 perspective	 on	 the	 role	 of	 education	 in	 the	 Kurdish	
Question,	 there	 is	 also	 an	 unavoidable	 gap	 in	 the	 extant	 literature	 on	 Kurdish	 pupils’	
experiences	 that	 are	directly	 linked	 to	 the	 ideological	 (Kemalist)	 and	ethno-nationalist	
characteristics	of	 the	Turkish	educational	 system.	 In	addition,	 this	 is	 reinforced	by	 the	
paucity	of	existing	empirical	research	on	the	same	issue	in	Turkey.	This	is	partly	due	to	
the	 fact	 that	 the	 Kemalist	 educational	 system	 of	 Turkey	 has	 not	 been	 analysed	
‘thoroughly’	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 effects	 on	 pupils,	 as	 the	 topic	 was	 quite	 sensitive	 for	
researchers	in	Turkey.	However,	in	the	post-Kemalist	era	1,	even	though	direct	criticism	
against	 the	 official	 ideology	 of	 Kemalism	might	 still	 be	 easily	 interpreted	 as	 an	 insult	
against	 the	 personality	 of	 Atatürk	 and	his	 ideals,	 and	 could	 even	be	 considered	 as	 an	
offence	due	to	the	ambiguity	of	Law	5816	concerning	crimes	committed	against	Atatürk	
2,	it	could	definitely	be	claimed	that	conducting	a	research	on	Kemalism	in	a	critical	way	
                                            
1		 Although	the	post-Kemalist	era	in	Turkey	could	be	traced	back	to	the	late	1990s	under	the	leadership	
of	Turgut	Özal	and	Necmettin	Erbakan	(former	President	and	Prime	Minister	of	Turkey),	notably,	the	
ideology	 of	 Kemalism	 within	 the	 state	 discourse	 weakened	 especially	 in	 the	 2000s	 after	 the	
conservative	Ak	Party	came	to	power.	




paragraphs	above	will	be	punished	as	 if	committing	the	crime.	 If	the	crimes	outlined	 in	the	second	
paragraph	of	the	first	article	are	committed	using	force...the	penalty	will	be	doubled”	Law	No.	5816	
Crimes	Against	Atatürk.	




The	 following	 sections	 detail	 the	 abovementioned	 issues	 around	 Turkey’s	 Kurdish	
Question	and	the	controversial	characteristics	of	the	Turkish	educational	system,	explain	
the	significance	of	the	topic,	and	highlight	the	research	questions	with	the	main	aims	of	
the	 study	 and	 the	 limitations	 of	 the	 research	 discussed.	 Finally,	 the	 structure	 of	 the	
thesis	is	outlined	at	the	end.	
	







Education	 is	 indeed	a	powerful	phenomenon,	as	 it	prepares	children	 for	 the	 future.	 In	




above	 quote	 suggests,	 with	 globalisation	 becoming	 an	 undeniable	 fact	 of	 the	 21st	
century,	 along	with	 social	 diversity	 becoming	more	 common,	 things	 have	 changed	 for	




                                            
3		 Westphalian	 system	 developed	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 Peace	 of	Westphalia	 in	 1648	 acknowledged	 the	
sovereignty	of	nation-states	over	domestic	affairs	within	their	‘national	borders’,	which	is	believed	to	
have	created	the	structure	of	the	modern	nation-state.		
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safety	 of	 nation-states,	 has	 lost	 some	 of	 its	 significance.	With	 the	 increasing	 flows	 of	










a	 crucial	 role	 in	 the	 continuity	 and	 survival	 of	 the	 nation-state.	 Having	 said	 this,	
education	 systems	 still	 operate	 pretty	 much	 in	 the	 same	 in	 many	 nation-states.	 For	
instance,	in	Turkey,	the	educational	system	and	the	existing	curriculum	are	still	primarily	
based	upon	 the	Turkish	nationalist	 ideals	and	Kemalist	principles.	The	 ideas	of	Turkish	
nationalism	 inspired	 by	 Kemalist	 ideology,	 including	 the	 cult	 of	 Atatürk,	 dominate	 the	
educational	 attainments	 and	 textbooks.	 This	 has	 an	 impact	 on	 every	 child	 due	 to	 the	
educational	 system	 being	 very	 centralised	 in	 Turkey,	 as	 all	 textbooks	 taught	 in	 both	
public	and	private	schools	must	either	be	prepared	or	approved	by	the	Turkish	Ministry	
of	 National	 Education	 (MoNE),	with	 all	 the	 textbooks	 distributed	 by	 the	MoNE	 alone.	
The	 MoNE	 also	 prepares	 teacher’s	 guidebooks	 for	 each	 textbook	 which	 provides	
information	about	what	should	be	taught	and	how	this	should	be	done	in	the	classroom,	
with	 the	 priority	 of	 the	 educational	 attainments	 specifically	 given	 in	 each	 unit.	 Even	
though	 use	 of	 the	 same	 teaching	method	 is	 not	 compulsory	 for	 teachers,	 this	 clearly	
shows	how	the	MoNE	tries	to	control	teaching	practices	as	well	as	everything	else	within	
the	system	(Öztürk,	2011).	As	a	result,	with	the	unchanged	structure	of	the	educational	
system	 in	 Turkey,	 education	 still	 appears	 to	 be	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 Turkey’s	 core	 issues.	
Therefore,	 one	 should	 understand	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 practices	
pupils/students	 experience	 through	 schooling	 and	 the	 issues	 they	 are	 facing	 in	 their	
daily	 lives	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 the	 bigger	 picture,	 since	 these	 two	 phenomena	 are	
inseparable.	
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Previous	 research	 has	 shown	 that	 the	 Kurds	 in	 Turkey	 face	 serious	 issues	 both	within	
wider	society	and	the	educational	system	in	particular	(e.g.	see	Altınay,	2004,	Ceylan	and	
Irzık,	 2004,	 Üstel,	 2005,	 Aycan,	 2005,	 Çapar,	 2006,	 Kadıoğlu,	 2007,	 Kancı	 and	 Altınay,	
2007,	Çayır	and	Gürkaynak,	2008,	Cemiloğlu,	2009,	Uçarlar,	2009,	Çayır,	2010,	Dixon	and	




Party	 in	 2009,	 Kurdish	 people	 suffered	 from	 what	 can	 be	 called	 the	 exclusionary	
behaviours	 of	 the	 Turkish	 state,	whereby	 the	 existence	 of	 Kurdish	 ethnicity	was	 even	
denied	outright	by	the	state.	The	Kurdish	initiative,	which	was	part	of	a	comprehensive	
democratic	 initiative	move	that	also	 included	Roma,	Alevi,	Caferi,	and	Greek	 initiatives	
aimed	at	ending	such	rejectionist	policies	against	the	Kurdish	ethnic	minority	in	Turkey,	
something	 which	 required	 reforms	 promised	 to	 be	 implemented	 gradually	 by	 the	
Turkish	 government.	 Within	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 Kurdish	 initiative,	 the	 Ak	 Party	
government	has	implemented	many	crucial	reforms	over	time.	For	example,	the	use	of	
any	 language	other	 than	Turkish	was	 restricted	by	 law	before	 the	Kurdish	Opening,	as	
language	was	given	certain	significance	after	 the	foundation	of	 the	Turkish	Republic	 in	
order	 to	 build	 a	 mono-linguistic	 society	 wherein	 everybody	 speaks	 Turkish.	 Mustafa	
Kemal	 Atatürk,	 the	 founder	 of	 the	 Turkish	 Republic,	 stressed	 the	 importance	 of	 the	
language	himself	by	saying	 that	“it	 is	not	possible	 to	believe	a	person’s	claims	 that	he	





Turkish	 culture,	 with	 Turkish	 being	 the	 only	 spoken	 language	 in	 public	 places.	 Such	
programs	were	successful	 in	that,	 interestingly	enough,	when	the	imprisoned	leader	of	
the	 PKK,	 Abdullah	 Öcalan,	 broadcasted	 his	 yearly	 Nevruz	 message	 to	 the	 public	 in	
Diyarbakır	 in	 2014,	many	 Kurdish	 people	 –	 including	 some	 of	 the	MPs	 from	 the	 pro-
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Kurdish	 Party	 HDP	 (People’s	 Democratic	 Party,	 Halkların	 Demokratik	 Partisi,	 HDP)	 –	
waited	 for	 the	 Turkish	 version	 of	 the	 message	 (Hürriyet,	 2014).	 However,	 after	 the	
Kurdish	Initiative,	the	Turkish	government	allowed	election	campaigning	to	be	made	in	
Kurdish	and	languages	other	than	Turkish.	Furthermore,	Kurdish	language	started	to	be	
offered	 as	 an	 elective	 course	 unit	 at	 universities	 and	 in	 public	 schools	 (Hürriyet	 Daily	
News,	2010a).	Kurdish	people	started	to	feel	the	change	in	their	daily	lives	as	well.	For	




Having	said	 that,	even	though	the	 findings	of	 recent	studies	clearly	confirm	that	 there	
has	been	a	significant	improvement	on	Kurdish	people’s	rights,	they	also	point	out	that	
there	 is	 still	 a	 number	 of	 crucial	 reforms	 needed	 to	 improve	 rights.	 For	 example,	 the	
reforms	 implemented	 in	 the	 field	 of	 education	 within	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 Kurdish	
initiative	remained	superficial,	such	as	the	abolition	of	the	Student	Pledge/Oath,	or	the	
making	 of	 Kurdish	 as	 an	 elective	 course	 unit	 in	 public	 schools,	 and	 allowing	 mother	




first	 private	 primary	 school	 Ferzad	 Kemanger	 opened	 in	 a	 district	 of	 Diyarbakır	 to	




claimed	as	 requirements	 for	a	 school	 to	operate	are	missing	 in	most	of	public	 schools	
across	 Turkey	 (Al	 Jazeera	 Turk,	 2014,	 Al	 Jazeera	 Turk,	 2015).	 Even	 though	 the	 Ferzad	
Kemanger	primary	school	still	continues	to	provide	Kurdish	mother	tongue	education,	it	
is	not	yet	recognised	by	the	Ministry	of	National	Education,	making	certificates	issued	by	
them	 illegal,	 something	which	discourages	parents	 from	sending	 their	 children	 to	 that	
school.	Thus,	this	experience	actually	 implies	that	although	the	reform	seemed	to	be	a	
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big	 step	 forward,	 the	MoNE	seems	 to	deliberately	hinder	attempts	 to	provide	Kurdish	
mother	tongue	education	even	in	private	schools.	
	
The	 abovementioned	 discussion,	 therefore,	 shows	 that	 one	 of	 the	 most	 serious	
problems	 Kurdish	 people	 face	 in	 today’s	 Turkey	 is	 obviously	 in	 the	 field	 of	 education.	
There	 is	 a	 need	 for	 a	 radical	 overhaul	 of	 the	 ideological	 structure	 of	 the	 Turkish	
educational	 system,	 changes	 to	 mother	 tongue	 education	 in	 languages	 other	 than	
Turkish	in	public	schools,	and	revision	to	the	existing	curriculum	and	textbooks,	among	
others.	This	thesis,	therefore,	seeks	to	reflect	Turkish	and	Kurdish	teachers’	perceptions	
on	 how	 the	 experiences	 of	 their	 Kurdish	 students	 in	 public	 schools	 affect	 them,	 and	
what	are	the	implications	of	this?	Furthermore,	it	also	tries	to	discuss	what	is	wrong	with	
the	educational	system	in	terms	of	its	exclusion	of	minority	groups,	and	what	should	be	












Turkey	 by	 39.3%	 of	 the	 participants,	 which	 even	 comes	 before	 the	 problem	 of	
unemployment	 (16.3%)	 something	 which	 had	 always	 occupied	 the	 first	 rank	 in	 the	
previous	 surveys	 and	 the	 last	 four	 consecutive	 years.	 Still,	 5.2%	 of	 the	 participants	
thought	that	the	Kurdish	Question	is	the	biggest	problem	in	Turkey.	Based	on	this	data,	
it	 could	be	argued	that	44.5%	of	 the	participants	considered	 the	Kurdish	Question	 the	
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these	 issues	 in	 mind,	 this	 research,	 therefore,	 aims	 at	 exploring	 the	 relationship	
between	 the	 Turkish	 national	 education	 and	 the	 Kurdish	 Question.	 This	 is	 because	 I	
strongly	 believe	 that	 offering	 an	 educational	 insight	 into	 the	 –both	 academic	 and	
political-	 debates	 of	 the	 Kurdish	 Question	 might	 contribute	 to	 the	 solution	 efforts	
greatly.	This	is	definitely	a	key	to	the	solution	of	many	issues	that	are	similar	to	that	of	
the	Kurdish	Question,	such	as	the	issues	affecting	the	Alevi	and	Roma	people,	and	non-







Kurdish	 pupils	 are	 examined	 in	 this	 thesis.	 Furthermore,	 an	 in-depth	 analysis	 of	 two	
different	versions	of	the	History	of	the	Turkish	Revolution	and	Kemalism	textbook	taught	
in	primary	and	middle	schools	(compulsory	education)	in	all	Turkish	public	schools	is	also	
conducted	 in	 a	 separate	 chapter,	 along	 with	 the	 examination	 of	 current	 policy	
documents	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 the	 issue	 better,	 because	 “information	 and	 values	
that	 fall	 in	 line	 with	 the	 official	 ideology	 adopted	 and	 legitimized	 by	 the	 political	
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government	are	 transferred	and	 re-produced”	 through	 textbooks	 (İnal,	2004:	11).	This	












3.	 What	 do	 teachers	 think	 about	 the	 Kurdish	 Question,	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 nationalist	
Kemalist	 educational	 system	 on	 the	 Kurds,	 and	 how	 do	 they	 respond	 to	 these	 in	
practice?		
	
This	 research	 is	 a	 case	 study.	 In	 order	 to	 conduct	 the	 research,	 Turkish	 and	 Kurdish	
teachers	from	twelve	Kurdish-inhabited	provinces	of	the	east	and	southeast	regions	of	
Turkey	 were	 interviewed.	 The	 interviews	 with	 both	 the	 Turkish	 and	 Kurdish	 teachers	
coming	from	different	social	and	political	background	enabled	the	researcher	to	be	able	
to	 realise	 both	 the	 seriousness	 of	 the	 existing	 problems	 and	 the	 implications	 of	 such	
issues	 for	 both	 academic	 and	 political	 debates.	 The	 research,	 however,	 has	 some	




the	 data	 was	 collected	 from	 specific	 provinces	 that	 are	 located	 in	 eastern	 and	
southeastern	regions	of	Turkey,	one	of	the	first	issues	in	using	this	method	relates	to	the	








teachers	 and	 the	 results	 produced	 by	 this	 research	 are	 based	 on	 educational	 issues.	
Therefore,	even	though	the	political	side	of	the	issue	is	mentioned	in	different	chapters,	





in	mind,	 although	pupils’	 experiences	 and	difficulties/challenges	 are	mentioned	 in	 the	








First,	 in	 this	 thesis,	Kemalist	national	education	 is	 critically	examined	 for	 the	 first	 time	
with	 a	 particular	 focus	 on	 the	 Kemalist	 and	 nationalist	 characteristics	 of	 the	 Turkish	
educational	system	and	the	critical	analysis	of	textbooks	taught	in	Turkish	schools.	
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Second,	 the	 results	 of	 this	 thesis	 are	 based	 upon	 teachers’	 opinions,	 who	 live	 in	 the	
Kurdish	 inhabited	provinces	 that	 are	 located	 in	 the	east	 and	 southeast	of	 Turkey,	 and	
who	come	from	different	social,	cultural,	and	political	backgrounds.	This	is	expected	to	
help	 the	 researchers/politicians	understand	 the	problems	and	struggles	of	 the	Kurdish	
people	better.	
	
Finally,	 as	 this	 thesis	 examines	 Turkey’s	 Kurdish	 question	 from	 an	 educational	













both	 state	 discourse	 and	 in	 the	 educational	 system,	 and	 as	 a	 result,	 I	 was	 greatly	
affected	by	this.	For	example,	by	way	of	an	anecdote,	when	my	family	members	used	to	
ask	 me	 the	 question,	 “who	 is	 the	 mother	 of	 the	 Prophet	 Muhammad?”,	 I	 always	
hesitated	to	answer	in	the	first	instance,	because	two	names	used	to	come	to	my	mind:	
“Is	 it	 Zübeyde	or	Âmine?”	 (Zübeyde	was	Mustafa	Kemal	Atatürk’s	mother).	 Thus,	 as	 a	
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Second,	in	university	I	studied	for	a	course	in	‘Social	Science	Education’,	and	some	of	the	
core	 subjects	 included	 history	 and	 ‘History	 of	 the	 Turkish	 Revolution	 and	 Kemalism’.	
Therefore,	 I	 had	 to	 study	 these	 courses	 in-depth	at	university	 too,	which	was	not	 any	
different	from	my	primary	school	experience.	 In	my	final	year,	 I	had	to	teach	6th	grade	
students	 in	 a	middle	 school	 in	 the	Akçaaabat	district	of	 Trabzon	province	as	 a	 trainee	
teacher.	Even	though	all	of	my	students	were	homogenously	Turkish,	I	had	a	chance	to	
observe	the	effects	of	the	nationalist	themes	and	the	Kemalist	ideology	on	pupils,	which	









on	 Kurdish	 pupils’	 education,	 their	 daily	 life	 practices	 and	 their	 culture,	 are	 worth	
investigating	more	deeply	in	a	future	research	project.	This	was	one	of	the	reasons	why	I	




The	 Turkish	 government	 had	 introduced	 the	 Kurdish	 initiative	 along	with	many	 other	
initiatives	aimed	at	resolving	issues	with	minority	groups	in	the	country.	Official	talks	as	
part	of	the	peace	process	between	the	PKK	insurgents,	the	imprisoned	leader	of	the	PKK,	
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Finally,	 considering	 all	 the	 above-mentioned	 reasons,	 there	 was	 one	 final	 reason	
motivation	 for	 me	 to	 conduct	 this	 research,	 which	 was	 the	 ease	 of	









posed	 in	 the	 research,	 the	 research	 questions,	 the	 limitations	 of	 the	 research,	 and	
personal	motivations	making	this	research	possible	are	outlined	and	discussed.	Chapter	
2	reviews	the	literature	regarding	the	relationship	between	nationalism	and	education	in	
general	 by	 looking	 at	 examples	 from	 different	 countries	 in	 the	 world,	 and	 then	
highlighting	 the	status	of	 the	existing	Turkish	educational	 system	and	 its	 issues.	 In	 the	
third	chapter,	Turkish	and	Kurdish	nationalism	are	thoroughly	discussed	via	a	historical	
overview	 of	 both	 kinds	 of	 nationalisms,	 along	 with	 the	 examination	 of	 the	 national	
ideology	 of	 Kemalism	 and	 Kurdish	Question	 in	 today’s	 Turkey.	 Chapter	 4	 outlines	 the	
theoretical	 framework	 and	 the	methodology	 used	 in	 this	 research,	 touching	 upon	 the	
issues	 relating	 to	method,	 the	data	 collection	process	 and	 the	 research	design.	 In	 the	
fifth	chapter,	the	textbooks	the	‘History	of	the	Turkish	Revolution	and	Kemalism’	for	8th	
and	11th	grades	are	analysed.	Chapter	6,	7	and	8	are	based	upon	the	empirical	data	of	
this	 research	 providing	 unique	 findings	 generated	 from	 the	 fieldwork.	 Chapter	 6	
explores	Turkey’s	Kurdish	Question	and	related	topics,	such	as	the	peace	process,	from	
the	teachers’	perspectives.	 In	the	seventh	chapter,	the	relevant	educational	 issues	and	
linguistic	 issues	are	 scrutinised	by	 looking	at	pupils’	 experiences	based	upon	 teachers’	
observations.	 Chapter	 8	 queries	 both	 the	 domination	 of	 the	 Kemalist	 ideology	 in	
education	and	 the	 implications	of	 this	domination	on	Kurdish	pupils.	 Lastly,	Chapter	9	
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reviews	 the	 main	 findings	 of	 the	 research	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 research	 questions,	 and	












of	 all,	 it	 shows	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 nationalism	 persists,	 and	 remains	 a	 powerful	
phenomenon	 in	 today’s	world	despite	predictions	made	earlier	 in	 the	1990s	 about	 its	
demise.	Secondly,	it	gives	a	brief	overview	of	how	‘nation’	and	‘nationalism’	have	been	




whether	 a	 national	 education	 is	 positive	 or	 negative	 in	 terms	of	 national	 cohesion.	 In	
doing	so,	this	chapter	will	argue	that	education	is	 in	fact	an	instrument	used	by	nation	
states	 to	 facilitate	 nationalism	 within	 their	 geographical	 borders,	 and	 that	 education	
becomes	 the	 ‘sector’	 wherein	 nationalist	 and	 assimilationist	 policies	 are	 conducted.	
Turkey	 represents	 one	 of	 the	 examples	 where	 this	 process	 was	 most	 pervasive.	 This	
process	 here	 created	 some	 unfortunate	 and	 serious	 issues	 among	 different	 ethnic	
groups,	 threatening	 national	 cohesion,	 and	 thus	 the	 peace	 between	 different	 ethnic	
groups	 in	 the	 state.	 In	 order	 to	 support	 this	 view,	 other	 examples	 are	 given	 from	
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2.2.1.	Does	nationalism	still	persist?	
	
It	 is	 not	 impossible	 that	 nationalism	 will	 decline	 with	 the	 decline	 of	 the	
nation-state,	without	which	being	English	or	Irish	or	Jewish,	or	a	combination	
of	these,	is	only	one	way	in	which	people	describe	their	identity	among	many	
others	 which	 they	 use	 for	 this	 purpose,	 as	 occasion	 demands.	 It	 would	 be	
absurd	to	claim	that	this	day	is	already	near.	However,	 I	hope	it	can	at	 least	
be	envisaged.	After	all,	the	very	fact	that	historians	are	at	least	beginning	to	
make	 some	 progress	 in	 the	 study	 and	 analysis	 of	 nations	 and	 nationalism	
suggests	 that,	 as	 so	 often,	 the	 phenomenon	 is	 past	 its	 peak.	 The	 owl	 of	




lose	 its	 popularity	 in	 the	 future,	 and	 the	 sense	 of	 identity	would	 evolve	 and	 become	
more	 globalised	 with	 the	 decline	 of	 the	 nation-state.	 He	 was	 not	 alone	 in	 this	 view.	
Appadurai	 (1996),	 for	 instance,	 also	 claimed	 that	 the	 concept	of	nation-state	was	 in	a	
serious	 crisis,	 because,	 for	 him,	 intensifying	 international	 relations	 would	 definitely	
affect	 the	nation-state	 in	a	negative	way	and	this	would	 finally	 result	 in	 the	demise	of	
the	nation-state.	Likewise,	Bauman	(1990)	expected	that	one	of	the	changes	that	might	
be	 seen	 in	 the	 future	 was	 the	 ‘denationalisation	 of	 the	 state’.	 He	 claimed	 that	 this	
process	is	similar	to	the	process	of	separation	between	religion	(the	church)	and	state.	
Rosenbaum	and	Staiger	used	a	new	phrase	called	homogenisation	in	order	to	illustrate	
the	decline	of	national	 initiatives.	They	exemplified	 this	by	pointing	out	 the	 increasing	
popularity	 of	 the	 international	 film	 industry	 and	 showing	 how	 it	 dominated	 other	
national	film	industries	throughout	the	world,	damaging	nation-states	(Williams,	2012).	
Furthermore,	 as	 stated	 by	 Zuelow	 et	 al.	 (2007),	 the	 ideas	 of	 ‘Coca-Colonisation’	 and	
‘McDonaldisation’	 also	 illustrate	 the	 dominance	 of	 a	 globalised	 culture	 over	 nations,	
creating	a	sort	of	a	global	culture	which	has	the	potential	to	negatively	impact	national	
cultures.	With	 all	 this	 in	mind,	 these	 writers/thinkers	 unanimously	 foresaw	 the	 same	
end,	claiming	that	the	nation-state	was	on	the	verge	of	decline	in	terms	of	its	power.	
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Despite	 all	 these	 pronouncements,	 a	 number	 of	 credible	 examples	 do	 show	 that	
nationalism	persists,	 and	 it	 is	 still	 one	of	 the	most	 influential	 political	 forces	 in	world-
politics	 today.	As	mentioned	by	 Ferguson	 (2012),	 even	 though	globalisation	has	made	
countries	more	integrated	with	each	other,	and	that	this	has	culminated	in	the	decline	




the	 June	2011	elections,	 receiving	13	percent	of	 the	vote.	Meanwhile,	 the	pro-Kurdish	
national	 political	 movement	 named	 the	 Peace	 and	 Democracy	 Party	 4	 (Barış	 ve	
Demokrasi	 Partisi,	 BDP)	 received	 seven	 percent	 of	 the	 vote,	 which	 enabled	 them	 to	
enter	the	Turkish	Parliament	with	36	seats.	Both	of	these	parties	represent	completely	
opposite	 nationalist	 ideologies	 in	 Parliament.	 An	 example	 of	 the	 antagonism	between	
these	parties	can	be	seen	in	the	example	of	Şerafettin	Elçi,	a	Kurdish	MP,	who	died	on	26	









despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 group	 rejects	 these	 claims.	 The	 following	 examples	may	 be	
given	to	support	these	views.	First,	the	official	symbol	of	Golden	Dawn	is	similar	to	the	
one	that	has	been	associated	with	Nazism,	created	by	Adolf	Hitler	himself.	Second,	Nikos	
Mihaloliakos,	 leader	of	Golden	Dawn,	said	 that	“We	will	 take	 Istanbul,	 Izmir	as	well	as	
the	Black	Sea	back”	during	an	election	meeting	in	the	Greek	city	of	Thessaloniki	in	2012	
                                            
4		 Predecessor	of	the	“People’s	Democratic	Party”	(Halkların	Demokratik	Partisi,	HDP).	
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(Hürriyet	Daily	News,	2012b).	 This	 statement	 indicates	a	degree	of	nationalist	 feelings	
which	enables	a	person	to	become	aggressive	and	offensive.	
	
Furthermore,	 recent	 research	 carried	 out	 by	 the	 British	 think	 tank	Demos	 shows	 that	
nationalist	 ideology	 is	 on	 the	 rise	 across	 Europe	 even	 among	 young	 people	 who	 are	
increasingly	part	of	anti-immigrant	groups	(Bartlett	et	al.,	2011).	The	main	focus	of	the	
research	was	 the	 attitudes	 of	 the	 supporters	 of	 nationalist	 parties	 and	movements	 in	
social	media.	 The	 results	 have	 indicated	 that	 a	 significant	 number	 of	 participants	 are	
deeply	concerned	about	the	presence	of	immigrants	in	their	countries	and	the	growth	of	
Islam	in	Europe,	and	they	express	these	feelings	in	social	media,	especially	on	Facebook,	
writing	 things,	 posting	 photos	 and	 promoting	 populism	 (Bartlett	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 Emine	
Bozkurt,	a	Dutch	politician	and	a	Member	of	the	European	Parliament	said	“In	five	years’	
time	we	will…	see	an	 increase	 in	the	forces	of	hatred	and	division	 in	society,	 including	
ultra-nationalism,	 xenophobia,	 Islamophobia	 and	 anti-Semitism”	 (Guardian,	 2011).	
Likewise,	Gavan	Titley,	co-author	of	the	book	The	Crises	of	Multiculturalism,	has	argued	
that	 “Over	 the	 past	 decade,	 Muslim	 populations	 around	 Europe,	 whatever	 their	
backgrounds,	 have	 been	 represented	 as	 the	 enemy	 within	 or	 at	 least	 as	 legitimately	
under	 suspicion.	 It	 is	 this	 very	mainstream	political	 repertoire	 that	 newer	movements	
have	appropriated”	(ibid).	A	far-right	English	street	protest	movement	called	the	‘English	
Defence	League’	 is	also	another	extremist	group	promoting	nationalist	 ideas,	opposing	
the	 religion	of	 Islam	 in	 the	United	Kingdom	and	 feeding	 Islamophobia	 among	 fanatics	
(Garland	and	Treadwell,	2012).	What	these	examples	clearly	indicate	is	that	the	idea	of	
nationalism	 not	 only	 continues	 to	 dominate	 politics,	 but	 that	 voters	 too,	 thus	 the	
entirety	of	social	life	in	today’s	world.	
	









Etymologically,	 the	 word	 ‘nation’	 comes	 from	 an	 old	 French	 word	 “nacion”	 which	
originally	 stems	 from	 the	 Latin	 word	 “natio”	 meaning	 “that	 which	 has	 been	 born”	
(Darighgoftar,	2012:	447).	Otto	Bauer	defined	the	nation	as	“the	totality	of	people	who	
are	united	by	a	common	fate	so	that	they	possess	a	common	(national)	character.	The	
common	 fate	 is	 primarily	 a	 common	 history;	 the	 common	 national	 character	 involves	
almost	necessarily	a	uniformity	of	language”	(cited	in	Davis,	1967:	150).	Alternatively,	it	
was	defined	by	Joseph	Stalin	as	“an	historically	evolved,	stable	community	of	language,	
territory,	 economic	 life,	 and	 psychological	 makeup	 manifested	 in	 a	 community	 of	
culture”	 (ibid.,	 p.	 163).	 Stalin	 added	 another	 point	 by	 saying	 that	 “nationality	 is	 not	 a	
racial	 or	 tribal	 phenomenon”	 (Bottomore,	 1983:	 344).	 Likewise,	 Guibarneu	 (1996:	 46)	
has	defined	the	nation	as	“a	human	group	conscious	of	forming	a	community,	sharing	a	
common	culture,	attached	to	a	clearly	demarcated	and	claiming	the	right	to	rule	itself”.	
However,	 Tamir	 (1995:	 424)	 criticises	 some	 of	 these	 definitions	 for	 mixing	 together	
“reasons	for	the	emergence	of	a	nation	(a	shared	historic	territory,	a	common	economy,	
and	a	common	legal	system)	with	the	results	(sharing	myths	and	historical	memories)”.	
Above	 all,	 Anderson’s	 (1991:	 6)	 definition	 would	 better	 match	 what	 is	 experienced	
today:	“an	 imagined	political	 community,	and	 imagined	as	both	 inherently	 limited	and	
sovereign”.	
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The	nation-state	here	is	a	significant	term	which	played	an	unavoidable	role	in	defining,	
thereby	 constructing	 the	 ‘national	 identity’	 within	 its	 official	 borders.	 Held	 (2000)	






Even	 though	 the	 term	 ‘nationalism’	 has	 several	 meanings,	 two	 basic	 phenomena	 are	
generally	 meant	 once	 it	 is	 used.	 The	 first	 one	 is	 that	 the	 common	 attitude	 of	 the	
members	of	a	nation,	which	creates	a	sense	of	 ‘national	 identity’,	whereas	the	second	
one	 is	 the	 actions	 taken	by	 the	members	of	 a	 nation	 in	order	 to	 achieve	 a	particular,	
‘national’	 goal.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 generally	 speaking,	 being	 a	 member	 of	 a	 nation	 is	











Nonetheless,	 some	 scholars	 criticise	 what	 they	 call	 ‘the	 loose	 use	 of	 the	 term	
nationalism’	 by	 pointing	 out	 that	 equating	 nationalism	 with	 ethnic	 politics	 is	
unacceptable.	 For	 example,	 Richmond	 (1987:	 5)	 claimed	 that	 “the	 politicisation	 of	
ethnicity	is	not	the	same	thing	as	ethnic	nationalism	although	it	may	lead	to	it	where	a	
historical	claim	to	a	particular	territory	can	be	established”.	Having	said	that,	while	doing	
research	 on	 dynamic	 political	 concepts	 like	 nationalism,	 it	 would	 actually	 be	 very	
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therefore	 adopts	 a	 critical	 approach	 to	 ‘nationalism’,	 considering	 ‘nations’	 as	 artificial	
modern	phenomena	generally	constructed	by	nationalists	and	states;	and	‘nationalism’	
as	 a	 phenomenon	 constructed	 and	 used	 by	 nation-states	 and	 nationalists	 as	 an	
instrument	for	their	own	sakes.	This	approach	is	based	upon	the	‘state-led	nationalism’	
model	 in	which	 nationalism	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 linked	 to	 nation-building	 and	modern	
state	 formation	 processes.	 In	 this	 regard,	 cultural	 homogenisation	 and	 linguistic	
uniformity	 are	 regarded	 as	 essential	 phenomena	 by	 nation-states,	 as	 the	 former	 is	
believed	to	make	citizens	more	loyal	and	devoted,	and	the	latter	is	considered	to	make	
the	 management	 of	 the	 state	 easier	 (Tilly,	 1994).	 In	 order	 to	 legitimise	 this	 new	
situation,	 “state-builders	attempt	 to	erode	 the	base	of	peripheral	nations	by	 fostering	
cultural	homogeneity	through	public	education	and	other	policies”	(Hechter,	2001:	28).	
Likewise,	 Castiglione	 and	 Longman	 (2007)	 also	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 notion	 of	
homogenisation/uniformity	 	 is	 being	 imposed	 on	 citizens	 through	 “education,	military	
service,	and	national	language”	(p.	199).	In	this	case	what	is	being	imposed	on	citizens	–
in	most	 cases-	 	 is	 the	 idea	 of	 ‘loyalty’	 and	 even	 ‘patriotism’,	 as	 stated	 by	 Hobsbawm	
(1989):	
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The	 state	 not	 only	made	 the	 nation,	 but	 needed	 to	make	 the	
nation.	Governments	now	reached	down	directly	to	each	citizen	
in	 their	 territory	 in	 everyday	 life	 through	 modest	 but	





Apart	 from	 the	 notion	 of	 cultural	 homogenisation,	 as	 Orman	 (2008)	 noted,	 linguistic	
uniformity	is	also	considered	to	be	a	prerequisite	for	the	formation	of	‘national	unity’.	In	
this	 case,	 the	 state	 promotes	 ‘single	 official	 language’,	 and	 deliberately	 ignores	 the	





and	 nationalism,	 and	 criticisms	 of	 both	 these	 concepts,	 the	 following	 section	 aims	 at	






important.	 There	 cannot	 be	 a	 firmly	 established	 political	 state	
unless	 there	 is	 a	 teaching	 body	 with	 definitely-recognised	
principles.	If	the	child	is	not	taught	from	infancy	that	he	ought	to	
be	a	republican	or	a	monarchist,	a	Catholic	or	a	free-thinker,	the	
state	will	 not	 constitute	 a	 nation;	 it	will	 rest	 on	 uncertain	 and	
shifting	 foundations;	 and	 it	 will	 be	 constantly	 exposed	 to	
disorder	 and	 change	 (Napoleon	 Bonaparte,	 cited	 in	 Reisner,	
1922:	35).	
	






and	 prominence	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 Philosophy	 of	 Enlightenment.	 With	 the	
unprecedented	change	at	the	time,	the	role	of	education	changed	after	the	18th	century,	
since	 one	 of	 the	 main	 outcomes	 of	 both	 the	 Philosophy	 of	 Enlightenment	 and	 the	
Industrial	Revolution	was	the	rise	of	the	nation-state.	Nationalism	began	to	be	reflected	
in	 the	 curricula	 of	 schools,	 and	 schools	 have	 since	 become	 one	 of	 the	 key	 state	
institutions	 facilitating	 nationalist	 projects,	 because,	 in	 most	 cases,	 the	 nation-state	
centralised	many	 institutions	such	as	schools	 in	the	name	of	achieving	the	major	goals	
set	 by	 the	 state	 itself.	 This	 irony,	 however,	 might	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
nation-state	is	itself	a	type	of	authoritarian	character.	
	
Robinson	 (2010)	 also	 stated	 that	 current	 educational	 systems	 across	 the	 world	 are	
primarily	 based	upon	 the	principles	of	 the	Philosophy	of	 Enlightenment	 and	 that	 they	
were	also	conceived	within	the	economic	circumstances	of	the	Industrial	Revolution.	He	
goes	 on	 to	 argue	 that	 almost	 every	 country	 in	 the	modern	 (or	 postmodern)	 world	 is	
presently	 trying	 to	 find	 the	most	efficient	way	of	educating	 their	children	so	 that	 they	
have	a	sense	of	cultural	and/or	national	 identity.	Similarly,	Green	(1997a)	claimed	that	
children	 are	 educated	 in	 accordance	 with	 nation	 building	 policies	 in	 most	 countries.	
These	are	because	“education	is,	by	definition,	the	space	for	the	construction	of	national	
identity”	 (Novoa,	 2000:	 46).	 It	 could	 therefore	 be	 concluded	 that	 the	 idea	 of	 nation	
building	 which	 enables	 a	 dominant	 culture	 to	 become	 a	 hegemonic	 and/or	
assimilationist	one	still	plays	an	 important	role	 in	educational	policy-making	processes.	
Hence,	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 this	 process,	 I	 shall	 now	 look	 at	 the	 foundations	 of	
national	educational	systems	and	look	at	the	theories	underpinning	these	systems.	
	
The	 foundational	 theories	 of	 existing	 national	 educational	 systems	 were	 highly	
dependent	on	particularly	renowned	intellectuals	such	as	Rousseau,	Herder,	Condorcet,	
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and	Fichte	whose	 ideas	are	still	 reflected	within	educational	systems	across	 the	globe.	
For	instance,	the	most	influential	of	these,	Jean	Jacque	Rousseau	and	Gottfried	Herder,	
both	 regarded	 education	 as	 a	 significant	 tool	 for	 creating	 a	 common	national	 identity	
(Barnard,	 1988,	Wiborg,	 2000).	 Nevertheless,	 what	 they	meant	 by	 the	 term	 ‘national	
identity’	 was	 not	 the	 same.	 Rousseau’s	 view	 of	 national	 identity	 represents	 political	
nationalism,	 relating	 national	 identity	 to	 a	 nation-state,	 whereas	 Herder’s	 view	 of	
national	 identity	 represents	cultural	nationalism,	 reflecting	cultural	aspects	of	national	




It	 could	 be	 claimed	 that	 states	 reproduce	 national	 narratives	 through	 institutions	 and	
policies	 in	 today’s	world.	 Foreign	policy,	 for	example,	 is	one	of	 the	 indicators	 showing	
how	nationalism	 is	perceived	by	the	state	 itself.	 In	addition	to	this,	 the	policy	 towards	
minorities	and/or	refugees,	asylum	seekers	is	another	key	indicator	showing	how	other	
ethnic	 groups	 are	 treated	 by	 the	 state.	 However,	 above	 all	 else,	 one	 of	 the	 most	
significant	 indicators	 is,	 of	 course,	 the	 educational	 policy	 of	 the	 state.	 This	 is	 partly	
because	of	the	fact	that	politicians	are	involved	in	educational	policy-making	processes.	
As	a	matter	of	 fact,	 aims	and	objectives	of	 education	are	determined	by	politicians	 in	
compliance	with	the	general	policies	of	the	state	(Gellner,	1983,	Anderson,	1991);	and,	
of	 course,	 it	 cannot	 be	 ignored	 that,	 from	a	 government’s	 perspective,	 education	 is	 a	
vital	instrument	which	could	not	be	left	to	the	mercy	of	anyone	other	than	themselves.	
Needless	 to	 say,	 education	 is	 being	 centralised	 and	 politicised	 as	 a	 result	 of	 this	
processes.	Furthermore,	in	these	circumstances,	the	presence	of	ideology	which	comes	
to	 dominate	 education	 becomes	more	 visible.	 Hence,	 to	 put	 it	 more	 simply,	 it	 could	
conceivably	 be	 hypothesised	 that	 education	 is	 a	 key	 sector	 which	 reflects	 the	 main	
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Moreover,	 Rousseau	 (1996a)	 believed	 that	 the	 institutions	 of	 the	 state	 (including	
schools)	ought	to	be	used	as	 instruments	 for	developing	a	common	national	character	
among	 people.	 He	 argued	 that	 there	 has	 to	 be	 a	 political	 culture	 which	 should	 not	
dominate	 only	 education,	 but	 also	 religion,	 military	 and	 even	 festivals	 in	 order	 to	









their	 tastes	 and	 their	 opinions,	 till	 they	 are	 patriotic	 by	












There	 can	 be	 no	 patriotism	without	 liberty,	 no	 liberty	without	
virtue,	no	virtue	without	citizens;	create	citizens,	and	you	have	
everything	 you	 need;	 without	 them,	 you	 have	 nothing	 but	
debased	 slaves,	 from	 rulers	 of	 the	 State	 downwards.	 To	 form	
citizens	is	not	the	work	of	the	day;	and	in	order	to	have	men	it	is	
necessary	 to	 educate	 them	when	 they	 are	 children	 (Rousseau,	
1996a:	147).	
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Rousseau’s	 suggestions	 regarding	 sustaining	 citizenship	 had	 some	 other	 interesting	
consequences,	 too.	 For	 instance,	 he	 suggested	 that	 subjects	 such	 as	 history	 and	








the	 ‘state-building’	 process.	 Among	 the	 two	 phenomena,	 especially,	 ‘national	
history/historiography’	 has	 usually	 been	 used	 by	 nation-states	 for	 nation-building	
policies	(Smith,	2001).	
	
Overall,	 Rousseau’s	 writing	 on	 patriotic	 education	 had	 a	 big	 effect	 in	 the	 following	
decades	 and	 has	 retained	 a	 huge	 impact	 on	 many	 educational	 systems	 to	 this	 day.	
However,	some	thinkers	such	as	Cardiff	(1996)	have	challenged	Rousseau’s	claim	on	the	
grounds	 that	his	writings/thoughts	 rely	 too	heavily	upon	the	 idea	of	having	a	patriotic	
state,	ranging	from	education	to	politics;	all	of	these	features	reflect	a	rather	totalitarian	
state,	according	to	these	scholars.	Cardiff	has	also	stated	that	the	concept	of	compulsory	





they	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 material	 has	 been	 sufficiently	
implanted.	 This	 method	 of	 ‘compulsory	 education’	 meets	 my	
dictionary’s	 definition	 of	 brainwashing.	 Whether	 the	 material	
‘taught’	is	based	on	liberal,	conservative,	religious,	communistic,	
democratic,	or	fascist	ideologies,	the	government	school	system	
method	 of	 delivery	 is	 founded	 on	 compulsion,	 coercion,	 force	
(p.	1).	
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Apart	from	the	term	political	nationalism	formulated	by	Rousseau,	the	other	important	
formulation	 which	 needs	 to	 be	 understood	 in	 order	 to	 fully	 grasp	 the	 relationship	
between	nationalism	and	education	in	today’s	world	is	the	idea	of	cultural	nationalism	
formulated	by	Herder.	Unlike	Rousseau,	Herder	(1969b)	pointed	out	that	governments	












on	 their	 intellectual	 abilities	 and	 thus	 using	 education	 as	 a	 sort	 of	 ‘glue’	 between	 the	
nation	and	state.	Furthermore,	they	both	agreed	that	an	educational	system	should,	in	
many	ways,	be	patriotic.	The	only	difference	between	Rousseau	and	Herder,	however,	
was	 their	 purpose.	 In	 brief,	 the	 major	 aim	 of	 Rousseau’s	 educational	 system	 was	 to	
create	a	nationalist,	while	the	main	purpose	of	Herder’s	system	was	to	support	the	‘pre-
existing	 national	 sense’	 in	 a	 person.	 The	 practices	 of	 nation-states	 in	 today’s	 world	
indicate	 that	both	Rousseau’s	and	Herder’s	 views	have	been	 taken	 into	consideration,	






recognised	 qualified	 teachers)	 and,	 of	 course,	 one	 specific	 (official)	 language	 with	 a	
standardised,	sophisticated	schooling	system	throughout	the	country.	As	pointed	out	by	
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Usher	and	Edwards	(1994),	one	of	the	possible	implications	of	this	is	that	governments	
manipulate	 this	 system	 in	 order	 that	 obedient,	 law-abiding	 citizens	 are	 produced	 in	
schools.	This	results	in	shaping	students’	personality,	making	them	similar,	squandering	
their	 creative	 capabilities	 as	 was	 beautifully	 illustrated	 in	 Pink	 Floyd’s	 (1979)	 single	
Another	Brick	in	the	Wall.	5	One	of	the	serious	issues	emerging	from	this	is	that	such	a	
system	automatically	 leads	 to	 the	homogenisation	of	 the	culture	within	 the	state,	and	
inevitably	affects	minorities	in	a	negative	way.	Therefore,	one	question	that	needs	to	be	




be	 educated	 with	 reference	 to	 minority	 ethnic	 and	 cultural	 identities	 as	 a	 threat	 to	
national	unity	and	cohesion	(see	Barry,	2001).	There	emerges	a	fear	among	the	majority	
ethnic	community	that	the	sense	of	national	belonging	cannot	flourish	under	any	other	
circumstance	 (Banks,	 2008).	 With	 this	 view,	 national	 education,	 with	 a	 national	
curriculum,	may	pose	problems	 for	a	multicultural	 society	 in	 terms	of	 failing	 to	 reflect	
the	 diversity	 of	 citizens	 coming	 from	 other	 ethnic	 backgrounds;	 this	 is	 all	 the	 more	
problematic	for,	a	democratic	state,	where	the	idea	of	providing	equal	opportunities	for	
all	ethnic	groups	is	considered	an	important	value	(Gutmann,	2004).	For	minority	ethnic	
communities,	 the	 forceful	 imposition	 of	 unitary	 and	 uniformed	 national	







either	 an	 individual	 or	 a	member	of	 a	 group	untenable.	 Rather	 than	 seeing	
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the	choice	as	either/or,	the	citizen	of	the	nation-state	operates	in	the	realism	
of	 both/and.	 She	 is	 both	 an	 individual	who	 is	 entitled	 to	 citizen	 rights	 that	
permit	one	to	legally	challenge	infringement	of	those	rights	[and	one	who	is]	
acting	 as	 a	member	 of	 a	 group…	People	move	 back	 and	 forth	 across	many	





in	 society.	 This	 is	 because,	 by	 taking	 a	 patriotic	 approach,	 one	 particular	 identity	
becomes	 hegemonic,	 and	 this	 system	 forces	 all	 people	 to	 adapt	 to	 that	 particular	
identity	 (the	 ‘official’	 identity	 in	most	 cases).	With	 all	 these	 criticisms	 against	 national	
education,	it	is	very	unfortunate	that	this	is	what	is	practised	in	many	states	today.	Thus,	
it	is	important	to	look	at	some	credible	examples.	However,	before	looking	at	these,	the	







from	 each	 other,	 since	 these	 institutions	 are	 categorically	 different.	 For	 instance,	
universities	 are	 expected	 to	 have	 academic	 freedom	and	 autonomy	while	 schools	 are	
not	 (Cowen,	 2000).	 Another	 possible	 explanation	 for	 this	 is	 that	 governments	 may	
assume	 that	 students’	 personalities	 are	 already	 shaped	 before	 the	 student	 starts	





case	 of	 Turkey,	 some	 course	 units	 in	 universities	 are	 highly	 questionable,	 too.	 For	
instance,	 the	 compulsory	 module	 “History	 of	 the	 Turkish	 Revolution”	 for	 university	
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students	 views	 history	 from	 the	 nationalist	 perspective	 in	 parallel	 with	 the	 official	
history	thesis	created	in	the	early	years	of	the	Turkish	Republic,	just	as	in	the	case	of	the	
course	unit	“History	of	the	Turkish	Revolution	and	Kemalism”	taught	in	middle	and	high	
schools	 (ortaokul	 ve	 lise).	 As	 an	 example,	 Uysal’s	 (2008)	 research,	 which	 investigated	
how	 the	 national	 ideology	 of	 Kemalism	 is	 perceived	 by	 students	 of	 the	 Middle	 East	
Technical	 University	 (METU)	 (regarded	 as	 one	 of	 the	 most	 prestigious	 universities	 in	
Turkey)	 concluded	 that	 even	 METU	 students	 “who	 believe	 [in]	 modernity	 recognise	
Kemalism	 as	 a	 castle	 against	 [the]	 conservative-nationalist	 values	 of	 the	 rest	 of	 the	
society”.	 Uysal	 also	 stated	 that	 “although	 Kemalism	 contains	 some	 non-democratic	
notions	and	the	application	which	contradicts	current	universal	values,	METU	students	
who	 support	 Kemalism	 ignore	 these	 realities	 and	 continue	 to	 support	 Kemalism	 as	 a	
core	representer	of	modernist	values”	(p.	103).	Even	though	Uysal	cautiously	noted	that	
conducting	 such	 research	 in	 another	 university	 such	 as	 Gazi	 or	 Bilkent	 may	 yield	
different	results,	the	findings	of	the	research	clearly	show	that	even	university	students	
are	 affected	by	 the	national	 ideology	of	 Kemalism,	 and	how	 they	 embrace/internalise	









and	 globalisation	 (Rhea	 and	 Seddon,	 2005).	 Therefore,	 even	many	 countries	 take	 the	
process	 of	 globalisation	 into	 consideration	 in	 their	 educational	 policy-making	
endeavours	 so	 as	 to	 keep	 the	 country	 integrated	 with	 the	 global	 system,	 they	 are	
nonetheless	still	prioritising	nationalist	 ideals	 in	education.	Thus,	the	curricula	of	many	
states	 are	 still	 national	 in	 many	 ways.	 In	 this	 regard,	 perhaps	 the	 most	 serious	
disadvantage	in	such	a	system	is	that	having	this	kind	of	nationalist	policy	in	education	





and	 external	 factors.	 External	 factors	 are	 simply	 the	 results	 of	 the	 processes	 of	
globalisation,	 both	 in	 an	 economic	 and	 cultural	 sense.	As	 highlighted	by	Burbules	 and	
Torres	(2000),	international	organisations	such	as	the	United	Nations	(UN),	the	European	
Union	 (EU)	 and	 the	World	 Bank	 would	 like	 to	 see	 the	 implementation	 of	 some	 new	
educational	 policies	 having	 an	 economic	 rationale,	 which	 forces	 governments	 to	







‘knowledge	 society’	 that	 transcends	 national	 borders	 (Ozga	 and	 Lingard,	 2007).	
Therefore,	 with	 the	 increasing	 power	 of	 ‘global	 culture’	 over	 local/national	 cultures	
within	 nation-states,	 it	 could	 well	 be	 argued	 that	 educational	 systems	 are	 also	 being	
reformed	accordingly	 in	some	cases	 (e.g.	 see	Schissler	and	Soysal,	2005,	Sağlam	et	al.,	
2011);	yet	it	is	also	worth	noting	that	the	effects	of	this	on	national	educational	curricula	
is	 not	 powerful	 enough	 to	 make	 such	 a	 huge	 difference	 in	 some	 countries	 such	 as	
Turkey.	
	
One	of	 the	 examples	 showing	 how	a	 national	 educational	 agenda	may	 end	up	 having	
serious	consequences	is	the	case	of	Hong	Kong.	Tens	of	thousands	protesters	took	to	the	
streets	 to	protest	 the	national	education	curriculum	 in	Hong	Kong	 in	 July	2012,	which	
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dialysis	 if	 they	 are	 sick”	 (Washington	 Post,	 2012).	 This	 could	 be	 considered	 a	 rather	
unfortunate	statement,	but	most	importantly,	the	Hong	Kong	example	clearly	provides	a	
valuable	 lesson:	 education	 is	 still	 viewed	 as	 an	 ideological	 instrument	 to	




government	 is	 already	 dominating	 the	 educational	 system	 in	 China.	 In	 fact,	 China	
specifically	 pursues	 a	 policy	 of	 defaming	Western	 values	 in	 order	 to	 protect	 its	 youth	
from	“Western	propaganda”	 (Guardian,	2015).	Moreover,	even	music	 lessons	 in	public	
schools	 include	 a	 sense	 of	 nationalism/patriotism	 and	 the	 official	 ideology	 of	
Communism	 in	 China.	Moreover,	 Brand	 (2003)	 looked	 at	music	 textbooks	 used	 in	 the	
Chinese	educational	system,	examining	song	lyrics,	and	he	found	out	that	song	lyrics	in	
music	 textbooks	 promote	 the	 idea	 of	 nationalism,	 a	 strong	 work	 ethic,	 unity	 and	
socialism.	In	relation	to	music	education	more	broadly,	one	of	the	most	important	parts	




United	 States.	 Kennedy	 and	 Guerrini	 (2012)	 argued	 that	 the	 teaching	 of	 the	 national	
anthem	 could	 be	 “an	 unhealthy	 type	 of	 patriotism”	 (p.	 21).	 Likewise,	 the	 national	
anthem	is	considered	very	important	in	Turkey,	too.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	for	example,	if	
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one	 does	 not	 stand	 up	 while	 singing	 the	 national	 anthem	 in	 Turkish	 schools,	 where	
students	have	to	sing	the	national	anthem	twice	a	week	(on	Mondays	before	the	classes	
and	 Fridays	 after	 the	 classes),	 it	 is	 very	 likely	 that	 s/he	 might	 be	 punished	 by	 the	
principal.	
	
Schissler	 and	 Soysal’s	 (2005)	 research	 revealed	 that	 the	 Greek	 national	 educational	
system	promotes	the	Greek	 identity	 that	 is	based	on	the	Hellenic	origin,	and	alienates	
others	such	as	the	Ottomans	(Turks)	and	Roman	Catholics.	The	study	showed	that	even	
though	 Greece	 implemented	 required	 reforms	 after	 they	 joined	 the	 EU,	 History	




Hellenic	 identity	 –	 that	 they	 view	 Turkish	 Cypriots	 unfavourably,	 excluding	 and	
discriminating	 them,	using	 the	phrases	such	as	“the	best	Turk	 is	a	dead	Turk”,	 “stupid	
Turk”,	“Cyprus	is	Greek”,	and	“Turks	out	of	Cyprus”	(p.	89).	
	




Hence,	 they	 concluded	 that	 despite	 the	 popularity	 of	 the	 international	 policies	
promoting	the	‘knowledge	economy’	and	‘knowledge	society’	which	should	normally	be	
based	upon	the	notion	of	‘competitiveness’	rather	than	‘competence’,	they	believe	that	











Because	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	 understand	 the	 real	 dynamics	 and	 characteristics	 of	 national	
education	 in	 Turkey	 so	 as	 to	 be	 able	 to	 see	 the	 bigger	 picture	 of	 how	 the	 education	
system	 is	 operating,	 this	 chapter	 thus	 seeks	 to	 examine	 the	 current	 status	 of	 the	





Soon	 after	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 Turkish	 Republic,	 Mustafa	 Kemal	 Atatürk	 and	 his	
colleagues	 embarked	 on	 creating	 a	 new	modern	 and	 secular	 state,	with	many	 radical	
reforms	 implemented	 in	 a	 short	 time.	 Education	was,	unsurprisingly,	 one	of	 the	areas	
that	could	not	be	left	untouched	while	the	new	modern	Turkish	state	was	being	formed.	
In	fact,	it	could	well	be	claimed	that	education	was	given	a	certain	priority	at	the	time,	
because	 one	 of	 the	 very	 first	 laws,	 the	 ‘Unification	 of	 Education’	 (Tevhîd-i	 Tedrîsât	
Kânûnu),	entered	 into	 force	as	part	of	Mustafa	Kemal’s	 revolutionary	 reforms	 in	1924	
only	 one	 year	 after	 the	 Turkish	 Republic	 was	 founded.	 With	 this	 reform,	 madrasas	
(Islamic	educational	 institutions)	were	abolished,	and	all	other	educational	 institutions	
including	 international	 colleges,	 such	 as	 the	 Robert	 College	 in	 Istanbul,	 were	 unified	
under	the	Ministry	of	National	Education.	This,	indeed,	gave	the	Ministry	of	Education	a	
significant	 power	 to	 control	 education	 by	 all	 means.	 Thus,	 it	 could	 be	 said	 that	 the	
Turkish	educational	system	was	not	only	secularised,	but	also	centralised	by	the	Turkish	
state	 (Kaplan,	 2005).	 This	obviously	made	 it	 easier	 to	diffuse	 the	 constructed	national	
identity	to	everyone	throughout	the	country,	because	the	Kemalist	elite	clearly	wanted	
to	 bring	 education	 under	 control	 in	 order	 to	 educate	 the	 future	 generations	 in	
accordance	with	their	ideals.	
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With	the	changes	mentioned	above	in	mind,	the	aims	of	the	Turkish	national	education	
were	 altered	 accordingly.	 Students	 were	 supposed	 to	 “respect	 and	 serve	 the	 Turkish	
nation,	the	Turkish	Grand	National	Assembly,	and	the	Turkish	state”	(Beşikçi,	1978).	All	
of	 these	 changes	 were	 made	 by	 the	 order	 of	 Mustafa	 Kemal,	 because,	 for	 Atatürk,	
education	“must”	be	national,	as	noted	in	this	speech:	
	
Education	 must	 be	 national,	 individuals	 must	 be	 educated	 to	
protect	 their	 own	 national	 values,	 government,	 the	 Turkish	
Chamber	 of	 Deputies	 and	 their	 society	 and	 basic	 principles	
which	 constitute	 Turkish	 Republic	 such	 as	 Republicanism,	
Populism,	 Nationalism,	 Revolutionism,	 State	 Socialism,	








official	 national	 ideology;	 or	 what	 Gellner	 (1983:	 38)	 calls	 “viable	 and	 usable	 human	
being[s]”.	 This	has	not	 changed	even	under	 the	 rule	of	 the	 conservative	Ak	Party	 that	
has	 been	 in	 power	 since	 2002.	 Despite	 the	 redefinition	 of	 Kemalist	 secularism	 and	
political	melting	away	of	Kemalism	under	the	conservative	Ak	Party	rule,	the	influence	of	
Kemalism	 and	 its	 concept	 of	 nationalism	 in	 education	 has	 endured,	 and	 it	 has	 been	





intolerant	 way	 and	 aiming	 at	 homogenising	 the	 nation	 with	 the	 main	 goal	 of	
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Today,	within	 the	Turkish	political	and	social	 community,	 there	
are	our	citizens	and	nationalities	who	were	propagandised	with	
the	ideas	of	kurdishness,	circasiannes,	and	even	bosniannes	and	
lazness.	 Nevertheless,	 these	 wrong	 thoughts	 which	 are	 the	
products	 of	 despotic	 periods	 of	 the	 past,	 could	 not	 affect	 any	
individual	of	the	nation	except	some	instruments	of	the	enemy,	
brainless	 reactionaries.	 Because	 the	 members	 of	 this	 nation	
[referring	 to	non-Turks]	have	 the	same	common	history,	ethics	




This	 quote	 obviously	 shows	 the	 degree	 of	 xenophobia	 in	 the	 hegemonic	 ideology	
prevalent	 at	 the	 time.	 In	 fact,	 the	 way	 Mustafa	 Kemal	 and	 İnan	 approached	 and	
described	the	‘issue’	 is	actually	reminiscent	of	racist	rhetoric,	since	the	remarks	clearly	
privileged	Turkishness	over	other	 identities,	with	other	offensive	 language	used	 in	 the	
textbook.	 It	 is	 also	 interesting	 to	 see	 from	 the	 above	quotation	 that	 ethnicities,	 apart	
from	 the	 Turkish	 one,	 are	written	 in	 non-capital	 letters	 (probably	 deliberately),	which	
might	well	 be	 considered	 another	 indication	 of	 how	 the	 new	 Turkish	 state	welcomed	
other	ethnic	groups	in	the	newly-formed	nation-state.	For	these	reasons,	some	scholars	
have	claimed	that	the	Kemalist	interpretation	of	nationalism	is	indeed	xenophobic	(see	








given	 a	 significant	 importance	 in	 the	 Turkish	 educational	 system,	 as	 the	 Article	 42	
explains	this	under	the	section	“Right	and	duty	of	education”:	
	
Education	 shall	 be	 conducted	 along	 the	 lines	 of	 the	 principles	
and	 reforms	 of	 Atatürk,	 based	 on	 contemporary	 scientific	 and	
educational	principles,	under	the	supervision	and	control	of	the	
State.	 Educational	 institutions	 contravening	 these	 principles	
shall	not	be	established	(TBMM,	n.d.).	
	
The	 Basic	 Law	 of	 National	 Education	 explains	 all	 the	 goals	 of	 the	 Turkish	 education,	




To	 raise	 all	 individuals	 as	 citizens	 who	 are	 committed	 to	 the	
principles	 and	 reforms	 of	 Atatürk	 and	 to	 the	 nationalism	 of	
Atatürk	 as	 expressed	 in	 the	 Constitution,	 who	 adopt,	 protect	
and	promote	 the	national,	moral,	human,	 spiritual	and	cultural	
values	of	the	Turkish	nation,	who	love	and	always	seek	to	exalt	
their	 family,	 country	 and	 nation,	 who	 know	 their	 duties	 and	
responsibilities	 towards	 the	 Republic	 of	 Turkey	 which	 is	 a	
democratic,	secular	and	social	state	governed	by	the	rule	of	law,	
founded	 on	 human	 rights	 and	 on	 the	 tenets	 laid	 down	 in	 the	
preamble	 to	 the	Constitution,	and	who	have	 internalised	 these	
in	 their	 behaviours	 (Ministry	 of	 National	 Education,	 2012	 [my	
italics]).	
	
The	 italicised	 phrases	 in	 the	 above	 quote	 highlight	 two	 key	 points,	 which	 are	 1)	 the	
importance	of	 the	Kemalist	 ideology	with	 a	 specific	 focus	on	 the	principles	 of	Atatürk	
and	 his	 interpretation	 of	 Turkish	 nationalism,	 and	 2)	 the	 significance	 of	 the	
characteristics	of	the	Turkish	nation.	 In	other	words,	students	are	expected	to	become	




Within	 the	 specific	 goals	 section	 of	 the	 National	 Education	 Law,	 Article	 10	 mentions	




clearly	mentions,	 Atatürk’s	 reforms,	 principles,	 and	 his	 version	 of	 Turkish	 nationalism	
(Kemalism)	are	considered	an	essential	part	of	the	Turkish	national	education	(ibid).	For	
instance,	 most	 of	 the	 units	 in	 different	 courses	 include	 at	 least	 one	 educational	
attainment	 about	 Atatürk’s	 personality,	 his	 reforms,	 principles,	 and	 his	 brand	 of	
nationalism.	Apart	from	social	sciences	course	units,	even	textbooks	pertaining	to	maths	
include	 sections	 such	 as	 “Atatürk	 and	 his	 views	 on	 science”.	 In	 doing	 so,	 it	 could	 be	
concluded	 that	 the	 Turkish	 Ministry	 of	 National	 Education	 wants	 to	 make	 sure	 that	




the	 other	 goals	 of	 the	 Turkish	 national	 education	 system	 is	 to	 improve	 students’	
awareness	of	democracy.	However,	 in	 the	very	 same	section,	any	 teaching	or	political	
and	 ideological	 discussion	 against	 “Atatürk	 nationalism	 stated	 in	 the	 Constitution”	 is	
strictly	prohibited	by	the	law	(ibid).	In	this	case,	making	an	exception	for	Kemalism	in	the	
Democracy	 Education	 section	 appears	 ironic,	 since	 democracy	 should	 normally	 allow	
everything	to	be	discussed	freely,	even	in	a	classroom	environment.	This	clearly	shows	
that	 students	 are	 expected	 to	 accept	 the	 Kemalist	 ideology	 without	 question,	 yet	 is	
something	which	results	in	an	absolute	obedience	that	contradicts	democracy.	
	
As	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 aforementioned	 examples,	 Kemalism	 (including	 the	 Kemalist	
interpretation	of	Turkish	nationalism)	is	considered	to	be	the	most	important	element	in	
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education,	and	is	further	privileged	over	other	goals.	Therefore,	it	can	be	concluded	that	












political	 community.	 In	 this	 regard,	 citizenship	 could	 be	 considered	 a	 civic	 identity.	
However,	Derek	(2004)	suggested	that	the	concept	of	citizenship	actually	includes	some	
controversial	 issues	 such	 as	 the	 uncertainty	 of	 how	 ‘duties’	 and	 ‘rights’	 should	 be	
balanced	 in	 the	 definition	 of	 citizenship.	 Besides,	 another	 issue	 is	 called	 the	 ‘consent	
descent	 distinction’	 which	 questions	 whether	 the	 concept	 of	 citizenship	 is	 something	
established	 by	 a	 person	 who	 could	 freely	 choose	 to	 be	 part	 of	 a	 specific	 nation	
(consent),	 or	 is	 it	 something	 that	 is	 associated	 with	 a	 particular	 country	 a	 person	 is	
actually	 born	 in	 (descent)	 (Yvonne,	 2002).	 Furthermore,	 some	 scholars	 such	 as	 Turner	
(1999)	and	Newell	 (2000)	warned	against	 the	exclusions	 that	might	be	 created	by	 the	
bond	 between	 citizenship	 and	 nation-states.	 In	 this	 regard,	 there	 are	 two	 types	 of	
exclusion,	which	are	1)	the	exclusions	created	by	the	concept	of	citizenship	against	non-
citizens	within	 nation-states,	 and	 2)	 the	 ones	 created	 by	 the	 definition	 of	 citizenship,	
something	which	directly	affects	citizens	of	nation-states.	Even	 though	 the	 former	can	
be	seen	in	almost	every	country,	the	latter	could	easily	be	observed	in	Turkey,	because	
ethnicity	is	still	one	of	the	determining	elements	in	the	definition	of	citizenship	in	Turkey	
(Bayır,	 2013),	 something	 which	 even	 excludes	 the	 citizens	 coming	 from	 non-Turkish	
ethnic	origins	in	society.	









participants	 trusted	 people	 of	 another	 nationality	 “completely”.	 Even	 though	 the	
number	 of	 people	 viewing	 other	 nationalities	 unfavourably	 fell	 over	 time,	 the	 data	
clearly	 shows	 that	 there	 is	 a	 serious	 problem	 in	 society	 in	 terms	 of	 viewing	 other	
nationalities	as	hostile.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	this	is	further	reinforced	by	another	finding	
in	 the	 same	 reports	 that	 show	 25%	 of	 respondents	 as	 viewing	 people	 speaking	 a	
language	other	 than	Turkish	negatively	 in	2008,	and	30%	of	 respondents	 in	a	2010-14	
research	 agreeing	 that	 “they	 would	 not	 like	 to	 have	 people	 who	 speak	 a	 different	
language	as	neighbours”.	This	indicates	that	a	significant	number	of	people	in	Turkey	do	
not	 view	 languages	other	 than	Turkish	 favourably.	 The	data	 reported	here	 appears	 to	
support	the	assumption	that	the	ideological	position	of	the	Turkish	educational	system	
fuels	 xenophobic	 attitudes	 in	 society.	 Therefore,	 Ince	 (2012b:	 115)	 concluded	 in	 her	
study	 that	 “there	 is	 an	 urgent	 need	 to	 re-examine	 civic	 education	 that	 is	 taught	 in	
schools,	which,	ideally,	plays	an	important	role	in	promoting	tolerance	among	citizens”.	
Likewise,	 this	 thesis	 also	 considers	 the	 examination	 of	 Turkey’s	 national	 education	





After	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	Ottoman	 Empire,	where	which	 different	 ethnic	 and	 religious	
group	 used	 to	 live	 in	 relative	 harmony,	 the	 establishment	 of	modern	 Turkey	 brought	
about	new	 types	of	attitudes	against	ethnic	and	 religious	entities	other	 than	Turks,	as	
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noted	earlier.	During	the	nation	forming	process	in	the	early	years	of	the	Republic,	the	
Turkish	nationalist	cadre,	or	the	Kemalists	as	they	are	known,	had	the	aim	of	creating	a	
new	 state	 that	 was	 homogenously	 Turkish.	 For	 the	 purpose	 of	 creating	 an	 ethnically	
pure	 homeland	 for	 the	 Turks,	 a	 population	 exchange	 with	 Greece,	 for	 example,	 was	
implemented	 after	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 Turkish	 state	 in	 1923.	However,	 Turkey	was	
still	home	to	other	ethnic	and	religious	groups	such	as	 the	Kurds,	Circasians,	Lazs,	and	
Armenians,	 among	 others.	 Because	 the	 Kemalists	 saw	 the	 practical	 impossibility	 of	










The	 quote	 above	 highlights	 the	 assimilative	 characteristics	 of	 the	 national	 policies	
implemented	at	 the	 time	 for	 the	 sake	of	nation-building	process,	which	 culminated	 in	
the	eradication	of	 ‘religious,	ethnic	and	 language-related	differences	 in	 society’.	These	
policies	 that	 dominated	 the	 single-party	 period	 in	 Turkey	 (1923-50)	 were,	 however,	
implemented	 gradually.	 For	 example,	 within	 this	 period,	 the	 main	 objectives	 of	 the	





Nationalism	 (Milliyetçilik),	 Statism	 (Devletçilik),	 Secularism	 (Laiklik)	 and	
Revolutionism/Reformism	(Devrimcilik).	6	
                                            
6		 These	 are	 the	 six	 basic	 principles	 of	 Kemalism	 which	 are	 also	 stated	 in	 the	 Constitution,	 and	
something	considered	as	unalterable.		
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After	1950,	which	brought	about	a	measure	of	democratisation	in	Turkey	known	as	the	
“multi-party	 period”,	 the	 Turkish	 state	 revised	 its	 stance	on	 citizenship	 education.	 For	
example,	the	goals	of	the	citizenship	education	included	phrases	such	as	“working	hard,	
being	 someone	 who	 has	 a	 sense	 of	 responsibility,	 studiousness”,	 with	 citizenship	
textbooks	containing	 topics	 like	“democracy	within	 family”	and	“democracy	at	 school”	
(ibid.,	 p.	 52).	 One	 of	 the	 possible	 explanations	 for	 this	 change	 is	 that	 the	 political	
atmosphere	 in	 the	 West	 started	 to	 be	 dominated	 by	 democratic	 regimes	 with	 the	
influence	of	American	liberalism	after	autocratic	regimes	and	single-party	dictatorships	














power	 in	 the	 administration	 of	 the	 country,	 further	 changes	 were	 made	 to	 the	





militarisation	 and	 re-nationalisation	 of	 education,	 a	 new	 “National	 Security”	 (Millî	
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Güvenlik)	course	unit	was	 introduced	and	taught	by	Turkish	army	officials	 in	schools,	a	
functional	example	of	 the	militarisation	of	 the	education	system	by	the	Turkish	armed	
forces.	 Apart	 from	 the	 National	 Security	 course	 unit,	 a	 compulsory	 “Religious	 Culture	
and	Moral	Information”	course	unit	was	also	introduced.	As	Kaya	(2014)	has	noted,	what	
would	 become	 the	 “Turkish-Islamic	 Synthesis”	 begun	 to	 be	 promoted	 after	 the	 1980	
coup	so	as	to	neutralise	the	ideologies	of	the	far	leftists	who	had	dominated	the	political	
landscape	during	the	1970s.	İnal	(1996)	has	also	noted	that	the	post-1980	military	coup	
period	 was	 marked	 by	 a	 new	 wave	 of	 “ideological	 indoctrination”	 of	 the	 national	
education	 system.	 Indeed,	 the	 Turkish	 armed	 forces	 did	 in	 fact	 use	 education	 as	 an	






liberal	 educational	 system	 promoting	 the	 idea	 of	 freedom;	 however,	 the	 military	
(Turkish	Armed	Forces)	appeared	to	interfere	and	hinder	those	attempts,	thus	kept	the	






the	 European	 Union	 –	 came	 to	 considerably	 affect	 Turkey’s	 approach	 to	 citizenship	
education.	Turkey	begun	the	accession	process	in	1987,	though	it	was	officially	accepted	
as	a	 ‘candidate’	 for	 full	membership	only	 in	1999.	Thus,	even	 though	positive	changes	
could	be	seen	in	the	post-1980s	due	to	the	fact	that	Turkey	began	to	be	become	more	
integrated	 into	 the	 free	 market	 economy	 of	 the	 world,	 considerable	 changes	 in	
education	came	only	in	the	late	1990s.	
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After	 the	 Ak	 Party	 came	 to	 power	 in	 2002,	 Turkey’s	 EU	 accession	 process	 gained	
momentum,	because	 the	Ak	Party	 took	a	pro-EU	 stance	 in	 the	early	period	of	 its	 rule	





Rights	 Education”	 course	 unit	 was	 introduced,	 and	 citizenship	 education	 began	 to	 be	
dominated	by	notions	of	human	rights	and	democracy;	this	was	at	the	time	when	Turkey	
was	 undergoing	 a	 reform	 process	 aimed	 to	 make	 it	 ready	 for	 European	 Union	
membership.	Also,	 content	 regarding	Alevism	was	added	 to	 the	compulsory	“Religious	
Culture	and	Moral	Knowledge”	textbook	in	2011,	and	non-Muslims	were	exempted	from	
these	 classes	 (Çayır	 and	 Gürkaynak,	 2008:	 52,	 Europa,	 2013).	 Then,	 the	 “National	




departments.	 Muş	 Alpaslan	 and	 Bingöl	 Universities	 set	 up	 Kurdish	 language	 and	
literature	departments”	 (Europa,	 2014:	 62).	Afterwards,	 the	 Student	Pledge/Oath	 that	
included	 the	 controversial	 phrase	 “How	 happy	 is	 the	 one	who	 says	 I	 am	 a	 Turk”	was	







aforementioned	 reforms	 ensured	 that	 the	 Turkish	 educational	 system	 became	 more	
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inclusive	of	ethnic	and	religious	minorities	within	society,	and	that	the	authority	of	the	
Turkish	 armed	 forces	 in	 education	 weakened,	 Turkish	 nationalist	 related	
themes/concepts,	and	the	domination	of	 the	Kemalist	 ideology	remained	more	or	 less	
the	 same.	 Furthermore,	 the	 exclusion	 of	 other	 ethnic	 and	 religious	 groups	 is	 still	 a	
significant	 problem	 in	 both	 textbooks	 and	 the	 curriculum	 in	 the	 Turkish	 educational	
system	(e.g.	 see	 Ince,	2012a,	Zeydanlıoğlu	and	Güneş,	2013,	Çayır,	2014,	Arslan,	2015,	
Çayır,	 2015).	 Despite	 all	 of	 this,	 what	 is	 surprising	 is	 that	 Turkey’s	 progress	 reports	
produced	 by	 the	 European	 Council	 have	 not	 mentioned	 any	 of	 the	 discriminatory	
language	used	in	school	textbooks	since	2009,	though	discrimination	against	minorities	
still	exists	in	the	curriculum.	Instead,	they	have	specifically	been	highlighting	the	lack	of	













Transformation	 of	 all	 textbooks	 according	 to	
student-centred	learning 2005 
Introduction	 of	 a	 new	 Democratic	 citizenship	
and	Human	Rights	Education	course	unit 2005 
Addition	 of	 the	 content	 about	 Alevism	 to	 the	











education	 in	 the	 country.	 Indeed,	 with	 multiculturalism	 and	 multicultural	 education	
becoming	more	popular	 in	Turkey	as	a	result	of	 increased	discussion	about	ethnic	and	
religious	 minority	 issues,	 studies	 on	 citizenship	 education	 have	 also	 increased	








Aside	 from	history,	 the	other	 significant	element	used	by	 the	nation-state	 to	 facilitate	
nationalism	is,	indeed,	language.	It	could	be	argued	that	language	policies	create	a	single	











Committee	 of	 Union	 and	 Progress,	 a	 policy	 of	 ‘Turkification’	 was	 embarked	 upon	 by	
Turkish	nationalists.	With	this	policy,	the	Unionists	aimed	at	saving	the	Ottoman	Empire	
by	homogenising	the	Empire,	and	Anatolia	 in	particular.	Turkish	was	of	the	paramount	
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importance	to	this	process.	For	example,	the	theoretical	founder	of	Turkish	nationalism	
and	the	ideologue	of	the	Turkish	nationalists	at	the	time,	Ziya	Gökalp,	who	also	provided	
the	 inspiration	 for	 the	 Kemalists	 during	 the	 nation-building	 period,	 suggested	 that	
“today	 in	 Europe	 only	 those	 states	 which	 are	 based	 on	 a	 single-language	 group	 are	
believed	to	have	a	future”	(Gökalp,	1981:	81)	
	





something	which	 aimed	 at	 homogenising	 and	 Turkifying	 the	 new	Republic.	 As	 for	 the	
latter,	the	nationalist	cadre	implemented	two	major	policies.	The	first	was	to	purify	the	





The	 language	 policies	 aimed	 at	 assimilating	 all	 ethnic	minorities	 in	 Turkey.	 Therefore,	
languages	 other	 than	 Turkish	were	 strictly	 prohibited	 by	 law.	 This	 point	 is	 beautifully	
illustrated	 in	 comments	 made	 by	 Ilhan	 Selcuk,	 who	 was	 the	 owner	 of	 a	
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2.5.4.2.	Turkey’s	current	language	policy	in	education	
	
The	 language	policy	of	 the	Kemalist	nation-building	project	 flourished	 in	Turkey	 in	 the	
post	 single-party	 period.	 The	 existence	 of	 a	 Kurdish	 ethnicity	 has	 been	 denied	 by	 the	
state	and	Kurdish	has	been	prohibited	from	being	spoken	in	public	up	until	1994	(Ince,	
2012a).	Kurdish	people	have	only	recently	regained	most	of	their	basic	rights	as	a	result	
of	 the	 recent	 ‘Kurdish	 Initiative’.	 For	 instance,	 the	 state	 broadcasting	 institution,	 TRT	
(Türkiye	 Radyo	 ve	 Televizyonu/Turkish	 Radio	 and	 Television)	 only	 introduced	 a	 new	
channel	broadcasting	in	Kurdish	in	2009,	even	though	children’s	programmes	in	Kurdish	
remained	 forbidden.	 In	2010,	 the	 right	 to	use	Kurdish	as	 the	 language	of	 campaigning	
during	elections	was	granted.	Moreover,	the	government	introduced	Kurdish,	along	with	
some	other	languages	such	as	Laz	and	Abaza,	as	elective	course	units	in	public	schools	in	
2012.	 After	 then,	 using	 Kurdish	 in	 the	 right	 of	 defence	 in	 a	 court	 was	 also	 allowed	
beginning	in	2013.	Furthermore,	the	right	to	be	instructed	in	Kurdish	in	private	schools	
was	 legalised	at	 the	end	of	2013	as	part	of	 the	democratic	package	 introduced	by	 the	
Turkish	 government	 (Arslan,	 2015).	 Therefore,	 having	 looked	 at	 the	 linguistic	 reforms	
implemented	 by	 the	 government	 from	 2009	 to	 2013,	 it	 could	 be	 seen	 that	 there	 has	
been	a	promising	development	in	terms	of	acknowledging	fundamental	rights	of	ethnic	
minorities,	 showing	 the	 transition	 from	 absolute	 non-recognition	 of	minorities	 to	 the	
recognition	of	basic	rights	in	a	legal	context.	
	
Despite	 all	 the	 changes	made	 regarding	minority	 languages	 in	 recent	 years	 however,	
Turkey	still	needs	to	revise	its	language	policy	in	the	Turkish	Constitution,	and	in	the	field	
of	education	in	particular,	such	as	allowing	mother	tongue	instruction	in	public	schools	




it	 is	 probable	 that	 the	 revitalisation	 of	 the	 minority	 language	 issue	 may	 lead	 to	
reactionary	movements	against	the	dominant	majority	language	–	something	which	may	
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culminate	in	a	new	type	of	nationalist	discourse	within	the	formerly	embittered	minority	
–	 something	which	Hechter	 (2001)	 calls	 ‘peripheral	nationalism’.	 For	him,	when	 state-
building	nationalism	fails,	“it	can	generate	peripheral	nationalism	within	state	borders”	
(p.	 56).	 For	 instance,	 in	 Spain,	 educational	 policies	 regarding	 language,	 such	 as	 the	
‘Catalan	law	of	language	normalisation’	in	the	region	of	Catalonia	focussed	on	privileging	
Catalan	over	Spanish	in	1983	when	the	Catalan	language	was	allowed	in	public	schools	
and	 taught	 alongside	 Spanish.	 This	 might	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 Catalan	
government	needed	to	promote	the	Catalan	language	at	the	time	in	order	to	protect	it	
from	 a	 more	 powerful	 language,	 Spanish.	 Nevertheless,	 Figueras	 and	 Masella	 (2009)	
claim	 that	 after	 this	 change,	 pupils	 educated	 in	 Catalonia,	 and	whose	parents	 are	not	
Catalan,	said	that	they	feel	themselves	to	be	 ‘more	Catalan	than	Spanish’.	The	Catalan	
case,	 therefore,	 appears	 to	 be	 an	 example	 of	 how	 a	minority	 language	 could	 also	 be	












By	 way	 of	 an	 example,	 the	 Polish	 minority	 has	 a	 right	 to	 be	 instructed	 in	 their	 own	
mother	 tongue	 in	 the	 Czech	 Republic.	 As	 a	 matter	 of	 fact,	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 has	 a	
sophisticated	schooling	system	whereby	all	subjects	are	taught	in	Polish	in	areas	where	
the	Polish	minority	lives	(European	Parliament,	2001).	According	to	a	report	produced	by	
the	 Czech	 Republic,	 which	 was	 submitted	 to	 the	 Framework	 Convention	 for	 the	
Protection	of	National	Minorities	Committee,	there	were	4000	pupils	being	instructed	in	
the	Polish	language	in	2004	in	the	Czech	Republic.	Moreover,	the	Polish	language	is	also	
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taught	 at	 university	 level.	 The	 Czech	 case,	 therefore,	 demonstrates	 that	multicultural	
policies	 in	 education	 focusing	 on	 mother	 tongue	 instruction	 could	 indeed	 be	
implemented	 successfully.	 This	 happens	 only	 if	 there	 is	 no	 strong	 nationalist	 view	








their	 own	 educational	 activities,	 including…	 the	 use	 or	 the	
teaching	of	their	own	language,	provided…	that	this	right	is	not	
exercised	 in	 a	 manner	 which	 prevents	 the	 members	 of	 these	
minorities	 from	understanding	 the	culture	and	 language	of	 the	





instructed	 in	 their	 mother	 tongue.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 successful	 implementation	 of	
mother	 tongue	 instruction,	 different	 cultural	 identities	 could	 be	 better	 preserved	 in	
societies,	 and	 the	 importance	 of	 cultural	 diversity	 can	 be	 better	 understood	 and	
appreciated	by	members	of	society.	
	















Muslim	 groups	 were	 treated	 as	 minorities.	 Thus,	 Muslim	 minorities	 such	 as	 the	
Circassians	and	Kurds	were	 treated	as	part	of	 the	Turkish	nation.	Consequently,	 these	
minorities	have	faced	serious	problems	and	challenges	in	Turkey,	both	in	education	and	
in	society	in	general.	Indeed,	all	non-Turkish	Muslim	groups	face	issues	around	the	use	
of	 their	own	 language	 in	education,	and	have	 thus	 faced	a	big	challenge	of	preserving	
their	 languages	 and	 cultures;	 this	 is	 down	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 are	 not	 counted	 as	
minorities	according	to	Turkish	law.	
	
Even	 though	what	 constitutes	a	minority	has	not	been	defined	 in	 international	 law	so	
far,	 Šmihula	 (2008)	 has	 categorised	 two	 types	 of	 minorities,	 which	 are	 1)	 traditional	
minority,	 2)	modern	 non-traditional	minority/immigrants.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 only	 factor	








1. it	 is	 numerically	 smaller	 than	 the	 rest	 of	 population	 of	 the	
state	or	a	part	of	the	state;	
2. it	is	not	in	a	dominant	position;		








presence	 on	 the	 territory	 where	 it	 has	 lived’,	 as	 mentioned	 earlier.	 Taking	 into	
consideration	 all	 of	 these,	 the	 Kurdish	 people	 should	 clearly	 be	 considered	 as	 a	
traditional	minority	in	Turkey	where	they	have	lived	for	centuries.	
	
Because	 Armenians,	 Jewish,	 and	 Greeks	 are	 legally	 classified	 as	 minorities	 in	 Turkey,	
they	have	certain	rights	above	Kurds	and	Assyrians.	These	groups	have	their	own	schools	
that	 are	 not	 directed	 by	 the	Ministry	 of	 National	 Education.	 For	 example,	 in	 Istanbul	
English/Hebrew	is	the	language	of	instruction	in	Jewish	schools;	Greek	in	Greek	schools;	
Armenian	 in	 Armenian	 schools	 –	 all	 of	 which	 are	 taught	 alongside	 Turkish.	 However,	
even	 these	schools	do	not	enjoy	 total	 flexibility	away	 from	the	centralised	curriculum.	
For	example,	in	all	these	schools,	History,	Geography,	History	of	the	Turkish	Revolution	
and	 Kemalism,	 and	 Social	 Studies	 course	 units	 have	 to	 be	 taught	 in	 Turkish.	
Furthermore,	the	weekly	hours	of	Greek	and	Armenian	instruction	must	work	alongside	
an	 equal	 amount	 time	 given	 to	 Turkish	 course	 units	 (Kaya,	 2011).	 This	 indicates	 that	









though	 they	 constitute	 a	 large	 community	 in	 southeastern	 cities	 such	 as	 Mardin.	 In	
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2012,	 an	Assyrian	 church	 foundation	 in	 the	Beyoğlu	district	of	 Istanbul	demanded	 the	
right	to	have	mother	tongue	education	in	Assyrian	in	a	kindergarten	from	the	Provincial	
Directorate	 of	 National	 Education	 in	 Istanbul.	 The	 response	 from	 the	 Provincial	
Directorate	was	as	follows:	
	
You	 are	 not	 a	 minority	 group,	 but	 a	 primary	 component	 in	
Turkey.	Therefore,	you	cannot	have	a	mother	tongue	education	
in	Assyrian	in	a	kindergarten.	As	Turkish	citizens	in	Turkey	do	not	
have	 a	 mother	 tongue	 apart	 from	 Turkish,	 you	 cannot	 teach	
Assyrian	to	students	(Agos,	2012).	
	
This	 clearly	 shows	 that	 the	definition	of	minorities	 stated	 in	 the	Treaty	of	 Lausanne	 is	
still	used	 today	as	an	excuse	by	 the	Turkish	 state	 in	order	not	 to	grant	more	 rights	 to	
some	ethnic	and/or	religious	groups	such	as	the	Assyrians,	Kurds	and	Alevis.	Having	said	
that,	 these	 issues	 are	 not	 the	 only	 challenges	 facing	 these	 groups.	 For	 example,	
Assyrians	also	face	other	serious	forms	of	discrimination	within	the	Turkish	educational	
system.	For	instance,	in	2011,	the	Assyrians	were	described	as	“traitors	who	co-operated	
with	Western	 states”	 in	 a	 History	 textbook	 for	 10th	 grade,	 something	which	 naturally	
caused	great	anger	in	the	Assyrian	community	(Milliyet,	2011).	
	
The	Assyrian	 community	 is,	however,	not	 the	only	non-Turkish	group	 suffering	 from	a	
discriminative	 attitude	 within	 the	 existing	 education	 system.	 The	 Armenians	 are	
probably	facing	the	highest	levels	of	prejudice	in	Turkish	society,	which	could	actually	be	





while	 they	 are	 teaching	 the	 ‘History	 of	 the	 Turkish	 Revolution	 and	 Kemalism’	 is	 that	
“teachers	–	according	to	the	principle	of	actuality	–	should	prioritise	the	discussions	of	
the	Armenian	claims	and	further	explain	that	these	claims	do	not	match	with	the	facts	of	
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historical	 events”	 (Başol	 et	 al.,	 2012b:	 35).	 Apart	 from	 efforts	 to	 teach	 students	 the	














talks,	 students	 became	 so	 motivated	 that	 had	 they	 seen	 an	






implementation	 and	 imposition	 of	 a	 Kemalist	 nationalist	 curriculum	 and	 constructed	
Turkish	 identity	onto	people.	This	has	profound	effects	on	minority	ethnic	groups	such	
as	the	Kurds.	To	give	an	example	here,	I	found	that	during	my	MA	dissertation	Creativity	
in	 the	 Turkish	 National	 Educational	 System	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 National	 Ideology	 of	
Kemalism	 and	 the	 Industrial	 Revolution,	 the	 majority	 of	 Kurdish	 participants	 (both	
teachers	 and	 students)	 criticised	 the	 prevailing	 influence	 of	 Kemalism	 and	 its	
interpretation	 of	 nationalism	 on	 education.	 One	 Kurdish	 student’s	 statement	 is	
particularly	 notable	 in	 this	 regard:	 “There	 is	 a	 strong	 nationalist	 concept	 in	 Mustafa	
Kemal's	 ideas	and	I	do	not	want	to	be	a	Turkish	nationalist	as	a	Kurdish	person”	(İnce,	
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upon	 democratic	 values	 instead	 of	 ideologies.	 Especially	 if	 the	
country	 includes	 multi	 ethnic	 groups,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 have	
common	 values	 in	 public	 institutions.	 So,	 in	 my	 opinion,	
students	 should	 be	 taught	 in	 the	 name	 of	 democratic	 and/or	




that	 the	next	 generation	of	 the	 country	 should	be	 taught	under	 the	 guise	of	 Kemalist	
principles	in	schools.	If	some	people	do	not	like	this,	they	actually	do	not	have	to	live	in	
Turkey.	 If	 they	 do	 [want	 to	 live	 here],	 they	 have	 to	 respect	 the	 national	 ideology	 of	
Turkey”	 (İnce,	 2012:	 42).	 Of	 course,	 this	 statement	 could	 be	 considered	 offensive	 by	
many.	These	examples	suggest	that	a	multi-ethnic	country	like	Turkey	should	develop	a	
more	 democratic,	 transparent	 and	 less	 nationalist	 educational	 system	 in	 order	 to	
promote	an	atmosphere	of	diversity	for	both	its	teachers	and	students.	
	
Apart	 from	 the	 ideological	 issues	 mentioned	 above,	 one	 of	 the	 biggest	 challenges	
Kurdish	 pupils	 face	 in	 Turkey	 is	 related	 to	 language.	 As	 Romaine	 (1994)	 has	 noted,	
language	 issues	 are	 one	 of	 the	 most	 serious	 barriers	 impacting	 minority	 pupils’	
attainment.	This,	 in	 fact,	 is	 the	case	 in	Turkey	for	Kurdish	pupils	who	start	school	with	
either	no	or	very	little	Turkish,	as	illustrated	by	the	following:	
	
Having	 to	 begin	 their	 education	 in	 Turkish	 is	 a	 serious	
disadvantage	 for	 Kurdish	 children,	 as	 demonstrated	 by	 the	
following	 statement	 by	 a	 Turkish	 teacher:	 ‘The	 kids	 did	 not	
understand	me	and	I	did	not	understand	them…	The	first	year	of	
education	 is	wasted.	 There	 is	 no	 time	 set	 aside	 for	 the	 kids	 to	
learn	Turkish.	They	have	to	 learn	a	new	 language	and	catch	up	
with	 their	 peers	 elsewhere	 in	 Turkey’	 (International	 Crisis	
Group,	2012:	13).		
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As	mentioned	above,	 the	 fact	 that	 some	Kurdish	pupils	 (especially	 in	 rural	areas)	 start	









are	 certainly	 hugely	 disadvantaged	 in	 terms	 of	 language,	
financial	circumstances,	family,	and	the	region	[they	live	in].	For	











These	examples	clearly	 indicate	that	 there	 is	a	huge	 language	barrier	 faced	by	Kurdish	
pupils,	something	which	affects	their	achievements,	and	thus	their	careers.	As	a	result,	
Coşkun	et	al.	(2010)	further	highlighted	the	importance	of	the	establishment	of	a	multi-
linguistic	 educational	 system,	 with	 minorities’	 mother	 tongues	 acknowledged	 as	 the	
language	of	instruction	in	public	schools.	
	
Another	 significant	 issue	 that	 emerges	 from	 the	 aforementioned	 examples	 is	 that	
teachers	with	Kurdish	students	also	face	serious	difficulties	in	primary	education,	as	they	
struggle	to	communicate	with	their	students.	The	famous	documentary	“On	the	way	to	
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school”	(İki	Dil,	Bir	Bavul)	is	a	useful	example	showing	the	difficulties	of	Turkish	teachers	
working	 in	Kurdish	 inhabited	cities.	The	film	tells	the	story	of	a	Turkish	teacher	named	
Emre	and	 the	 challenges	he	 faces	 as	 a	 teacher	 in	 a	 remote	Kurdish	 town	where	he	 is	
appointed.	When	Emre	goes	 to	 the	 school	 for	 the	 first	 time,	he	experiences	 a	 culture	
shock,	finding	out	that	people	and	students	there	do	not	know	Turkish,	finding	himself	
as	 ‘a	stranger	 in	Turkey’,	his	own	country	 (Demir,	2014).	He	struggles	 to	communicate	





















‘Golden	Dawn’	 political	movement	 in	 Greece.	 It	may	 be	 that	 such	movements	 benefit	
from	economic	recessions	taking	place,	just	as	the	popularity	of	the	Nazis	increased	and	





education	was	 diminishing	 in	 influence,	 a	 number	 of	 examples	mentioned	 throughout	
the	 chapter	 from	 different	 countries	 clearly	 indicates	 that	 education	 policies	 in	 nation	
states	 are	 generally	 determined	 by	 the	 state	 in	 order	 to	 diffuse	 the	 national	 identity	
created	 and	 defined	 by	 the	 state	 itself	 through	 the	 implementation	 of	 a	 centralised	
curriculum	 in	 the	 modern	 (or	 postmodern)	 world.	 Examples/anecdotes	 mentioned	
throughout	the	chapter	further	assist	in	our	understanding	of	the	role	of	education	being	
used	to	facilitate	nationalism	and	exclude	(even	assimilate)	minorities	in	society.	Despite	
the	 effects	 of	 globalisation,	 nationalism	 still	 influences	 educational	 policies	 both	 in	 a	
national	and	cultural	sense.	Education,	in	this	case,	is	used	by	politicians	and	educational	
authorities	 by	 constructing	 a	 national	 history	 curriculum	 and	 privileging	 an	 official	
language	over	minority	 languages,	and	 thus	creating	a	 specific	national	 (ideal)	 identity.	
Therefore,	all	of	these	corroborate	the	idea	of	Wiborg	(2000)	who	claimed	that	education	
is	 an	 indispensable	 sector	 for	 the	 nation-state	 in	 order	 to	 produce	 new	 generations	






Thirdly,	 it	was	mentioned	before	 that	Rousseau	emphasised	 the	necessity	 of	 having	 a	
‘national’	history	and	geography	curriculum	in	order	to	form	a	strong	national	identity.	





nation	 was	 constructed	 by	 linking	 its	 modern	 culture	 to	 the	 Hellenic	 identity	 of	
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Byzantium	 (Liakos,	 2001).	 Likewise,	 the	 official	 Turkish	 history	 thesis	 also	 reflects	 a	






up	 having	 an	 ethnocentric	 view	 of	 history	 which	 usually	 feeds	 xenophobia	 and	
nationalism.	In	this	regard,	so-called	‘enemy	states’	are	created	by	the	nation-state.	For	
example,	Greece	has	been	seen	as	an	enemy	of	the	Turkish	state	since	the	foundation	of	
the	 Turkish	 Republic.	 Similar	 processes	 were	 experienced	 after	 the	 breakdown	 of	
Yugoslavia	 whereby	 Croatia	 and	 Slovenia,	 for	 example,	 still	 regard	 Serbia	 as	 a	 great	
enemy	(Koren,	2002).	Therefore,	it	could	be	said	that	these	examples	show	us	that	the	
construction	 of	 the	 national	 history	 inevitably	 creates	 ‘the	 other’,	 thus	 promoting	







claim.	 With	 this	 in	 mind,	 generally	 speaking,	 modern	 nation	 states	 tend	 to	 see	






something	which	results	 in	the	exclusion	of	other	ethnic	groups	 in	society;	 this	chapter	
also	 contributes	 additional	 evidence	 to	 idea	 that	 the	 nation-state	 represents	 a	 type	of	
authoritarian	system	in	society.		
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Finally,	 this	 chapter	 gave	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 education	 and	
nationalism,	and	therefore	provided	context	and	background	that	are	necessary	in	order	
to	 understand	 the	 examination	 of	 Turkey’s	 Kurdish	 question	 from	 an	 educational	
perspective	better.	






Nationalism	 played	 a	 huge	 role	 in	 the	 foundation	 of	 states	 after	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	
Ottoman	Empire.	With	the	great	influence	of	the	idea	of	nationalism,	especially	after	the	
French	Revolution,	many	 revolts	were	also	 initiated	against	 the	Ottomans,	 since	many	
parts	 wanted	 to	 establish	 their	 own	 nation	 states	 instead	 of	 living	 under	 the	 rule	 of	
someone	else.	8	Turkey	was	also	one	of	these	nation	states,	founded	in	a	territory	ruled	
by	 the	Ottomans	 for	 hundreds	 of	 years.	 In	 fact,	 it	would	 not	 be	 incorrect	 to	 say	 that	
every	nation	that	used	to	live	under	the	rule	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	has	its	own	nation	
state	except	 the	Kurds	 today.	Therefore,	given	 that	nationalism	 is	a	 crucial	 concept	 to	
understand	 the	current	 situation	 in	 the	area	and	 thus	 the	Kurdish	Question	 in	Turkey,	






When	 discussing	 Turkish	 nationalism,	 one	 has	 to	 account	 for	 the	 existence	 of	 varying	
versions	of	Turkish	nationalisms:	(i)	extreme	nationalism	which	is	the	main	philosophy	of	
the	 the	 Nationalist	 Action	 Party	 (Milliyetçi	 Hareket	 Partisi	 –	 MHP),	 (ii)	 Turkish	
                                            
8		 Just	a	note	that	some	academics	 today	discuss	 the	 idea	that	actually	 initial	 revolts	were	not	about	
nationalism	 but	 centre-periphery	 struggles;	 nationalism	 came	 later	 and	 was	 back	 projected	 by	
nationalists.	 See	 ARDIÇ,	 N.	 2013.	 Islam	 and	 the	 Politics	 of	 Secularism:	 The	 Caliphate	 and	 Middle	
Eastern	Modernization	in	the	Early	20th	Century,	London,	Routledge.	
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nationalism	 among	 Muslim	 conservatives	 (iii)	 and	 Kemalist	 nationalism	 which	 is	 the	
official	 one	 embraced	 by	 the	 Turkish	 state.	 Even	 though	 only	 the	 official	 Turkish	
nationalism	 is	 examined	deeply	 in	 this	 paper,	 it	 is,	 however,	 important	 to	 understand	
the	birth	of	Turkish	nationalism,	its	background	and	how	it	has	evolved	over	time.	
	
3.2.1.	 Three	 Ways	 of	 Policy	 to	 Save	 the	 Sick	 Man	 of	 Europe	 (The	 Ottoman	
Empire)	
	
In	 his	 famous	 book	 titled	 “Üç	 Tarz-ı	 Siyâset”	 (Three	 Ways	 of	 Policy),	 Akçura	 (1976)	
discussed	 three	 different	 policies	 proposed	 at	 the	 time	 as	 necessary	 to	 save	 the	 ‘Sick	
Man	of	Europe’	(that	is,	the	Ottoman	Empire).	The	three	policies	mentioned	by	Akçura	
were	Ottomanism,	Pan-Islamism	and	Pan-Turkism	 (or	Turanism)	 respectively.	With	 the	
first	policy,	the	unification	of	all	people	under	the	umbrella	‘being	Ottoman’	was	aimed	
at,	 regardless	 of	 people’s	 religious	 and	 ethnic	 backgrounds	 and	 thus	 making	 each	
individual	 equal	 before	 the	 law	 and	 the	 creation	 of	 an	 ‘Ottoman	 nation’.	 Akçura,	
however,	criticised	this	policy	in	his	book	and	labelled	it	as	“pointless”	and	“impractical”	
by	 arguing	 that	 “the	 illusion	 of	 organising	 an	 Ottoman	 nation	 passed	 away	 with	 the	
French	Empire	and,	like	it,	can	never	be	revived	again”	(ibid.,	p.	3).	Indeed,	the	policy	of	
Ottomanism	 did	 fail	 especially	 soon	 after	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire	 was	 defeated	 in	 the	
Balkan	wars	 ending	 in	 1913.	 The	 great	 loss	 of	 territories	 in	Rumelia	 (Albania,	 Bulgaria	
etc.,)	proved	that	Ottomanism	would	not	be	sufficient	to	achieve	success	in	preserving	
these	territories.	The	second	policy	is	Pan-Islamism	which	was	an	attempt	to	politically	
unify	Muslims	under	 the	banner	of	 Islam,	 regardless	of	 their	 ethnicity,	 and	 seeking	 to	
create	a	kind	of	‘Islamic	Commonwealth’.	Sultan	Abdul	Hamid	II	in	particular	embraced	a	
Pan-Islamist	 policy,	 using	 the	 title	 ‘Caliph’	 more	 vigorously	 than	 his	 predecessors,	 as	









Aside	 from	 two	 policies	 (Ottomanism	 and	 Pan-Islamism),	 some	 other	 Ottoman	
intellectuals	and	officials	also	sought	to	find	an	alternative	policy	in	order	for	the	great	
empire	to	rise	from	the	ashes,	yet	they	thought	that	all	territories	beyond	Anatolia	were	
practically	 surrendered	 and	 thus	 at	 risk.	 For	 them,	 this	 complicated	 policy-making	
processes	 at	 the	 time	and	 the	only	 idea	 left	 to	 save	what	was	 left	 of	 the	 empire	was	
thought	 to	 be	 ‘Turkism’	 which	 aimed	 at	 unifying	 all	 Turks.	 Akçura	 (1976)	 called	 this	
policy	 ‘Türk	Milliyet-i	 Siyâsiyesi’	 (Turkish	 Political	 Nationalism).	 Nevertheless,	with	 this	






inviting	 an	 answer	 is	 still	 unanswered.	 The	 question	 is:	 of	 the	 three	 policies	 of	 Pan-








standards	 of	 the	 Empire.	 He	 also	 claimed	 that	 these	 three	 policies	 were	 actually	
implemented	 unintentionally	 and	 simultaneously,	 because,	 for	 him,	 “Turkism,	
Ottomanism	 and	 Islamism	 cannot	 be	 separated	 from	 each	 other”	 (Akçura,	 1976:	 37).	
Ahmed	Ferid	also	contributed	to	this	discussion	and	criticised	Ali	Kemal,	arguing	that	the	
policies	 of	 Ottomanism	 and	 Islamism	 were	 implemented	 by	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire	 as	
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Akçura	had	said.	Furthermore,	Ferid	claimed	that	these	policies	were	actually	the	natural	
consequences	 of	 the	Tanzimat	 which,	 for	 him,	 “meant	 the	 abandonment	 of	medieval	
traditions...	the	reformist	politicians	of	the	[Tanzimat]	era	accepted	as	they	should	have	
[the	idea	of	people’s	representation]	brought	about	by	the	great	[French]	revolution	and	






Even	 though	 the	 discourse	 of	 Turkish	 nationalism	 emerged	 as	 an	 ideology	 in	 both	 a	





Islamism	 during	 his	 rule,	 the	 İttihad	 ve	 Terakki	 Cemiyeti	 (Committee	 of	 Union	 and	
Progress	–	CUP),	a	political	party	 founded	by	Young	Turks,	began	to	dominate	politics.	





at	 the	 time.	 Therefore,	 the	CUP	embarked	upon	 the	policy	 of	 Pan-Turkism	which	was	
seen	as	a	way	of	reviving	the	Ottoman	Empire	(Akçam,	2006).	
	
Under	 CUP	 leadership,	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire	 joined	 World	 War	 I	 on	 the	 side	 of	 the	
Central	 Powers	 (Germany,	 Austria-Hungary	 etc.,)	 in	 1914,	 because	 three	 prominent	
figures	 in	 the	 CUP	 (Enver	 Pasha,	 Cemal	 Pasha,	 Talat	 Pasha)	 thought	 that	 the	 war	
represented	a	good	opportunity	for	the	implementation	of	Pan-Turkist	policies.	The	CUP	
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attempted	to	use	the	war	to	homogenise	Turkey	in	order	to	better	 implement	 its	Pan-





World	War	 I,	 however,	 led	 to	 the	 collapse	of	 the	Ottoman	Empire	 after	 defeat	 in	 the	
War.	As	a	result,	the	rule	of	the	CUP	finally	ended.	Nevertheless,	members	of	the	CUP	
continued	 to	 pursue	 their	 ideology	within	 Turkey	 even	 after	 the	 Turkish	 Republic,	 up	
until	the	so-called	‘İzmir	assassination’,	a	failed	attempt	to	kill	Mustafa	Kemal	Atatürk	in	
1926.	With	 this	 incident,	powerful	CUP	figures	were	either	hanged	or	 imprisoned,	and	
they	were	banned	from	politics	(Savaşal,	2006).	Other	leaders	of	the	CUP	left	Turkey	and	
continued	to	 fight	 for	 this	 ideology	abroad.	For	 instance,	Enver	Pasha,	one	of	 the	CUP	






often	 came	 from	 people	 displaced	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire.	 This	 was	
frequently	Europeans	from	Rumeli,	but	also	came	from	the	East	–	for	example	Gökalp,	
who	was	a	Kurd.	Taking	into	consideration	the	official	nationalism	in	Turkey,	it	could	be	
said	 that	 the	most	 prominent	 figure	 promoting	 nationalist	 ideas,	 thus	 ‘nationalism’	 in	
Turkey,	was	actually	Ziya	Gökalp	 (1876-1924),	 an	 ideologue	who	 inspired	 the	Kemalist	




during	 the	early	days	of	 the	Republic	were	also	 shaped	by	 the	 ideas	of	Gökalp	 (Parla,	
1980).	
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Gökalp,	 like	 some	 other	 Ottoman	 intelligentsia,	 abandoned	 the	 policy	 of	 Ottomanism	
after	 the	 Balkan	Wars.	 He	 then	 began	 to	 theorise	 the	 idea	 of	 Pan-Turkism,	 intensely	
studying	 pre-Islamic	 Turkish	 history	 and	 Turkish	 civilisation.	 In	 Gökalp’s	 mind,	 the	
Turkish	 nation	 is	 different	 from	 other	 nations.	 For	 instance,	 he	 claimed	 that,	 unlike	
Egyptians,	 all	 the	 Turks	 are	 considered	 Muslim	 and	 this	 is	 why	 all	 Turkish	 speaking	
Muslim	 countries	 should	 unite	 under	 the	 banner	 of	 ‘Turkism’.	 When	 talking	 about	
‘Turkishness’,	he	meant	the	people	who	have	the	same	language	(Turkish)	and	the	same	




Armenian	 incidents	 9	 that	 took	 place	 in	 1915	 which	 resulted	 in	 the	 loss	 of	 a	 great	
number	 of	 Armenians	 (Lewy,	 2005:	 45).	 What	 is	 more,	 due	 to	 his	 position	 against	
minorities,	Gökalp	has	also	been	cited	by	many	nationalist	 thinkers	such	as	Türkdoğan	
(1997)	in	order	to	support	the	view	that	the	Kurds	in	Turkey	are	not	a	nation,	but	only	a	










                                            
9		 That	 the	 deportation	 of	 Armenian	 people	 resulting	 in	 the	 extermination	 of	 the	 great	 number	 of	
Armenians	 is	 acknowledged	 as	 a	 ‘genocide’	 by	 some	Turkish	 academics	 (e.g.	 see	AKÇAM,	 T.	 2006.	
From	Empire	to	the	Republic,	London,	Zed	Books.),	whereas	it	 is	regarded	as	‘deportation’	by	some	
(e.g.	 see	HALAÇOĞLU,	 Y.	 2001.	Ermeni	 Tehciri	 ve	Gerçekler,	Ankara,	 TTK	 Yayınları.).	 Because	 it	 is	 a	
contentious	and	political	issue,	and	because	it	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper,	we	prefer	to	refer	to	
the	events	as	‘incidents’	here	without	delving	into	detail.	
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(nationalism,	Westernisation	and	secularism)	were	the	pillars	the	new	Turkish	state	was	
built	upon,	and	they	were	further	strengthened	by	Kemalist	reforms	for	the	purported	
purpose	 of	 creating	 a	modern,	 secular	 and	 national	 ‘Turkish’	 identity.	Mustafa	 Kemal	
himself	emphasised	the	importance	of	nationalism	as	a	policy:	
	
We	 are	 a	 nation	 that	 has	 come	 very	 late	 to	 and	 acted	 very	
negligently	 in	 the	 implementation	 of	 nationalist	 ideas.	 Our	
nation	 has	 paid	 an	 especially	 bitter	 price	 for	 having	 arrived	
without	 knowing	 nationalism.	We	 have	 [now]	 understood	 that	
our	 error	 was	 that	 we	 have	 forgotten	 ourselves	 (in	 Goloğlu,	
1971:	177).	
	
In	 order	 to	 create	 a	 secular	 and	 national	 identity,	 it	 is	 apparent	 that	 the	 Kemalist	







1923.	Having	 signed	 this	 treaty,	 it	 primarily	 aimed	 to	 replace	 the	Greek	 population	 in	
Turkey	with	the	Turkish-Muslim	population	at	the	time	living	in	Greece	(Cagaptay,	2006).	
In	 accordance	 with	 this	 treaty,	 the	 last	 Greek	 group	 left	 Turkey	 in	 1924,	 which	
culminated	 in	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Anatolian-Greek	 community,	 making	 Turkey	 more	





The	 Kemalist	 government	 knew	 that	 Islam	 had	 to	 be	 brushed,	 along	 with	 other	
dominant	 ideologies	 threatening	 the	 idea	 of	 Turkism.	 Therefore,	 the	 secularisation	 of	
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the	 new	 state	 was	 seen	 as	 a	 precondition	 for	 creating	 a	 national	 Turkish	 identity.	
Attempts	 made	 to	 secularise	 Turkey	 begun	 in	 1924	 with	 the	 abolition	 of	 the	 Islamic	
caliphate	and	 finished	 in	1935	with	 the	change	of	 the	weekly	holiday	 from	Friday	and	
Saturday	to	Saturday	and	Sunday.	Other	radical	reforms	were	implemented	accordingly.	
For	 instance,	 one	 of	 the	 most	 daring	 was	 the	 replacement	 of	 the	 Ottoman,	 hitherto	
written	using	the	Arabic	script,	with	the	Latin	one.	Aside	from	these	drastic	reforms,	in	
the	 1920s,	 madrasas	 (Islamic	 educational	 institutions)	 and	 Islamic	 law	 (Sharia)	 were	
abolished,	 and	 the	 lunar	 calendar	 was	 replaced	 with	 the	 Gregorian	 calendar.	 The	
statement	 declaring	 ‘Islam	 is	 Turkey’s	 official	 religion’	 was	 also	 removed	 from	 the	
Constitution.	However,	despite	all	 these	 reforms	aimed	at	eradicating	 the	 influence	of	
Islam	in	the	daily	lives	of	people,	as	well	as	on	politics,	Islam	remained	a	force	in	society.	
For	instance,	the	presidency	of	Religious	Affairs	(Diyânet	İşleri	Riyâseti)	was	established	








the	 Kemalist	 regime	 put	 a	 profound	 emphasis	 on	 Turkish	 language	 in	 daily	 life,	 as	
promoted	by	Gökalp	and	Namık	Kemal	(Akçam,	2006).	For	example,	Namık	Kemal	once	
said	 that	 “we	 must	 try	 to	 annihilate	 all	 languages	 in	 our	 country	 except	 Turkish...	
Language	may	be	 the	 firmest	barrier	–	perhaps	 firmer	 than	 religion	–	against	national	
unity”	 (cited	Mango,	 1999:	 537).	 For	 instance,	 in	 the	 late	 1920s,	 the	 Prime	Minister,	
İsmet	 İnönü,	 highlighted	 the	 necessity	 of	 making	 every	 citizen	 speak	 only	 Turkish	
regardless	of	their	ethnicity	in	Turkish	Hearths	(Türk	Ocakları),	an	institution	founded	to	
specifically	promote	Turkish	nationalism	at	an	 intellectual	 level	by	 the	CUP.	Moreover,	
İnönü	 said	 that	 all	 citizens	 other	 than	 the	 Turks	 were	 going	 to	 be	 transformed	 into	
Turkish	“no	matter	what	happens”	 (Vakit,	1925).	 In	 the	meanwhile,	a	public	campaign	
called	 “Vatandaş!	 Türkçe	 Konuş”	 (Oh	 Citizen!	 Speak	 Turkish)	 was	 launched	 in	 1928,	
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These	 assimilationist	 policies	 and	 political	 oppression	 automatically	 led	 to	 unrest	 in	
Turkey.	 For	 instance,	 the	 Sheikh	 Said	 rebellion,	which	was	 both	 a	 Kurdish	 and	 Islamic	
rebellion,	 begun	 in	 the	 eastern	 provinces	 in	 1925	 and	 was	 only	 quashed	 after	 huge	
military	offensives.	Other	serious	disturbances	included	the	Menemen	rebellion	and	the	
Ağrı	uprising	in	the	1930s,	both	of	which	were	ruthlessly	suppressed	by	Kemalists.	It	can	
be	 said	 that	 with	 all	 these	 rebellions	 and	 uprisings,	 the	 Kemalist	 regime	was	 given	 a	
certain	 justification	 for	 their	 oppression	 of	 minorities,	 particularly	 those	 inspired	 by	
Kurdish	or	Islamic	ideals.	
	
In	 the	 1930s,	 the	 main	 concern	 of	 the	 Kemalists	 was	 promoting	 their	 brand	 of	
nationalism,	since	the	nationalist	cadre	already	established	a	secular	state	quite	firmly	as	
a	 result	of	 the	policies	 in	 the	1920s.	Hence,	 it	was	now	time	to	pay	more	attention	to	











Genç,	 a	 district	 in	 the	 province	 of	 Bingöl,	 was	 replaced	 with	 a	 Turkish	 word	 Karlıova	
meaning	‘snowy	plain’	among	many	others	(Cagaptay,	2006).	
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The	Kemalist	government	accelerated	 its	 implementation	of	 cultural	policies	aiming	at	
the	 Turkification	 of	 other	 ethnic	 groups	 in	 the	 1930s.	 The	 regime	 attempted	 to	make	
‘Turkishness’	a	supra-national	 identity	over	all	other	national	 identities,	very	much	 like	
the	idea	of	‘Britishness’,	though	the	main	problem	with	this	approach	is	that	Turkishness	
was	 already	 regarded	 as	 an	 ethnic	 identity	 by	 the	majority	 at	 the	 time.	 Thus,	 it	 was	
absurd	 to	 expect	 other	 ethnic	 groups	 to	 recognise	 ‘Turkishness’	 as	 a	 supra-national	
identity.		
	
In	 this	 vein	 however,	 the	 Turkish	 Hearth	 Committee	 for	 the	 Study	 of	 Turkish	 History	
(Türk	Ocakları	Türk	Tarihi	Tedkik	Heyeti	-	TOTTTK)	was	established	in	1930	and	was	given	
a	 specific	 task	 by	 Mustafa	 Kemal	 Atatürk	 himself:	 to	 study/investigate	 pre-Islamic	
Turkish	history	and	the	whole	Turkish	civilisation.	Soon	after	this	order,	the	First	History	
Congress	was	 held	 in	 Ankara,	which	 included	 nationalist	 ideologues	 like	 Yusuf	 Akçura	
and	 well-known	 intellectuals	 such	 as	 Köprülüzade	 Fuad	 (Köprülü)	 and	 Âfet	 İnan	
(Copeaux,	1998,	Cagaptay,	2006).		
	





it	 was	 concluded	 that	 Turkish	 history	 before	 Islam	 was	 also	 highly	 remarkable.	 For	
example,	the	idea	was	promoted	that	the	Turks	of	the	Central	Asia	had	established	well-
developed	 states,	 and	 had	 a	 unique	 civilisation	 which	 influenced	 many	 other	
civilisations.	In	this	case,	Ottoman	history	was	intentionally	ignored	by	the	Kemalists	in	
order	 to	 put	 a	 profound	 emphasis	 on	 the	 pre-Islamic	 period	 of	 Turkish	 history,	which	
might	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 Kemalist	 regime	 did	 not	 want	 to	 use	 Islam	
anymore	when	defining	 ‘Turkishness’.	 Indeed,	 this	 idea	of	Turkishness	now	assumed	a	
more	secular	connotation	than	it	had	done	during	Ottoman	times	and	even	in	the	1920s.	
Another	significant	 implication	of	 the	congress	was	 the	assertion	 that	 the	Turks	 in	 the	
Middle	Asia	were	the	ancestors	of	all	people	(Ergün,	1982).		




National	 languages	 are	 ...	 almost	 always	 semi-artificial	
constructs	 and	 occasionally,	 like	 Modern	 Hebrew,	 virtually	
invented.	 They	 are	 the	opposite	of	what	nationalist	mythology	
supposes	 them	 to	 be,	 namely	 the	 primordial	 foundations	 of	
national	 culture	 and	 the	 matrices	 of	 the	 national	 mind	
(Hobsbawm,	1990:	54).	
	
As	 Hobsbawm	 pointed	 out,	 language	 is	 used	 by	 nation	 states	 to	 justify	 their	
interpretation	of	nationalism,	and	for	broader	nation-building	policies.	This	could	well	be	
applied	 to	 the	 Turkish	 case	 too	 since	 attempts	made	 to	 ‘prove’	 that	 the	 Turks	 had	 a	
great	civilisation	before	 Islam	automatically	 forced	the	Kemalists	to	take	another	thing	
into	 consideration	 –	 that	 is,	 language.	 As	 mentioned	 previously,	 Gökalp	 had	 already	
argued	 that	 the	 Turkish	 language	 should	 be	 given	 importance	 in	 order	 to	 establish	 a	
‘Turkish	 nation’.	 The	 new	 Turkish	 Republic	 did	 what	 Gökalp	 desired.	 What	 is	 more,	
Mustafa	 Kemal	 also	 highlighted	 the	 significance	 of	 the	 language	 as	 a	 part	 of	 any	
definition	of	a	Turk,	by	arguing	out	the	following:	
	
One	of	 the	 significant	 characteristics	of	 the	nation	 is	 language.	
One,	 who	 regards	 himself	 as	 a	member	 of	 the	 Turkish	 nation,	
should	 before	 everything	 and	 in	 any	 case,	 speak	 Turkish.	 If	
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Cretans	and	of	 the	Aegeans,	who	were	 the	 founders	of	 the	Greek	civilisation,	and	 the	
Etruscans,	the	founders	of	the	Roman	culture”	(ibid.,	p.	647).		
	
Taking	 into	 consideration	 the	 aforementioned	 theories,	 ancient	 Anatolian	 civilisations	
such	 as	 the	 Sumerians	 and	 the	 Hittites	 were	 also	 regarded	 as	 Turkish	 civilisations,	
evoking	the	idea	that	Anatolia	was	once	the	Turkish	homeland	before	the	emergence	of	
Islam.	 It	 is	 apparent	 that	 the	 major	 target	 of	 these	 endeavours	 was	 the	 attempt	 to	
theorise	Turkishness	as	a	first	real	identity,	and	Turkish	as	the	first	language	in	history	so	









Another	 issue,	 that	of	 the	“the	purification	of	 the	Turkish	 language”,	also	came	to	 the	
fore	during	 the	First	 Turkish	 Language	Congress	 (Türk	Dil	 Kurumu,	1933:	389).	 Turkish	
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After	 the	 foundation	of	 the	new	Turkish	Republic,	 it	 could	be	argued	 that	persecution	
was	also	another	method	used	by	the	Turkish	state	to	strengthen	the	new	reforms	made	
by	the	Kemalists	to	create	their	version	of	modern	republic.	A	special	type	of	legal	entity,	
called	 Independence	 Courts	 (İstiklâl	Mahkemeleri)	 were	 used	 by	 the	 state	 to	 execute	
people	 deemed	 to	 be	 against	 the	 policies	 of	 secularisation	 and	 nationalisation	 in	 the	
1920s	 and	 1930s.	 With	 the	 decisions	 of	 these	 tribunals,	 thousands	 of	 people	 were	
hanged	due	 to	anti	 regime	activities	 (Alkan,	2011).	Mumcu	 (1992:	1)	considered	 these	
tribunals	 as	 anti-democratic	 foundations	 judging	 counter-revolutionists,	 labelling	 them	





The	 Turkish	 History	 thesis	 defended	 that	 the	 Turks	 –	 anthropologically	 speaking,	 had	
‘brachycephalic	 alpine’	 origin	 (Cagaptay,	 2004).	 In	 order	 to	 prove	 the	 Turkish	 History	
thesis,	anthropological	studies	were	commissioned	by	the	Turkish	state	in	the	late	1930s	
(Copeaux,	1998).	For	 instance,	anthropometric	measurements	(of	people’s	skulls)	were	
employed	 by	 Âfet	 İnan,	 adopted	 daughter	 of	 Atatürk,	 by	 the	 orders	 of	 Atatürk,	









too.	As	mentioned	by	Tunçay	(1999),	 ‘racism’	played	an	 important	role	 in	the	Kemalist	
                                            
10		 Sinan	was	the	chief	architect	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	in	the	16th	century.	
- 75 - 
version	 of	 Turkish	 nationalism	 during	 the	 process	 of	 identity	 formation	 and	 nation-
building.	 For	 instance,	 Prime	 Minister	 İsmet	 İnönü	 commented	 on	 the	 Sheikh	 Said	
rebellion	 in	1925	 that	 “only	 the	Turkish	nation	 is	entitled	 to	claim	ethnic	and	national	
rights	 in	this	country.	No	other	element	has	such	a	right”	(Kendal,	1980:	65).	Likewise,	
Mahmud	 Esad	 Bozkurt,	 the	 Minister	 of	 Justice	 at	 the	 time,	 made	 the	 following	
statement	on	16	September	1930:	“We	live	in	a	country	called	Turkey,	the	freest	country	
in	 the	world...	 I	believe	 that	 the	Turks	must	be	 the	only	 lords,	 the	only	master	of	 this	
country.	Those	who	are	not	of	pure	Turkish	stock	can	have	only	one	right	in	this	country,	
the	 right	 to	 be	 servants	 and	 slaves”	 (both	 cited	 in	 Kendal,	 1980-66).	 This	 statement	
obviously	 shows	 that	 the	 Kemalist	 cadre	 considered	 other	 ethnic	 groups	 to	 be	
subservient	and	who	should	be	 ruled	over,	which	 is	a	 result	of	 the	“hegemonic	 efendi	
(master)	 positioning	 of	 Turkishness”,	 as	Demir	 calls	 is	 (2014).	 Similarly,	Mahmud	 Esad	
Bozkurt	also	commented	at	one	point	that	“the	worst	Turk	is	even	better	than	the	best	
of	 a	 non-Turk”	 (Yıldız,	 2001),	 something	which	 also	 shows	 ‘the	 superiority	 and	 efendi	
role’	that	was	beginning	to	be	associated	with	Turkish	identity.	
	
In	 such	 an	 environment,	 the	 Kurdish	 identity	 was	 also	 alienated.	 For	 example,	 Tevfik	
Rüşdü	Saraçoğlu,	the	Foreign	Minister	in	1926,	had	this	to	say	of	the	Kurds	as:	“in	their	
[Kurdish]	 case,	 their	 cultural	 level	 is	 so	 low,	 their	 mentality	 so	 backward,	 that	 they	
cannot	 be	 simply	 in	 the	 general	 Turkish	 body	 politic...	 they	will	 die	 out,	 economically	
unfitted	 for	 the	 struggle	 for	 life	 in	 competition	with	 the	more	 advanced	 and	 cultured	
Turks	 ...	 as	many	 as	 can	will	 emigrate	 into	 Persia	 and	 Iraq,	 while	 the	 rest	will	 simply	
undergo	 the	 elimination	 of	 the	 unfit”	 (cited	 in	 McDowall,	 2003:	 277).	 This	 quote	
indicates	 that	 the	Kurds	were	 seen	as	 inferior	by	 the	Turkish	 government	 in	 the	early	
years	of	 the	Republic.	 Furthermore,	as	hinted	 in	 the	 last	phrase	of	 the	 statement,	 the	
assimilation	 of	 the	 Kurds	 was	 also	 being	 thought	 about	 during	 this	 time.	 In	 fact,	 the	
Prime	Minister	İsmet	İnönü	spoke	of	this	necessity	to	assimilate	all	ethnicities	other	than	
the	 Turks	 by	 saying	 that	 “Our	 mission	 is	 to	 make	 all	 non-Turks	 within	 the	 Turkish	
homeland	Turks	no	matter	what	happens”	(Yıldız,	2001:	156).	
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3.2.9.	The	national	ideology	of	Kemalism	
	
Kemalism	 is	 an	 ideology	 primarily	 based	 upon	 ‘Atatürk’s	 Principles’,	 which	 is	 also	
referenced	 in	 the	 Turkish	 Constitution:	 Republicanism	 (Cumhûriyetçilik),	 Populism	
(Halkçılık),	 Laicism	 (Laiklik),	 Revolutionism	 (Devrimcilik),	 Nationalism	 (Milliyetçilik)	 and	
Statism	 or	 State	 Socialism	 (Devletçilik).	 As	 mentioned	 by	 Yavuz	 and	 Esposito	 (2003),	
Kemalism	was	systemised	by	Mustafa	Kemal	in	the	Fourth	Congress	of	the	CHP	in	1935,	
when	the	six	principles	were	acknowledged	as	 the	main	principles	of	 the	CHP	and	 the	




Apart	 from	Atatürk’s	principles,	 in	order	 to	understand	the	philosophy	of	 the	Kemalist	
ideology	it	is	vital	to	comprehend	the	ideas	shaping	Atatürk’s	thoughts,	thus	Kemalism.	
For	 instance,	 İnsel	 (2004)	 suggested	 that	 the	 prevailing	 characteristic	 of	 Kemalism	 is	
actually	 ‘authoritarianism’.	 To	 him,	 the	 ideal	 political	 system	 for	 Kemalism	 is	 an	
‘authoritarian	 democracy’,	 which	 promotes	 the	 disciplined	 and	 ordered	 society,	
expecting	an	unconditional	obedience	to	state	authority,	adopting	the	understanding	of	
limited	freedom	under	the	absolute	authority	of	the	state.	Uyar	(2004)	also	highlighted	
the	 importance	 of	 the	 ‘authoritarianist’	 feature	 of	 all	 existing	 versions	 of	 Kemalism.	
Moreover,	 Çandar	 (2000)	 further	 adds	 another	 point	 by	 highlighting	 the	 inspiring	
phenomenon	 for	 Kemalism:	 “In	 their	 secularism	 (and	 in	 their	 statecraft	 generally),	
Atatürk	and	the	Kemalist	elites	were	powerfully	influenced	by	French	ideas,	particularly	
those	 of	 French	 Revolutionary	 Jacobinism”.	 İnsel	 (2004)	 also	 believes	 that	 the	 French	
Revolution	and	Jacobinism	greatly	affected	Kemalism	in	many	ways.	In	this	regard,	it	 is	
true	 that	 the	 Kemalist	modernisation	 project	 represented	 a	 rather	 ‘authoritarian’	 and	




- 77 - 
Moreover,	 as	 stated	 by	 Vahide	 (2005:	 192),	 Atatürk’s	 “outlook	 and	 worldview	 were	
shaped	by	positivism”.	Atatürk	was	influenced	by	the	positivist	ideology	that	developed	
in	 line	with	 August	 Comte’s	 thinking.	 Comte’s	 positivist	 ideology	 sought	 to	 substitute	
empirical	 science	 for	 revealed	 religion	 (Mango,	1999),	 and	Atatürk	used	positivism	 for	
the	same	purpose	to	bring	about	a	modern	Turkish	republic.	In	this	vein,	Adnan-Adıvar	




thus	 attaching	 a	 moral	 value	 to	 science	 (Mardin,	 1983).	 To	 illustrate	 this,	 Atatürk	
highlighted	the	 importance	of	science	by	claiming	that	“the	best	guide	 in	 the	world	of	
civilization,	 for	 life	 and	 for	 success	 is	 science.	 Searching	 other	 guides	 out	 of	 science	
means	heedlessness,	ignorance	and	heresy”	(in	İnal	and	Akkaymak,	2012:	38).		
	
Even	 though	 Atatürk	 was	 in	 favour	 of	 ‘Turkifying’	 Islam,	 and	 even	 trying	 to	 reconcile	





religion	 through	 the	 abandonment	 of	 Christianity,	 Islam	 and	 Buddhism”	 (Hanioğlu,	






to	 negligence,	 and	 finally	 towards	 an	 adoption	 of	 the	 positivist	 and	 rational	 French	
model	 of	 secularism	 (unlike	 the	 Anglo-Saxon	 	 embrace	 of	 a	more	 liberal	 approach	 to	
secularism	or	the	Soviet	total	rejection	of	the	role	of	religion,	see	Tunçay,	2004).	The	fact	
that	 Atatürk	 preferred	 the	 French	 model	 instead	 of	 others	 stems	 from	 the	 fact	 that	
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almost	all	 late	Ottoman	pashas	 (generals	 in	the	army)	were	under	the	influence	of	the	






Rousseau.	 As	 cited	 by	 Turan	 (1999:	 14),	 Atatürk	 even	 said	 in	 one	 of	 his	 addresses	 in	
Parliament	that	“You	should	read	Jean	Jacques	Rousseau	thoroughly	from	beginning	to	
end.	I	did”.	With	this	fact	in	mind,	it	could	well	be	hypothesised	that	Atatürk	might	also	





Ziya	 Gökalp	 was	 probably	 one	 of	 the	 most	 influential	 figures	 influencing	 Atatürk’s	
thinking.	 As	 pointed	 out	 by	 Belge	 (2004),	 Atatürk	 admitted	 himself	 that	 though	 his	
biological	father	was	Ali	Rıza	Efendi,	his	emotional	father	was	Namık	Kemal,	a	renowned	
Turkish	 novelist	 and	 thinker,	 while	 the	 one	 inspiring	 his	 ‘thoughts’	 (father	 of	 his	
thoughts)	was,	indeed,	Ziya	Gökalp,	an	ideologue	behind	the	idea	of	Turkish	nationalism.	
Atatürk’s	thoughts	were	profoundly	influenced	by	Gökalp.	That	being	said,	for	instance,	
it	 is	 claimed	 by	 Belge	 (2004)	 that	 even	 his	 sympathy	 to	 positivism	 was	 affected	 by	
Gökalp’s	stance,	who	was	inspired	by	Emilie	Durkheim	and	August	Comte.		
	
Belge	 (2004)	 goes	 on	 to	 highlight	 another	 point	 by	 arguing	 that	 Atatürk	 considered	
‘liberalism’	one	of	the	enemies	of	the	early	republican	era	along	with	the	‘Islamist	and	
communist	 ideology,	 and	 the	 Kurdish	Question’,	 because	Gökalp	was	 also	 against	 the	
                                            
11		 According	 to	 Turan	 (1999),	 Atatürk	 studied	 the	 French	 revolution	 and	 the	 French	 philosophers’	
revolutionist	ideas	intensely	in	Monastery	Military	High	School	(Manastır	Askerî	İdâdîsi).	




single-party	 period	 embraced	 the	 ‘one-man	 one-party	 spirit’.	 It	 appears	 that	Mustafa	
Kemal	–	who	was	affected	by	Gökalp’s	ideas	deeply	–	also	adopted	the	idea	of	having	a	
unitary	 nation-state	 which	 is	 strictly	 centralised	 and	 militantly	 secularised,	 and	 is	




also	 a	 prominent	 sociologist/thinker	 who	 is	 seen	 “the	 father	 of	 Turkish	 nationalism”	
(Melson,	 1990:	 164),	 systemising	 Turkish	 nationalism	 in	 the	 late	 Ottoman	 period,	
defending	 it	 against	 the	 ideas	 of	 Islamism	 and	 Ottomanism.	 Because	 his	 ideas	
significantly	 affected	 Atatürk,	 thus	 the	 nation-building	 policies	 of	 the	 Kemalist	
modernisation	project	 in	 the	single-party	period,	he	has	been	portrayed	as	part	of	 the	
“cult	of	nationalism	and	modernisation”	(Erickson,	2001:	97).	However,	even	though	it	is	
a	common	assumption	that	Mustafa	Kemal’s	nationalist	ideas	were	‘totally’	inspired	by	
Gökalp,	 there	appears	 to	be	a	clear	distinction	between	 the	 two.	As	Turan	 (1999)	and	
Belge	(2004)	noted,	Gökalp	was	not	in	favour	of	racism,	defending	the	version	of	cultural	
(Turkish)	 nationalism	 that	 should	 neither	 be	 aggressive	 nor	 imperialist,	 while	 the	
Kemalist	 version	 of	 nationalism	 included	 a	 ‘racist’	 rhetoric.	 To	 illustrate	 this,	 as	
mentioned	 earlier,	 Âfet	 İnan’s	 anthropological	 research	 –	 commissioned	 by	 Atatürk	
himself	 –	 on	 ‘cephalometry’	 (the	 measurement	 of	 living	 people’s	 cranium12)	 and	
‘craniometry’	 (the	 measurement	 of	 dead	 people’s	 cranium)	 shows	 the	 racist	
characteristic	 of	 the	 Kemalist	 version	 of	 Turkish	 nationalism	 (Guttstadt,	 2013).	
Therefore,	even	though	Atatürk	was	influenced	by	Gökalp’s	nationalist	ideas,	the	‘racial-
based	definition	of	 the	 Turkish	nation’	 and	 ‘racism’	 seem	 to	be	distinctive	 features	of	
Kemalist	nationalism.	
	
                                            
12	The	main	part	of	the	skull.	
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Apart	 from	 the	prominent	 thinkers	 affecting	Atatürk’s	 ideas,	 another	 significant	 figure	
shaping/systemising	the	national	ideology	of	Kemalism	was	Recep	Peker	who	served	in	
various	 posts	 in	 the	 early	 republican	 era.	 However,	 he	 was	most	 influential	 between	
1931	 and	 1936,	 when	 he	 was	 the	 General	 Secretary	 of	 the	 CHP.	 According	 to	 Yıldız	
(2004),	Recep	Peker	was	highly	influenced	by	the	fascist	regimes	of	Italy	and	Germany,	
and	 he	 wanted	 to	 formulate	 the	 Kemalist	 ideology	 accordingly.	 For	 instance,	 Peker	
coined	the	term	‘Chief’	by	calling	Atatürk	the	‘National	Chief’	for	the	first	time	in	1930	
(Ünder,	2004).	Atatürk	later	began	to	be	called	the	‘Eternal	Chief’.	As	Froembgen	put	it,	
“As	a	 living	guarantee	of	 the	state,	 [Atatürk]	has	 the	People’s	Party	whose	chief	he	 is.	
State	and	party	are	 identical.	The	organization	of	the	party	 is	military	and	rests	on	the	




On	 the	 other	 hand,	 contrary	 to	 Yıldız’s	 claim	 that	 Peker,	 and	 thus	 Kemalism,	 was	
influenced	by	 the	 Italian	 and	German	 fascism,	 in	 his	 recent	 book	 titled	Atatürk	 in	 the	













the	 new	 Democrat	 Party	 (Demokrat	 Parti	 –	 DP)	 gained	 the	 majority	 in	 Parliament	 in	
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three	consecutive	elections	 in	a	 row,	and	 ruled	Turkey	 for	10	years	between	1950-60.	
Under	 the	 DP,	 even	 though	 the	 Kemalist	 state	 model	 was	 damaged	 due	 to	 onset	 of	
democratic	 order	 and	 the	 subsequent	 weakening	 of	 the	 Kemalist	 autocratic	 regime,	
Kemalist	 discourse	within	 the	 state,	 and	 the	 Kemalist	 indoctrination	 in	 general	 and	 in	






In	1960,	 Turkey	experienced	 its	 first	 coup	d’état	 that	 resulted	 in	 the	 suspension	of	 all	
political	activities.	The	Turkish	armed	forces	claimed	that	they	had	to	stage	the	coup	in	
order	 to	 preserve	 democratic	 rule	 in	 Turkey,	 but	 the	 real	 reason	was	 the	 assumption	
that	 the	DP	had	undermined	 the	Kemalist	 principles	 of	 the	 state.	 The	Prime	Minister,	
Adnan	 Menderes,	 Foreign	 Minister	 Fatin	 Rüşdü	 Zorlu,	 and	 the	 Minister	 of	 Finance,	
Hasan	Polatkan	were	all	later	hanged.	This	was	a	turning	point	in	the	history	of	modern	
Turkey,	starting	the	period	of	military	coups.	Indeed,	Prime	Minister,	Süleyman	Demirel,	
another	 right-wing	 politician,	 was	 forced	 to	 resign	 after	 the	 1971	 Turkish	 military	





political	 activities	 just	 as	 with	 the	 1960	 military	 coup.	 After	 the	 1980	 coup,	 a	 new	
constitution	was	written	and	accepted,	and	 remains	 in	 force	 today	 in	Turkey,	which	 is	
referred	 to	 as	 the	 ‘coup	 constitution’	 (ibid).	With	 this	 new	 constitution	 and	 the	 post-
coup	 military	 domination	 in	 society	 and	 politics,	 the	 regime	 brought	 a	 new	 type	 of	
Kemalism	into	existence,	which	is	called	‘right	Kemalism’.	In	fact,	some	thinkers	such	as	
Kahraman	claimed	that	the	period	from	1980	to	1997	and	from	1997	to	the	present	day	
                                            
13	Law	No.	5816	Crimes	Against	Atatürk	mentioned	earlier	in	Chapter	2.	




reaction	 to	 the	 rise	 of	 Islamic	 ideology	 especially	 in	 the	 1990s	 (Kahraman,	 2008).	
Another	 distinctive	 feature	 of	 the	 right	 Kemalism	 was	 that	 it	 accepted	 religion,	 and	
recognises	 it	 in	 its	 discourse,	 unlike	 the	 ‘left	 Kemalism’.	 To	 illustrate	 this,	 a	 right	
Kemalist,	 Kenan	 Evren,	 a	 former	 general	 in	 the	 Turkish	 armed	 forces	 and	 the	 chief	
perpetrator	of	the	1980	coup,	made	the	‘Religious	Culture	and	Moral	Knowledge’	course	
unit	 a	 compulsory	one	 in	 schools	 after	1980,	which	 remains	 the	 case	 today	 (Bora	and	
Taşkın,	2004).	In	addition	to	this,	the	‘National	Security’	course	unit	was	also	introduced	
by	 the	 post-coup	 regime,	 which	 was	 a	 clear	 indication	 of	 the	 increasing	 role	 of	 the	
military	in	education.	For	Jacoby	(2004:	145),	the	post-coup	era	was	the	period	in	which	
“the	 discourse	 of	 the	 1930s”	 was	 reintroduced.	 Likewise,	 Belge	 (2004)	 argued	 that	
Kemalism	 actually	 developed	 as	 a	 ‘doctrine’	 after	 the	 1980	 military	 coup,	 because	 it	
culminated	in	the	institutionalisation	of	the	Kemalist	ideology/mind-set	within	the	state	
mechanism.	 With	 this	 in	 mind,	 the	 Kemalist	 ideology	 remained	 privileged	 in	 today’s	
Turkey	because	of	this	institutionalisation.	
	
In	 the	 late	1990s,	Necmeddin	Erbakan,	 a	pro-Islamist	politician,	 gained	popularity	 and	
his	political	party,	 the	Welfare	Party	 (Refah	Partisi	 –	RP)	 came	 to	power	 in	a	 coalition	
with	 the	 True	 Path	 Party	 (Doğru	 Yol	 Partisi	 –	 DYP),	 a	 right-wing	 political	 party.	 The	
Turkish	 armed	 forces	 were	 suspicious	 that	 the	 ‘political	 Islam’	 and	 increasing	 Islamic	
activities	in	society	would	damage	the	secular	Kemalist	Republic.	As	a	consequence,	the	
most	 important	 outcome	 of	 the	 National	 Security	 Council	 meeting	 on	 the	 28th	 of	
February	 in	 1997	was	 the	military	memorandum,	which	was	part	 of	what	 came	 to	be	
known	as	the	‘post-modern	coup’	which	forced	Erbakan	to	resign	(Çandar,	1997).	Apart	
from	this,	 since	 the	military	 thought	 that	 the	 secularist	and	Kemalist	 characteristics	of	
the	Turkish	state	were	undermined	by	Islamic	events/activities,	they	forced	the	Security	
Council	to	take	some	controversial	decisions,	such	as	the	closure	of	İmam-Hatip	middle	
schools	and	the	abolition	of	Tarikats	 (Sufi-based	 Islamic	 institutions)	 (Türkiye,	2013).	 It	
can	 be	 argued	 that	 all	 these	 coups	 mentioned	 above	 gave	 absolute	 authority	 to	 the	




child	 of	 this	 marriage	 is	 secularism.	 Now	 this	 child	 gets	 sick	 from	 time	 to	 time.	 The	
Turkish	armed	forces	is	the	doctor	which	saves	the	child.	Depending	on	how	sick	the	kid	




In	2002,	 the	Ak	Party,	a	conservative	party,	 came	to	power	and	has	 ruled	Turkey	ever	






It	 is	 observed	 that	 some	 circles	 who	 have	 been	 carrying	 out	
endless	efforts	to	disturb	fundamental	values	of	the	Republic	of	




forgotten	 that	 the	 Turkish	 armed	 forces	 are	 a	 party	 in	 those	
arguments,	and	absolute	defender	of	secularism.	(..)	Those	who	
are	 opposed	 to	 Great	 Leader	 Mustafa	 Kemal	 Atatürk’s	
understanding	“How	happy	is	the	one	who	says	I	am	a	Turk”	are	
enemies	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 Turkey	 and	 will	 remain	 so.	 The	
Turkish	 armed	 forces	 maintain	 their	 sound	 determination	 to	
carry	 out	 their	 duties	 stemming	 from	 laws	 to	 protect	 the	
unchangeable	 characteristics	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 Turkey.	 Their	
loyalty	determination	is	absolute	(BBC	News,	2007).	
	
As	 can	be	 seen	 from	 the	 statement,	 the	 Turkish	 armed	 forces	 considers	 itself	 to	 be	 a	
political	 actor	 with	 a	 say	 in	 politics.	 Having	 considered	 all	 the	 interventions	 of	 the	






and	 the	 institutionalisation	of	Kemalism	have	been	completed	over	 time.	Even	 though	
some	of	the	developments	such	as	the	rise	of	the	Communist	or	Islamist	ideology	were	
interpreted	to	be	undermining	the	Kemalist	ideology	and	the	role	of	Atatürk	in	Turkey,	it	
appears	 that	 the	 Turkish	 armed	 forces	 played	 a	 key	 role	 in	 re-establishing	 and	
consolidating	 the	 Kemalist	 ideology	 within	 state	 mechanism.	 Thus,	 Kemalism	 still	
remains	a	strong/privileged	and	an	official	ideology	in	today’s	Turkey,	dominating	many	
areas	ranging	from	the	Turkish	Constitution	to	the	educational	system.	This	 is	because	
the	military	 in	 Turkey	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 designing	 the	 new	 Republic.	 Harris	
(1965:	55),	for	example,	stated	that	“it	was	the	military	and	not	the	party	that	became	
the	 fountainhead	 of	 progressive	 practices;	 an	 organ	 for	 the	 spread	 of	 the	 reforms	
considered	vital.	Further	it	was	the	ultimate	base	of	power	for	the	regime,	the	guardian	
of	its	ideals”.	With	this	in	mind,	the	army	was	not	only	guarding	the	frontiers	of	Turkey,	








awareness	 of	 being	 a	 separate	 people,	 distinct	 from	 Persians,	
Turks	 and	 Arabs	 as	 well	 as	 from	 the	 various	 Christian	 groups	
living	in	their	midst.	There	was	also,	at	least	among	the	literate,	
a	quite	concrete	idea	of	who	were	and	who	were	not	Kurds,	and	
of	 where	 they	 lived.	 This	 awareness	 of	 identity	 and	 unity	 is	
surprising,	 given	 the	many	 things	 that	 divided	 (and	 still	 divide)	
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the	Kurds.	 Language	and	 religion	 are,	 to	many	Kurds,	 essential	
aspects	of	their	identities,	but	neither	do	all	Kurds	adhere	to	the	
same	 religion,	 nor	 do	 they	 speak	 the	 same	 language	 (Van	
Bruinessen,	1992:	34).	
	
According	 to	 Van	 Bruinessen,	 Kurdish	 national	 identity	 is	 quite	 a	 new	 phenomenon	
compared	 to	 other	 national	 identities	 such	 as	 the	 Turkish	 one,	 and	 the	 possibility	 of	
becoming	assimilated	by	other	ethnicities	(Arab,	Persian,	Turkish)	was	always	a	distinct	
one	 for	 the	Kurdish	 identity.	 It	was	usually	dominated	by	another	 identity	 throughout	
history	(Romano,	2006).	
	
When	 talking	 about	 Kurdish	 nationalism,	 it	 can	 be	 said	 that,	 like	 Turkish	 nationalism,	
there	 are	 different	 types	 of	 Kurdish	 nationalism,	 too.	 Primarily,	 (i)	 early	 Kurdish	
nationalism	 without	 a	 dominant	 ideology,	 (ii)	 Kurdish	 nationalism	 among	 Kurdish	
Muslim	 conservatives,	 and	 (iii)	 a	 left-wing	 Kurdish	 nationalism	 declaring	Marxism	 and	












Taking	 advantage	 of	 the	 atmosphere	 of	 political	 freedom	 during	 the	 Second	
Constitutional	 Era	 (1908-1920),	 the	 Society	 for	 the	 Rise	 of	 Kurdistan	 (Kürdistan	 Teâlî	
Cemiyeti	-	SRK)	was	established	in	Istanbul	in	1918.	The	main	purpose	of	this	society	was	
the	foundation	of	an	independent	Kurdish	state	in	Eastern	Turkey,	with	its	claims	based	









It	would	 not	 be	wrong	 to	 say	 that,	 having	 been	 influenced	 by	 the	 French	 Revolution,	
both	of	 these	 rebellions	were	 led	by	early	Kurdish	nationalists	whose	aim	was	 to	only	





was	 denied	 and	 all	 people	 in	 Turkey	 were	 regarded	 as	 ‘Turks’.	 In	 the	 Kurdish	 Report	
written	 by	 İsmet	 İnönü	 in	 1935	 who	 was	 the	 Prime	 Minister	 at	 the	 time,	 it	 was	
specifically	mentioned	that	Turkish	schools	are	of	paramount	importance	for	the	Turkish	
state	 in	 enforcing	 its	 agenda	 on	 the	 entire	 country.	 Therefore,	 every	 Kurd	 should	 be	
forced	 to	go	 to	Turkish	 schools	 so	 that	 they	 could	be	more	easily	assimilated	 into	 the	
Turkish	 identity	 (Öztürk,	 2008).	 What	 is	 more,	 during	 this	 period,	 5	 Kurdish	 soldiers	
escaping	 from	 the	 Turkish	 army	 presented	 a	 report	 to	 the	 English	 authorities	 in	 Iraq,	
making	the	following	statement:		
	
The	 Turks	 forbade	 the	 institution	 of	 primary	 schools...	 They	
refused	 to	 allow	 the	 Kurds	 to	 learn	 their	 own	 language,	 and,	
since	 they	 did	 not	 wish	 to	 learn	 Turkish,	 education	 became	
practically	 non-existent...	 In	 addition,	 they	 closed	 down	 pious	
institutions	–	the	only	source	of	education	left	to	the	Kurds.	The	
word	 ‘Kurdistan’	 has	 been	 deleted	 from	 all	 books	 of	 the	
education	and	Kurdish	geographical	names	were	replaced	by	the	
Turkish	ones	(cited	in	Meiselas,	1997:	124).	
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In	 response	 to	 the	 assimilationist	 policies	 of	 the	 new	 Turkish	 Republic,	 there	 were	
approximately	18	Kurdish	uprisings	between	1923	and	1938	(Çelik,	2010),	but	many	of	









siege	 of	 Diyarbakır	 was	 the	 turning	 point	 where	 the	 Kurdish	 rebels	 were	 defeated	
however.	As	a	result	of	the	uprising:	
	
Hundreds	 of	 villages	 were	 destroyed,	 thousands	 of	 innocent	
men,	women	 and	 children	 killed.	 Special	 courts,	 established	 in	
accordance	 with	 the	 Law	 on	 the	 Reinforcement	 of	 Order,	
condemned	 many	 influential	 persons	 to	 death	 –	 including	
several	who	had	no	connection	whatsoever	with	the	revolt.	On	
September	 4,	 1925,	 Sheikh	 Said	 and	 forty-seven	 other	 leading	
Kurds	were	 hanged	 in	 Diyarbakir.	 Thousands	 of	 less	 influential	
Kurds	were	slaughtered	without	a	trial.	The	population	of	entire	
districts	were	deported	 to	 the	west.	 The	 role	of	 sheikhs	 in	 the	
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of	 the	 Caliphate,	 but	 you	 are	 all	 united	 on	 one	 point:	 to	 create	 an	 independent	
Kurdistan”	(Viennot,	1974:	108).	
	








revolt	after	 the	Sheikh	Said	 rebellion	was	 the	Mount	Ararat	uprising	 that	broke	out	 in	
1930.	Soon	after	the	beginning	of	the	uprising,	the	Turkish	armed	forces	tried	to	supress	
the	 rebellion.	 The	 Kurdish	 nationalist	 organisation	 Xoybûn	 co-ordinating	 the	 rebellion	
and	asked	for	help	from	other	Kurds	in	eastern	Turkey.	Kurdish	people	did	not	leave	this	
appeal	unanswered,	attacking	other	cities	 in	eastern	Turkey	such	as	Van,	Bitlis,	 Iğdır	 in	
order	to	attract	the	government’s	attention	elsewhere,	thus	to	relieve	the	pressure	on	





The	 other	 significant	 uprising	 occurred	 during	 Mustafa	 Kemal’s	 presidency	 was	 the	
Dersim	 one,	 which	 was	 suppressed	 by	 the	 Turkish	 army	 in	 a	 more	 ruthless	 way	
compared	to	the	other	two	uprisings	mentioned	earlier.	 In	Dersim	(later	replaced	with	
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the	name	 ‘Tunceli’)	 the	Kurds	were	predominantly	Alevi.	This	meant	 that	 they	did	not	
support	the	Sheikh	Said	rebellion	when	it	broke	out,	as	Sheikh	Said	was	a	Sunni	Muslim.	
However,	 after	 the	 Grand	 National	 Assembly	 passed	 the	 Resettlement	 Law	 aiming	 at	
promoting	homogeneity	within	 the	official	borders	of	Turkey	and	assimilating	minority	
ethnic	 groups	 into	 Turkish,	 the	 Alevi	 Kurds	 began	 to	 complain	 about	 the	 status	 of	
Kurdish	people	in	the	new	Turkish	Republic	as	well,	claiming	that	the	Kurdish	culture	was	
being	 ignored	 intentionally	 by	 the	 government,	 something	 which	 they	 deemed	 to	 be	
unacceptable.	After	the	Law	on	the	Administration	of	the	Tunceli	Province	entered	into	
force	 in	 1935,	 the	 rebellion	 begun	 under	 the	 leadership	 of	 a	 prominent	 figure,	 Seyid	
Rıza,	the	chieftain	of	one	of	the	Alevi	Kurdish	tribes.	Military	operations	were	carried	out	
between	 1937	 and	 1938	 by	 the	 Turkish	 armed	 forces	 with	 orders	 given	 by	 Mustafa	
Kemal	himself	(Hürriyet,	2010).	
	
The	 Turkish	 armed	 forces	 even	 used	 warplanes	 to	 bomb	 targets	 in	 Dersim.	 In	 fact,	
Sabiha	 Gökçen,	 the	 adopted	 daughter	 of	 Mustafa	 Kemal,	 participated	 in	 these	




consequently	 executed	 in	Dersim	 together	with	 his	 lieutenants	 (Beşikçi,	 1991).	 Before	
his	 execution,	 he	 said	 “I	 am	 75	 years	 old,	 I	 am	 becoming	 a	 martyr,	 I	 am	 joining	 the	





was	 officially	 recognised	 as	 such	 by	 the	 state,	 and	 then	 Prime	Minister	 Recep	 Tayyip	
Erdoğan	 apologised	 to	 the	 people	 of	 Dersim	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 Turkish	 state	 for	 the	
massacre,	 labelling	 it	 as	 “one	 of	 the	most	 tragic	 events	 of	 Turkish	 near	 history”	 (BBC	
News,	2011).		




that	 resistance	 to	 the	 Turkish	 state	 was	 pointless.	 Especially	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	












and	 the	 the	 Turkish	 Workers’	 Party	 (TWP)	 became	 popular	 among	 the	 young	 Kurds.	
These	 groups	 organised	 protests	 in	 major	 cities	 of	 eastern	 and	 western	 Turkey,	
mobilising	 the	 Kurdish	 youth	 and	 demanding	 rights	 for	 Kurdish	 people.	 However,	 in	
1970,	at	 the	TWP’s	Fourth	Congress,	 the	 following	statement	was	made	 regarding	 the	
Kurdish	issue:	
	
There	 is	 a	 Kurdish	 people	 in	 the	 East	 of	 Turkey...	 The	 fascist	




Having	made	 this	 statement,	 as	mentioned	 by	 Dodd	 (1990:	 16),	 the	 TWP	was	 closed	
down	 soon	 after	 the	 1971	 military	 memorandum	 (in	 effect,	 a	 coup	 that	 forced	 the	
government	 to	 resign)	 and	 members	 of	 the	 TWP	 were	 accused	 of	 “propagating	
communist	propaganda	and	advocating	autonomy	for	the	Kurds”	(Romano,	2006:	43).	
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In	 the	 1970s,	 the	 polarisation	 between	 the	 right-wing	 and	 left-wing	 groups	 began	 to	
grow	at	an	unbelievable	pace,	and	it	finally	turned	to	serious	clash	between	rightists	and	
leftists,	 especially	 in	 the	 late	years	of	 the	decade.	This	might	be	explained	by	 the	 fact	
that	the	1960	Constitution,	which	was	the	most	liberal	one	since	the	foundation	of	the	
Turkish	Republic,	created	an	atmosphere	of	political	freedom	for	both	rightist	and	leftist	
political	 movements	 (Romano,	 2006).	 Nevertheless,	 the	 1971	 coup	 resulted	 in	
constitutional	 amendments,	 taking	 back	 the	 political	 advantages/gains	 of	 the	 liberal	
1960	 constitution,	 showing	 that	 the	 fate	 of	 the	 Turkish	 state	 was	 something	 which	
could,	 the	military,	 not	 be	 left	 to	 the	mercy	 of	 anyone	other	 than	 themselves,	 as	 the	
Turkish	armed	forces	always	saw	themselves	as	guardians	of	the	Kemalist	principles	of	
the	 Turkish	 state,	 and	 they	 assumed	 that	 political	 freedom	 and	 pluralism	 would	
challenge	those	principles.	
	
The	main	clashes	were	between	 leftists	and	 rightists,	 the	 latter	 supporting	 the	 idea	of	
Turkish	 nationalism	 and	 thus	 the	 Nationalist	 Action	 Party.	 It	 could	 be	 said	 that	 the	
Turkish	and	Kurdish	revolutionary	groups	were	mainly	based	on	workers	and	students	in	




While	 all	 of	 this	 was	 happening,	 Abdullah	 Öcalan	 and	 his	 friends	 founded	 a	 Kurdish	
nationalist	 party	 called	 the	 Kurdistan	 Workers’	 Party	 (in	 Kurdish:	 Parti	 Karkerani	
Kurdistan	 –	 PKK)	 in	 1978.	 Öcalan	 and	 other	 insurgents,	 unlike	 other	 revolutionary	
groups,	chose	to	reside	in	rural	areas	and	the	main	strategy	of	the	organisation	was	‘hit	
and	run’	operations	against	Turkish	garrisons	 (İmset,	1992).	 It	was	not	 too	difficult	 for	
the	 PKK	 to	 attract	 all	 people’s	 attention	 in	 Turkey	 in	 such	 a	 short	 time.	 After	 the	
insurgents	 attacked	 Turkish	 military	 posts	 on	 the	 borders	 and	 the	 village	 guards	








We	 should	 be	 given	 our	 cultural	 freedoms	 and	 the	 right	 to	
broadcast	 in	 Kurdish.	 The	 village	 guard	 system	 should	 be	
abolished	 and	 the	 Emergency	 legislation	 lifted.	 The	 Turkish	
authorities	 should	 take	 the	 necessary	 measures	 to	 prevent	
unsolved	 murders	 and	 should	 recognize	 the	 political	 rights	 of	
Kurdish	organization	(McDowall,	2003:	437).	
	
The	Turkish	 state	 left	 this	 reasonable	demand	unanswered,	 considering	making	a	deal	
with	the	‘terrorist	organisation’	a	sign	of	the	state’s	weakness.	Instead,	Turkey	continued	
spending	 billions	 of	 dollars	 on	 military	 operations	 against	 the	 PKK	 for	 the	 sake	 of	
crushing	 it	 completely.	 As	 an	 example,	 an	 estimated	 of	 $9	 billion	 was	 spent	 on	
operations	 in	 the	 southeast	 region	 of	 Turkey	 in	 1994	 alone	 (McDowall,	 2003).	 Yet,	
ironically,	one	of	the	biggest	hopes	for	the	solution	was	in	1993	when	the	PKK	declared	a	





tense	 period	 in	 the	 1990s.	 As	 stated	 by	 Beşikçi	 (Beşikçi,	 2015:	 17)	 in	 his	 book	 Paths	
Opened	by	Courts	 (Mahkemelerin	Açtığı	Yol),	 the	Attorney	General	Cemalettin	Çelik	at	
                                            
14 	 Indeed,	 there	 have	 been	 numerous	 prolonged	 ceasefires	 between	 the	 Turkish	 state	 and	
Kurdish	guerrillas	so	far,	but	what	I	mean	here	is	that	the	war	has	not	stopped	permanently	
since	it	started.	





is	 no	 other	 nation	 other	 than	 the	 Turkish	 nation,	 no	 other	
language	other	than	the	Turkish	language.	Existence	of	a	nation	
other	 than	 the	 Turks,	 a	 language	 other	 than	 Turkish	 is	
unacceptable.	 All	 people	 dependent	 on	 the	 Turkish	 state	 are	
Turks...	 To	 say	 that	 there	 is	 a	 nation	 other	 than	 Turks	 and	 a	




nationalities	except	 the	Turkish	one,	which	 is	 reminiscent	of	 the	very	mentality	of	 the	
authoritarian	 and	 patronising	 prospect	 of	 the	 Kemalist	 single-party	 period.	





complicated	 and	 unresolvable	 year	 by	 year.	 Furthermore,	 the	 attempts	 made	 by	 the	
Kurdish	people	to	found	political	organisations	and	thus	to	become	part	of	the	political	
process	was	not	permitted.	For	instance,	legal	Kurdish	political	organisations	such	as	the	
TWP,	 DEP	 and	 HADEP	 were	 all	 closed	 down.	 Even	 the	 Democratic	 Society	 Party	
(Demokratik	 Toplum	 Partisi	 –	 DTP)	 was	 closed	 down	 by	 the	 Constitutional	 Court	 as	
recently	 as	 2009.	 What	 is	 strange	 here	 is	 after	 all	 these	 closures,	 Kurdish	 MPs	
established	 a	 new	 political	 party.	 People’s	 Democratic	 Party	 (Halkların	 Demokratik	
Partisi	–	HDP)	is	now	the	only	pro-Kurdish	political	party	in	Turkish	Parliament.	
	
However,	even	 though	 the	state	made	serious	mistakes	 in	dealing	with	 this	 issue,	 it	 is	
worth	noting	here	that	there	has	been	a	promising	development	in	Turkey	since	the	Ak	
Party	 government	 introduced	 the	 Kurdish	Opening	 (Kürd	 Açılımı)	 in	 2009	 as	 a	way	 of	
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solving	the	Kurdish	problem	permanently	by	making	the	necessary	democratic	reforms	
and	giving	rights	demanded	by	the	Kurds.	Recep	Tayyip	Erdoğan,	the	Prime	Minister	at	
the	 time,	himself	 admitted	after	 the	 introduction	of	Kurdish	 Initiative	 that	 the	Turkish	
state	 had	 made	 a	 lot	 of	 mistakes	 in	 the	 past	 by	 denying	 the	 Kurdish	 identity	 and	
persecuting	its	own	people	(BBC	News,	2011).	
	
With	 the	 Kurdish	Opening,	 Kurdish	 identity	 has	 now	 been	 officially	 recognised	 by	 the	
Turkish	 state.	 A	 number	 of	 reforms	 have	 already	 been	 implemented	 accordingly.	 For	
instance,	a	state	Kurdish	TV	channel	has	been	opened;	 the	Kurdish	 language	has	been	
made	an	elective	course	in	primary	schools;	Kurdology	departments	have	been	opened	
in	 some	Turkish	 universities	 such	 as	 in	Mardin	Artuklu	University;	 and	mother	 tongue	





PKK	 via	 the	 pro-Kurdish	 political	 party,	 HDP	 –	 something	which	 is	 officially	 called	 the	
peace	 process.	 Even	 though	 the	 public	 opinion	 was	 against	 any	 (direct	 or	 indirect)	
official	 talks	with	Öcalan	 and	 the	 PKK,	 it	 has	 evolved	 over	 time	 and	 finally	 adopted	 a	
more	positive	approach	to	these	negotiations	because	of	the	peaceful	atmosphere	the	
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I	 offer	 the	 Turkish	 society	 a	 simple	 solution.	 We	 demand	 a	
democratic	nation.	We	are	not	opposed	to	the	unitary	state	and	
republic.	 We	 accept	 the	 republic,	 its	 unitary	 structure	 and	
laicism.	 However,	 we	 believe	 that	 it	 must	 be	 redefined	 as	 a	
democratic	state	respecting	peoples,	cultures	and	rights.	On	this	
basis,	the	Kurds	must	be	free	to	organize	in	a	way	that	they	can	
live	 their	 culture	 and	 language	 and	 can	 develop	 economically	
and	 ecologically.	 This	 would	 allow	 Kurds,	 Turks	 and	 other	
cultures	to	come	together	under	the	roof	of	a	democratic	nation	
in	 Turkey.	 This	 is	 only	 possible,	 though,	 with	 a	 democratic	
constitution	 and	 an	 advanced	 legal	 framework	 warranting	
respect	for	different	cultures.	Our	idea	of	a	democratic	nation	is	
not	 defined	 by	 flags	 and	 borders.	 Our	 idea	 of	 a	 democratic	
nation	 embraces	 a	 model	 based	 on	 democracy	 instead	 of	 a	
model	 based	 on	 state	 structures	 and	 ethnic	 origins.	 Turkey	
needs	 to	 define	 itself	 as	 a	 country	 which	 includes	 all	 ethnic	
groups.	This	would	be	a	model	based	on	human	rights	instead	of	





permanent	 solution.	 For	 instance,	 after	 Öcalan’s	 call	 for	 disarmament,	 Group	 of	
Communities	in	Kurdistan	(Koma	Civakén	Kurdistan	–	KCK)	announced	that	“We	own	the	
will	 of	disarmament.	Demirtaş	or	Öcalan	 cannot	urge	us	 to	 lay	down	our	arms”	 (Daily	








national	 ideology	 of	 Kemalism	 and	 the	 Kurdish	 Question	 in	 Turkey	 have	 also	 been	




On	 the	 one	 hand,	 this	 chapter	 clearly	 showed	 that	 Turkish	 nationalism	 emerged	 as	 a	
political	ideology	when	the	Ottoman	Empire	was	about	to	dissolve.	With	World	War	1,	it	
started	to	dominate	the	political	arena	in	Turkey,	and	finally	became	the	most	important	
ideology	 after	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 Turkish	 Republic.	 The	 Kemalists	 made	 Turkish	
nationalism	 one	 of	 the	 pillars	modern	 Turkey	was	 built	 upon.	 They	 further	 laid	 down	
theoretical	foundations	for	ethnic	Turkish	nationalism,	and	claimed	that	Turkishness	was	














concepts	 nationalism	 and	 education,	 and	 it	 further	 presented	 examples	 of	 national	
education	 systems	 across	 the	 world,	 examining	 specifically	 the	 Turkish	 educational	
system	at	the	end.	It	provided	the	context	and	background	for	the	relationship	between	
nationalism	and	education,	and	how	national	education	is	perceived	both	in	theory	and	
practice	 in	 different	 cases.	On	 the	other	 hand,	 this	 chapter	 specifically	 looked	 at	 how	
Turkish	 and	 Kurdish	 nationalisms	 have	 evolved	 over	 time,	 and	 further	 examined	 the	
national	 ideology	of	Kemalism.	Education,	 for	 instance,	was	not	 the	main	 focus	of	 this	
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chapter,	as	it	mostly	dealt	with	political	developments	surrounding	Turkish	and	Kurdish	
nationalisms.	












Furthermore,	 the	 chapter	 also	 gives	 an	 account	 of	 the	 approach	 used,	 and	 further	
discusses	 the	 sampling	 strategy.	 In	 this	 regard,	 how	 participants	 were	 recruited	 for	
interviewing	 is	 also	 explained	 and	described	 thoroughly.	 In	 doing	 so,	 the	 place/region	








In	 this	 research,	 participants’	 responses	 and	 comments	 will	 help	 the	 researcher	
understand	how	nationalist	 the	 Turkish	 educational	 system	 is	 in	 practice	 as	well	 as	 in	
theory,	and	how	 it	negatively	affects	 the	Kurdish	culture,	 thus	the	Kurdish	Question	 in	
Turkey.	 This	 will	 also	 show	 how	 the	 Kurdish	 students	 are	 excluded	 in	 the	 Turkish	
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educational	 system.	 The	 thesis	 further	 aims	 at	 finding	 out	 how	 the	 nationalist	
characteristics	 of	 the	 Turkish	 national	 education	 operate	 in	 a	 schooling	 environment,	
and	 how	 teachers’	 pedagogical	 strategies	 play	 out	 despite	 the	 strictly	 centralised	










Sub-questions:	 What	 is	 the	 relative	 importance	 of	 nationalist	 influences	 on	 the	
curriculum	 and	 the	 language	 of	 instruction	 from	 the	 teachers’	 perspective.	 Are	 there	
different	perceptions	between	those	who	teach	the	nationalist	aspects	of	the	curriculum	
and	 those	who	 do	 not?	 Are	 there	 differences	 in	 perception	 and	 perspective	 between	
Kurdish	teachers	and	Turkish	teachers?	
	
These	 questions	 seek	 to	 address	 ‘what’	 teachers	 think	 about	 the	 issues	 around	 the	
Kurdish	 Question	 in	 general	 and	 in	 the	 field	 of	 education.	 The	 responses	 to	 these	
questions	will	enable	the	researcher	to	have	a	better	understanding	of	the	opinions	of	
Turkish	and	Kurdish	teachers	on	the	Kurdish	Question	and	its	effects	on	education.	It	will	
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Sub-questions:	 How	 do	 teachers	 perceive	 the	 relationship	 between	 nationalism,	 the	
curriculum	 and	 the	 language	 of	 instruction	 and	 the	wider	 Kurdish	 Question?	 How	 do	
teachers	 perceive	 education	 having	 an	 impact	 on	 Kurdish	 pupils?	 How	 do	 teachers	
perceive	 pupils	 and	 their	 parents’	 responses	 to	 their	 educational	 experiences?	 How	
might	 the	educational	 system	contribute	 to	 the	 resolution	of	 the	conflict	between	the	
Turkish	state	and	the	Kurds	in	the	view	of	teachers?	
	







teachers’	own	 judgements	will	 also	be	 revealed.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 see	how	 they	 think	
about	 certain	 issues,	 such	 as	mother	 tongue	 education,	which	 are	 being	 discussed	 by	




3.	 What	 do	 teachers	 think	 about	 the	 Kurdish	 Question,	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 nationalist	
Kemalist	 educational	 system	 on	 the	 Kurds,	 and	 how	 do	 they	 respond	 to	 these	 in	
practice?		
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Sub-questions:	How	do	teachers	approach	the	challenges	Kurdish	pupils	face	in	schools,	
and	 in	 wider	 society?	 How	 do	 they	 perceive	 Turkey’s	 Kurdish	 Question?	 Why	 might	
there	 be	 variations	 between	 teachers	 in	 their	 perceptions	 and	 judgements	 about	 the	
education	 system	 and	 its	 effects?	 Are	 these	 due	 to	 ethnicity,	 teaching	 experience	 or	








considered	 remarkable	 in	 this	 study,	 since	 teachers	 are	 able	 to	 comprehend	 the	
challenges/issues	pupils	are	facing	in	the	school	environment,	and	how	this	affects	them	
in	 terms	 of	 their	 identity	 and	 culture	 in	 daily	 life,	 as	 well	 as	 their	 progresses	 and	
achievements	 in	school.	Furthermore,	teachers’	behaviours	and	reactions	to	the	 issues	
in	 education	 are	 also	 of	 the	 great	 importance,	 because	 they	 might	 potentially	 affect	







This	 research	 is	 significant	 and	 contributes	 to	 the	 academic	 field	 for	 the	 following	
reasons:	
	
- 102 - 
1. It	 is	 the	 first	attempt	 to	examine	Kemalist	national	education	 in	Turkey	 thoroughly,	
with	 the	 Kemalist/nationalist	 characteristics	 of	 the	 educational	 system	 and	 the	
curriculum/textbooks	discussed	critically.	
2. It	 is	 the	 first	 study	 to	 examine	 the	 opinions	 of	 teachers	 on	 the	 issues	 of	 the	
Kurds/Kurdish	 Question,	 who	 come	 from	 different	 social,	 cultural,	 and	 political	





Question,	 which	 has	 been	 ignored	 highly	 ever	 since	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 Kurdish	
Initiative.	
	
In	 short,	 the	project	aims	at	 searching	 for	 tangible	evidences	of	how	Kurdish	 students	
are	 affected	 by	 Turkish	 national	 education,	 and	 it	 further	 asks	 how	 this	 is	 affecting	
Turkey’s	 Kurdish	 Question.	 Since	my	MA	 dissertation	 revealed	 that	 there	 is	 a	 serious	
issue	 regarding	 the	 exclusion	 of	 the	 Kurdish	 students	 within	 the	 Turkish	 educational	
system,	this	thesis,	therefore,	questions	why	and	how	the	Kurdish	students	are	excluded	
in	 Turkish	 schools,	 and	 what	 the	 implications	 are	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 ethnic	 identity	 or	
culture	and	their	academic	performance.	Finally,	the	research	is	expected	to	propose	a	
solution	 to	 the	 Kurdish	 Question	 from	 an	 educational	 perspective,	 suggesting	 what	
needs	 to	 be	 done	 in	 the	 field	 of	 education,	 mentioning	 the	 implications	 for	 both	
academic	and	political	debates	regarding	the	issue.	This	research	may,	however,	not	be	






- 103 - 
One	of	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 research	 is	 to	 explore	what	 characteristics	 of	 the	 Turkish	
national	 education	 affect	 the	 Kurdish	 Question	 in	 Turkey.	 It	 will	 examine	 how	 this	 is	
related	to	the	exclusion	of	the	Kurdish	students	within	the	Turkish	national	educational	
system.	 By	 doing	 so,	 this	 research	 is	 expected	 to	 reveal	 experiences	 and	 examples	 of	
how	the	inclusion	of	the	Kurdish	students	take	place	in	Turkish	public	schools.	In	my	MA	
dissertation,	 I	examined	the	creativity	of	students	 in	the	Turkish	educational	system	in	
relation	 to	 the	 dominant	 ideology	 of	 Kemalism,	 which	 involved	 Turkish	 and	 Kurdish	
students.	This	research	showed	that	the	majority	of	the	Kurdish	students	suffer	from	the	
exclusion	 within	 the	 Turkish	 national	 education.	 Therefore,	 it	 was	 stated	 in	 the	
conclusion	of	 the	dissertation	 that	 this	area	should	be	 investigated	 further	with	an	 in-
depth	examination/analysis	of	multiple	factors	such	as	teachers’	opinions,	experiences,	
and	 actions,	 textbooks,	 and	 educational	 policies.	 Thus,	 a	 qualitative	 research	method	
has	been	 selected	 for	 this	 research,	as	 this	will	help	 the	 researcher	 compare	different	
perceptions	of	participants,	and	thus	interpret	their	attitudes	and	experiences	in	terms	




naturalistic,	 which	 “means	 that	 qualitative	 researchers	 study	 things	 in	 their	 natural	
settings,	 attempting	 to	 make	 sense	 of,	 or	 to	 interpret,	 phenomena	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
meanings	 people	 bring	 to	 them”	 (p.	 3).	 In	 other	words,	most	 importantly,	 qualitative	
research	enables	the	researcher	to	be	able	to	see	any	social	phenomenon	through	the	






make	 appeals	 to	 ‘the	 people’	 in	 the	 broadest	 sense,	 and	 we	
might	 expect	 to	 see	 these	 things	 represented	 in	 the	 ‘talk’	 of	
individuals	(Kiely	et	al.,	2005:	66).	
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This	 quote	 offers	 a	 good	 justification	 for	 the	methodology	 of	 this	 research,	 since	 this	




There	 are	 a	 number	 of	 other	 advantages	 of	 qualitative	 research.	 The	 first	 of	 these	
advantages	is	flexibility.	Because	this	research	planned	to	use	semi-structured	interviews	
as	 the	 method	 of	 data	 collection,	 it	 is	 obviously	 more	 flexible	 for	 the	 researcher	
attempting	 to	 collect	 the	 required	 data	 when	 compared	 to	 other	 methods	 (in	 this	
regard,	quantitative	methods	are	fairly	inflexible).	In	other	words,	qualitative	interviews	
are	 a	 less	 rigid	 style	 of	 eliciting	 responses	 to	 questions	 posed.	 Thus,	 this	 makes	 the	
research	 design	 (e.g.,	 wording	 of	 interview	 questions)	 flexible	 as	 well	 (Griffin,	 2004).	
However,	 it	 is	worth	 noting	 here	 that	 just	 because	 the	 research	 is	more	 flexible,	 this	
does	 not	 automatically	 mean	 that	 it	 is	 more	 scientific.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	 degree	 of	
flexibility	 helps	 the	 researcher	understand	 the	 issue	better.	 Furthermore,	 this	method	
also	allows	for	the	possibility	of	unanticipated	issues	to	be	introduced	by	interviewees,	




between	 the	 researcher	 and	 the	 participant	 is	 more	 interactive.	 For	 instance,	
participants’	 responses	 might	 affect	 what	 questions	 could	 be	 asked	 next	 while	 the	
interview	 is	 taking	 place.	 Besides,	 participants	 also	 have	 the	 opportunity	 to	 answer	
questions	more	elaborately	rather	than	simply	saying	‘yes’	or	‘no’,	by	giving	examples	or	
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…explore	 a	 wide	 array	 of	 dimensions	 of	 the	 social	 world,	
including	 the	 texture	 and	 weave	 of	 everyday	 life,	 the	
understandings,	 experiences	 and	 imaginings	 of	 our	 research	
participants,	 the	 ways	 that	 social	 processes,	 institutions,	
discourses	 or	 relationships	 work,	 and	 the	 significance	 of	 the	
meanings	that	they	generate.	We	can	do	all	this	qualitatively	by	













This	 research	 uses	 the	 interpretivist	 approach	 in	 order	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 data	
collected	 through	 interviews.	Given	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 research	 is	primarily	based	upon	
teachers’	perceptions	and	their	experiences	in	terms	of	nationalism,	exclusion,	ideology	
etc.,	 the	 interpretivist	 approach	 is	 assumed	 to	 reflect	 all	 of	 these	 issues	 in	 a	 more	
satisfactory	 way;	 indeed,	 as	 explained	 by	 Deetz	 (1996),	 the	 interpretivist	 paradigm	




instead	 they	 are	 the	 subjects	 who	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 influence	 the	 world	 around	
them	by	interpreting	and	reproducing	things	in	their	own	way.	Likewise,	in	this	research,	
teachers	and	even	pupils	are	not	seen	as	passive	objects,	they	are,	on	the	contrary,	seen	
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as	the	active	subjects	who	interact	dynamically,	and	thus	react	to	the	issues	they	face,	
and	 also	 who	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 reconstruct	 and/or	 deconstruct	 what	 is	 being	
imposed	on	them.	
	
Interpretivism	 is	 also	 expected	 to	 enable	 the	 researcher	 to	 better	 understand	 how	











interviews	 and	 Skype	 video	 interviews.	 Because	 visiting	 12	 provinces	 to	 conduct	
interviews	was	not	possible	for	the	researcher	due	to	lack	of	funding	for	the	fieldwork,	
only	 the	most	 crowded	province	 (Diyarbakır)	was	visited	and	8	 face-to-face	 interviews	








aims	 to	 discover	 people’s	 perceptions,	 experiences,	 and	 judgements	 regarding	 the	
relationship	 between	 the	 Turkish	 national	 education	 and	 the	 Kurdish	 Question;	 the	
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qualitative	interview	has,	therefore,	been	selected	as	the	main	tool	of	data	collection	to	
reach	 the	 aims	 of	 the	 study.	 Moreover,	 as	 pointed	 out	 by	 McNamara	 (2009),	 the	
qualitative	interview	also	gets	to	the	hidden	story	behind	the	interviewees’	experiences,	
because	 via	 a	 questionnaire,	 for	 example,	 it	 is	 not	 always	 possible	 to	 learn	 about	
people’s	 thoughts	 in	much	detail.	 Instead,	qualitative	analysis	allows	the	researcher	to	
ask	further	questions	to	get	the	whole	story.	Another	advantage	of	interviews	is	that	the	
interviewees	 can	 be	 asked	 follow-up	 questions	 with	 regards	 to	 their	 responses	 while	
s/he	 is	 being	 interviewed.	 Using	 open-ended	 questions	 also	 enables	 participants	 to	
express	 themselves	 in	a	more	comfortable	way	without	any	given	 limitation.	With	 the	
comfort	of	the	participants	in	mind,	Mason	(2002)	claims	that	the	qualitative	interview	




Qualitative	 interviews	 are	 primarily	 divided	 into	 three	 categories:	 structured,	 semi-
structured	 and	 unstructured.	 A	 structured	 interview	 is	 more	 standardised	 (it	 is	 also	
called	a	‘standardised	interview’),	and	it	is	regarded	as	something	that	mostly	produces	
quantitative	 data	 (Corbetta,	 2003).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 an	 unstructured	 approach	 is	
inadequate	 if	 the	 researcher	 aims	 at	 producing	 a	 highly	 generalizable	 set	 of	 findings	
(Fontana	and	Frey,	2005).	In	this	research,	participants’	attitudes	are	crucial	in	order	to	
understand	the	research	topic	in	the	broadest	sense.	This	is	why	both	a	structured	and	





questions	 spontaneously	 right	after	participant	 responses,	 something	 	which	creates	a	
certain	 degree	 of	 flexibility	 during	 the	 interview	process	 (Gray,	 2004).	 Probing,	 in	 this	
case,	 is	 a	way	of	 investigating	any	 social	phenomenon	deeply	 from	 the	perspective	of	
the	 interviewee.	However,	 having	 “key	 themes	 and	 sub-questions	 in	 advance…	 [gives]	
the	 researcher	 a	 sense	 of	 order	 from	 which	 to	 draw	 questions	 from	 unplanned	
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encounters”	 (David	 and	 Sutton,	 2004).	 A	 semi-structured	 approach	 also	 helps	 the	
interviewee	when	s/he	does	not	understand	the	question.	In	this	case,	the	researcher	is	
able	 to	 explain	 the	 question	 to	 the	 interviewee	 and	make	 it	 crystal	 clear.	 Taking	 into	
consideration	all	 of	 these	 features,	 a	 semi-structured	 interview	was	 considered	as	 the	








The	 provinces	 of	 Siirt,	Mardin,	 Van,	 Batman,	 Tunceli,	 Bingöl,	 Diyarbakır,	 Şırnak,	 Bitlis,	
Muş,	Ağrı	 and	Hakkari,	which	 are	 located	 in	 both	 Eastern	Anatolian	 and	 Southeastern	
Anatolian	 regions	of	Turkey	were	selected	as	 the	 research	site	 (see	Figure	4.1).	This	 is	
because	 these	 provinces	 are	 predominantly	 inhabited	 by	 Kurds.	 Besides,	 these	 places	
are	 where	 the	 Kurdish	 culture	 is	 still	 alive	 and	 visible	 in	 many	 respects.	 Another	
important	detail	 is	 that	 the	Kurdish	 language	 is	 spoken	 in	daily	 life	 in	 these	provinces	
more	than	other	provinces	in	Turkey.	
	
- 109 - 
McDowall	 (2003)	 argued	 that	 23%	of	 Turkey’s	 population	 is	 Kurdish,	whereas	 the	 CIA	




suggested	 that	 around	 76%	 of	 the	 Kurds	 live	 in	 the	 east	 and	 southeast	 of	 Turkey	









Turkey’s	 nation-building	 project	 resulting	 from	 the	 Kemalist	 nationalist	 doctrine	
(Gambetti,	2008),	they	continue	to	reflect	Kurdish	culture	in	daily	life.	This	is	partly	due	
to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 municipalities	 of	 these	 provinces	 have	 rejected	 the	 Turkification	
policy	 via	 institutional	 means	 in	 the	 recent	 past,	 and	 most	 of	 these	 provinces	 are	
currently	run	by	the	pro-Kurdish	People’s	Democratic	Party	(HDP,	Halkların	Demokratik	
                                            
15		 Most	of	the	Kurds	in	Turkey	live	in	the	darker	areas	marked	on	the	map.		





was	 expected	 to	 give	 a	 unique	 account	 of	 pupils’	 experiences,	 stemming	 from	 the	
demographic	 and	 cultural	 uniqueness	 of	 each	 province.	 For	 example,	 there	 are	many	
Assyrian	 people	 in	 Mardin	 province,	 and	 the	 teachers	 from	 that	 city	 mentioned	
particularly	unique	examples	concerning	their	Assyrian	students.	
	
As	 a	 result,	 based	 on	 the	 reasons	 given	 above,	 these	 Kurdish	 inhabited	 provinces	 are	






via	 Skype.	 A	 sample	 group	was	 selected	 amongst	 teachers.	 This	 included	 one	 Kurdish	
and	 non-Kurdish	 primary	 school	 teachers,	 and	 one	 Kurdish	 and	 non-Kurdish	 middle	
school	teachers	teaching	the	compulsory	course	unit	‘History	of	the	Turkish	Revolution	
and	 Kemalism’.	 These	 four	 teachers	were	 interviewed	 via	 Skype	 and	 these	 interviews	
were	recorded	using	an	mp3	player.	
	
A	 pilot	 study	 was	 expected	 to	 help	 the	 researcher	 test	 the	 quality	 of	 his	 interview	
questions,	 and	 to	 see	 how	 well	 these	 questions	 address	 the	 issue.	 The	 researcher,	
therefore,	 had	 the	 opportunity	 to	 compare	 teachers’	 responses,	 and	 had	 a	 chance	 to	
make	some	changes	to	the	questions	(which	was	not	planned	initially)	where	necessary.	
This	pilot	study	was	believed	to	 improve	the	 interview	questions	so	that	 the	fieldwork	
part	 of	 the	 project	 could	 be	 done	 in	 a	more	 beneficial	way.	 The	 pilot	 study	was	 also	
believed	to	help	the	researcher	test	the	length	of	interviews,	and	this	did	indeed	give	an	
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the	 classroom.	He	goes	on	 to	 say	 that	 “power	 refers	 to	a	 teacher’s	 ability	 to	affect	 in	
some	way	 the	 student’s	well-being	beyond	 the	 student’s	own	 control”	 (p.124).	 In	 this	
regard,	teachers	can	act	as	lecturers,	and	are	able	to	interpret	what	is	in	the	curriculum,	
and	teach	that	to	students.	They	are	also	observers	who	track	their	students’	progress,	
and	witness	what	 they	experience	 in	 the	 classroom.	 Furthermore,	 I	 selected	 teachers,	
because	 I	 had	 chosen	 middle	 school	 pupils	 for	 my	MA	 research,	 and	 found	 out	 that	
getting	information	from	pupils	at	that	age	is	extremely	difficult.	
	
Second,	 the	 critical	 analysis	 of	 textbooks	 was	 made	 in	 this	 study.	 Olson	 (1980:	 192)	
claimed	that	an	“authorised	version	of	society’s	valid	knowledge”	is	constructed	through	
school	 textbooks.	 It	 can	safely	be	stated	 that	 textbooks	contain	 the	official	knowledge	
that	 can	 represent	 the	mind-set	 of	 the	 state.	 This	 is	why	 Thoma	 (2015)	 asserted	 that	
Foucault’s	following	remarks	could	well	be	applied	to	“textbooks	as	teaching	tools”:	
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When,	 for	 example,	 the	 newsreader	 on	 the	 radio	 or	 television	
says	something,	you	believe	it	or	you	don’t	believe	it,	but	in	the	
heads	of	 thousands	of	people	 this	 statement	becomes	 fixed	as	
truth,	just	because	it	has	been	delivered	in	this	way,	in	this	tone,	
by	 this	 person	 at	 this	 time	 (Foucault,	 cited	 in/translated	 by	
Thoma,	2015:	3).	
	
Foucault’s	 statements	 clearly	 indicate	 the	 significance	 of	 the	 way	 the	
knowledge/information	 is	presented.	With	this	 in	mind,	 this	chapter	attempts	to	show	




both	 of	 these	 directly	 reflect	 how	 the	 state	 approaches	 to	 these	matters,	 and	 how	 it	












aims”	 (Babbie,	 1990:	 97).	 Likewise,	 Mason	 (1996:	 93)	 also	 stated	 that	 “purposive	
sampling	 involved	 selecting	 individuals	 on	 the	basis	 of	 their	 relevance	 to	 the	 research	
questions”.	Taking	 into	consideration	these	characteristics,	 it	 is	obvious	that	purposive	







are	as	 follows,	 though	a	detailed	 list	of	 interviewees	will	be	given	 later	 in	Appendix:	8	
teachers	were	from	Diyarbakır	province.	22	other	teachers	were	from	Siirt,	Mardin,	Van,	
Batman,	Tunceli,	Bingöl,	Şırnak,	Bitlis,	Muş,	Ağrı	and	Hakkari	provinces	 in	 the	east	and	













an	 analysis	 of	 their	 attitudes	 towards	 the	 national	 curriculum	 of	 Turkey,	 how	 it	 is	
practiced	in	Turkish	schools,	and	what	the	implications	are.	
	
Teachers	who	were	 recruited	 for	 the	 research	were	 all	 aged	between	25-35.	 This	 age	
range	was	intentionally	selected,	because	1)	there	are	a	lot	of	young	teachers	working	in	
the	 east	 and	 southeast	 regions	 of	 Turkey	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 experienced	 teachers	
generally	tend	to	move	to	the	western	part	of	the	country,	and	2)	teachers	at	this	age	
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are	 recent	 graduates	 from	 university,	 and	 most	 of	 them	 are	 energetic	 and	 idealist	
teachers	who	want	their	students	be	successful,	which	means	that	they	may	care	about	
their	 students	 more	 compared	 to	 their	 older	 counterparts.	 These	 factors	 made	 the	
selected	 sample	 valuable	 to	 this	 research,	 because	 the	 former	 made	 the	 recruiting	
process	easier,	 and	 the	 latter	helped	 the	 researcher	 to	be	able	 to	understand	Kurdish	
pupils’	experiences	better.	
	
In	 terms	 of	 access	 to	 participants,	 snowball	 sampling	 is	 used.	 	 As	 pointed	 out	 by	
MacNealy	 (1999:	 157),	 snowball	 sampling	 can	 be	 used	 “in	 those	 rare	 cases	when	 the	
population	of	 interest	 cannot	be	 identified	other	 than	by	 someone	who	 knows	 that	 a	
certain	person	has	the	necessary	experience	or	characteristics	to	be	included.”	Biernacki	
and	Waldorf	(1981)	claimed	that	it	is	better	to	use	snowball	sampling	if	the	research	is	
carried	 out	 on	 a	 sensitive	 issue.	 However,	 there	 is	 a	 disadvantage	 of	 this	 sampling	
method,	since	it	is	not	seen	as	highly	representative.	Having	said	that,	the	participants	of	
this	research	project	were	selected	from	different	backgrounds	as	much	as	possible	so	
as	 to	ensure	 that	 the	 findings	of	 the	 research	can	be	generalised	 to	a	population,	and	
can	be	more	consistent.	 I	was	able	to	use	my	contacts	 in	the	region	 in	order	to	access	
each	 participant	 who	 work	 in	 one	 of	 the	 Kurdish	 inhabited	 towns,	 and	 whose	 pupils	
mostly	come	from	a	Kurdish	ethnic	background.	
	
Informed	 consent	was	obtained	 from	 the	 research	participants	 themselves.	 I	 first	met	
each	participant	and	explained	the	reason	of	my	study	and	the	nature	of	my	research;	
emphasising	the	importance	of	their	help,	participation,	willingness	and	honesty.	It	was	
made	 crystal	 clear	 to	 them	 that	 the	 data	 which	 was	 to	 be	 collected	 will	 remain	
completely	anonymous,	confidential	and	safe;	as	well	as	the	fact	that	their	participation	
would	 be	 absolutely	 voluntary.	 An	 informative	 leaflet	 including	 the	main	 goals	 of	my	
research,	methodology	 and	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 research	were	 given	 to	 them.	 This	
included	my	contact	details	as	well.	Consent	form	was	then	given	with	enough	time	(3	
days	at	 least)	 to	decide	 if	 they	would	 like	 to	participate	 in	 the	 research	or	not.	 I	 then	
collected	the	consent	forms	during	the	second	time	we	met	and	did	the	interviews	with	
each	participant.	On	the	other	hand,	for	the	majority	whom	I	interviewed	via	Skype,	they	









more	 common	 with	 the	 internet	 being	 more	 popular	 in	 today’s	 world.	 They	 further	
stated	that	Face	Time	and	Skype	are	two	of	these	online	technologies	researchers	prefer	
to	use	 for	data	 collection.	Berg	 (2007)	 stressed	 the	practicality	of	using	web-based	 in-
depth	 interviews	 by	 talking	 about	 ‘synchronous	 environments’	 such	 as	 video	
conferences	 and	 chat	 rooms,	 and	 ‘asynchronous	 environments’	 such	 as	 the	 use	 of	 e-






be	more	 studied	exactly	with	 the	 same	material.	 The	 recorded	




Furthermore,	 conducting	 interviews	 via	 Skype	 is	 also	practical,	 since	 it	 saves	 time	and	
money	 for	 the	 researcher,	 and	 thus	 makes	 the	 process	 easier.	 For	 instance,	 the	
interviews	 for	 this	 research	 were	 conducted	 with	 teachers	 living	 in	 twelve	 different	
provinces	 in	 the	east	 and	 southeast	 regions	of	 Turkey,	with	eleven	of	 them	being	not	
visited	due	to	lack	of	funding.	Thus,	using	Skype	appeared	to	be	“a	very	convenient	way	
of	being	able	to	maximise	the	research	effort	on	a	budget”	(Lo	Iacono	et	al.,	2016:	8).	All	




On	 the	 other	 hand,	 some	 scholars	 discussed	 the	 disadvantages	 of	 using	 Skype	 for	
interviews.	 For	 instance,	 Janet	 (2011)	 stated	 that	during	Skype	 interviews	only	a	head	
shot	of	the	interviewee	can	be	seen	on	the	screen	by	the	researcher	and	this	definitely	
prevents	 the	 researcher	 being	 able	 to	 observe	 participants’	 body	 language.	
Furthermore,	Markham	(2008)	pointed	out	that	obtaining	an	informed	consent	through	
the	 Internet	 might	 be	 difficult,	 especially	 if	 the	 participant	 is	 worried	 about	 his/her	
anonymity.	However,	this	research	revealed	that	the	point	Janet	made	above	is	actually	
not	 at	 the	 centre	of	 the	 interviews,	 as	 it	 turned	out	 in	 this	 research	 that	participants’	
reactions/emotions/feelings	could	easily	be	read	from	their	faces.	Regarding	Markham’s	
point,	 as	 the	 recruiting	 of	 interviewees	 was	 based	 upon	 the	 snowball	 method	 and	
purposive	 sampling	 strategy,	 obtaining	 an	 informed	 consent	was	 not	 an	 issue	 for	 this	
research,	as	only	two	teachers	refused	to	participate	in	the	study.	
	
Another	 disadvantage	 of	 using	 Skype	 mentioned	 by	 academics	 is	 that	 some	 people	
might	be	unwilling	to	use	the	Internet	which	might	create	problems	for	the	researcher	
(Lo	 Iacono	et	al.,	2016);	however,	as	 the	participants	of	 this	study	are	younger	people	
aged	between	25-35,	 this	was	not	 the	case	 for	 this	 research.	Additionally,	Seitz	 (2015)	
also	warned	against	any	possible	technical	difficulties	such	as	experiencing	an	 Internet	
connection	problem	while	the	interview	is	taking	place,	and	further	said	this	might	have	
an	 impact	 on	 both	 the	 interviewer	 and	 interviewee,	 because	 the	 conversation	 is	
interrupted	and	 returning	 to	 conversation	 can	be	difficult	on	 these	occasions.	 For	 this	
research,	this	issue	did	occur	and	the	connection	was	lost	four	or	five	times	during	the	
interviews;	 however,	 resuming	 the	 conversation	was	 not	 as	 difficult	 as	 anticipated	 by	
Seitz.	
	
- 117 - 
Having	 looked	 at	 the	 advantages	 and	 disadvantages	 of	 using	 Skype	 for	 qualitative	







research,	 especially	 regarding	 the	 area/school/neighbourhood	 they	 are	 living/working	




schools	and	teachers	 in	 these	 two	regions.	Given	this,	along	with	 the	 information	 that	
will	be	given	in	the	research,	it	will	almost	be	impossible	to	find	any	participant.	Having	
said	 that,	 the	 participants	 of	 the	 research	were	 informed	 about	 these	 issues	 and	 the	





the	 researcher	 in	 the	 first	 instance	 before	 the	 fieldwork.	 Cities	 located	 in	 the	 Eastern	
Anatolia	 and	 Southeastern	 Anatolia	 regions	 were	 quite	 peaceful	 while	 the	 interviews	




                                            
16		 Data	 derived	 from:	 http://www.tuik.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=temelist	 (Accessed	 at	 20	 January,	
2016).	
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Also,	I	asked	very	similar	questions	(about	Kemalism	and	nationalism	in	education)	while	
conducting	questionnaires	 for	my	MA	dissertation	 in	 2012.	 I	 also	obtained	permission	
from	 the	 MoNE	 (the	 Ministry	 of	 National	 Education)	 for	 that	 research,	 and	 those	
questions	were	reviewed	by	a	committee	 in	 the	Ministry	of	National	Education	before	
permission	was	 granted.	 This	 shows	 that	 the	 questions	 of	 this	 research	will	 not	 be	 a	
problem	 for	 the	 researcher	 and	 participants	 alike,	 even	 if	 the	 research	 is	 public	
knowledge.	Furthermore,	it	is	worth	mentioning	here	again	that	there	is	no	permission	
required	unless	a	researcher	undertakes	his/her	research	in	a	school	environment	(in	a	




in	 a	 school	 environment.	 Another	 important	 point	 is	 that	 I	 had	 a	 number	 of	 personal	













used,	 as	 they	 have	 a	 better	 sound	 quality,	 which	 can	 be	made	 even	 better	 by	 using	
software	 programmes	 specifically	 designed	 to	 remove	 background	 noise	 in	 order	 for	
that	the	participants’	responses	to	be	heard	and	understood	more	clearly.	Due	to	all	of	
these	reasons,	a	digital	MP3	recorder	was	used	for	recording	interviews.	As	Denzin	and	
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Lincoln	(2000:	13)	noted,	transcripts	of	audio	recordings	that	are	“based	on	standardized	






in	 which	 there	 is	 no	 freedom	 of	 choice”.	 In	 this	 regard,	 another	 important	 issue	
emerges,	 which	 is	 to	 transcribe	 the	 data	 collected	 in	 another	 language	 (other	 than	
English).	 In	 this	 case,	 I	 chose	 to	 transcribe	 the	 data	 in	 English.	 All	 responses	 were	
translated	and	transcribed	accurately	for	use	in	the	research	or	 in	any	publication.	The	





translation	 and	 transcription	 of	 the	 responses	were	 done	 carefully	 by	 the	 researcher.	









language	 is	 tied	 to	 local	 realities,	 to	 literary	 forms	 and	 to	
changing	identities.	Translators	must	constantly	make	decisions	
about	 the	 cultural	 meanings	 which	 language	 carries,	 and	
evaluate	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 the	 two	 different	 worlds	 they	
inhibit	 are	 ‘the	 same’.	 These	are	not	 technical	difficulties,	 they	
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The	 analysis	 of	 the	 raw	 data	 collected	 through	 interviews	 began	 by	 translating	 (from	
Turkish	 into	 English)	 and	 transcribing	 each	 interview.	 As	 a	 native	 Turkish	 speaker,	
considering	ethical	purposes,	 I	did	translations	of	all	 interviews	 in	order	to	protect	the	
data	 as	 well	 as	 the	 anonymity	 of	 the	 participants.	 This	 process	 was	 followed	 by	 the	
organisation	 of	 the	 translated	 and	 transcribed	 data.	 Because	 the	 questions	 and	 sub-
questions	 of	 the	 interviews	 were	 systematically	 designed	 to	 elicit	 responses	 to	 the	
research	questions	posed	in	this	research,	this	made	the	process	of	the	categorisation	of	
the	data	 easier,	 since	Miles	 and	Huberman	 (1994:	 432)	 highlighted	 the	 importance	of	
this	 point	 by	 stating	 that	 “valid	 analysis	 is	 immensely	 aided	 by	 data	 displays	 that	 are	
focused	 enough	 to	 permit	 viewing	 of	 a	 full	 data	 set	 in	 one	 location	 and	 are	
systematically	 arranged	 to	 answer	 the	 research	 question	 at	 hand”.	 In	 this	 process,	
coding	 was	 employed,	 which	 was	 simply	 “the	 process	 of	 breaking	 down,	 examining,	
comparing,	conceptualizing,	and	categorizing	data”	(Strauss	and	Corbin,	1990:	61).	As	a	
result,	 teachers’	 ideas	 and	 the	 concepts	 in	 the	 interviews	 were	 organised	 into	 codes	
such	as	 teachers’	 concerns	over	Kurdish	people’s	 culture,	 	 the	effects	of	 the	nationalist	
themes	on	Kurdish	pupils,	and	the	consequences	of	the	indoctrination	of	Kemalism.	With	
this	 step,	 the	 data	 was	 reduced	 to	 a	 manageable	 form.	 Following	 the	
translation/transcription	 and	 organisation	 of	 the	 data,	 the	 list	 of	 codes,	 ideas,	 and	
patterns	were	classified	under	different	categories	such	as	the	mother	tongue	education,	
Kemalism,	 and	nationalist	 themes	 in	 the	 curriculum,	 all	 of	which	 constituted	 the	 sub-
sections	of	the	empirical	chapters	of	this	study.	
	
The	 final	 step	 that	 was	 employed	 before	 writing	 the	 empirical	 chapters	 was	 the	
interpretation	of	the	organised	data.	At	this	stage,	the	interpretivist	approach	was	used,	
as	 mentioned	 earlier	 in	 the	 methodology	 section.	 This	 is	 because	 in	 this	 thesis,	
knowledge	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 socially	 constructed	 by	 actors	 in	 society	 (see	 Putnam,	
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1983,	Deetz,	1996).	Therefore,	 in	order	to	make	sense	of	the	data,	 	 the	text	organised	
into	 codes	 and	 patterns,	 and	 then	 classified	 under	 categories	 was	 interpreted	 by	 the	
researcher.	
	

















mind	 would	 be	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 generalizability	 of	 the	 findings/results	 of	 the	
study.	One	may	argue	that	the	findings	of	this	thesis	may	not	necessarily	reflect	
Turkey	 as	 a	 whole,	 as	 the	 research	 was	 undertaken	 in	 a	 specific	 location	 (the	
eastern	 and	 southeast	 regions	 of	 Turkey)	 with	 a	 specifically	 selected	 sample	
(Turkish	 and	 Kurdish	 teachers	 whose	 students	 are	 predominantly	 Kurdish)	 in	
order	to	understand	a	specific	problem	(the	relationship	between	the	 ideology-
driven	Turkish	educational	 system	and	 the	Kurdish	Question).	Thus,	 conducting	
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the	same	research	in	a	different	location	might	produce	different	results.	Having	
said	that,	 there	are	ways	to	 improve	the	generalizability	of	 the	case	studies	via	
the	right	strategy	in	the	selection	of	the	case	(see	Gerring,	2008).	For	instance,	as	
this	 research	 seeks	 to	 find	 out	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 Turkish	 national	
education	 and	 Turkey’s	 Kurdish	 Question	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 the	










Ankara	 and	 İzmir	 are	 assimilated	 into	 the	 dominant	 Turkish	 culture	more	 than	
the	ones	living	in	the	abovementioned	twelve	cities.	
Despite	 the	possibility	of	 limitation	 in	 terms	of	 the	generalizability	of	 the	data,	
using	 the	 case	 study	method	 has	 had	 some	 distinctive	 advantages	 in	 order	 to	
collect	 the	 appropriate	 data	 for	 the	 research.	 Firstly,	 the	 case	 study	 method	
enables	the	researcher	to	investigate	a	particular	topic	thoroughly	and	deeply	by	
providing	an	empirically-rich	account	of	a	specific	phenomenon	(Eckstein,	1975).	
Secondly,	 as	mentioned	 by	 Donmoyer	 (2000),	 “accessibility	 to	 a	 rare	 location”	
wherein	 researchers	 do	 not	 usually	 prefer	 to	 conduct	 their	 research	 is	 a	
significant	 advantage	 for	 the	 researcher	 in	 order	 to	 be	 able	 to	 discover	 the	




On	 the	other	hand,	 it	must	be	noted	 that	 this	 research	was	not	 conducted	 for	
generalization	 purposes.	 It	 is	 designed	 to	 be	 a	 case	 study,	 since	 it	 aimed	 at	
discovering	 the	 complexity	 of	 a	 specific	 issue	 by	 focussing	 on	 particular	
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experiences	 of	 particular	 people	 in	 a	 certain	 location.	 As	 deftly	 explained	 by	
Ragin	(1987:	54),	“...in	the	case-oriented	approaches	(..)	it	is	clear	that	the	goal	of	
appreciating	 complexity	 is	 given	 precedence	 over	 the	 goal	 of	 achieving	





Turkish	 and	 Kurdish	 teachers	 working	 in	 the	 primary	 and	 middle	 schools,	 the	
findings	 may,	 therefore,	 not	 be	 applicable	 to	 other	 Kurdish	 students	 who	 are	





3. Thirdly,	 this	 thesis	 overall	 reflects	 the	 perceptions	 of	 Turkish	 and	 Kurdish	
teachers	 coming	 from	 different	 social	 and	 political	 backgrounds,	 and	 it	mainly	
gives	 an	 account	 of	 teachers’	 perception	 on	 the	 issues	 along	 with	 their	
observation	about	the	experiences	of	their	students.	
	
4. The	 analysis	 of	 textbook	 chapters	 is	 limited	 to	 the	 History	 of	 the	 Turkish	
Revolution	 and	 Kemalism,	 though	 there	 are	 a	 few	 quotes	 taken	 from	 other	
textbooks	too.	That	being	said,	a	comprehensive	analysis	of	all	textbooks	used	in	
the	 Turkish	 educational	 system	 already	 exists	 in	 the	 literature,	 examining	 the	





up-to-date	 developments	 when	 they	 were	 interviewed.	 It	 must	 be	 noted	 that	
there	 have	 been	 many	 radical	 developments	 recently	 regarding	 the	 Kurdish	




















given.	 Furthermore,	 the	 names	 of	 the	 schools	 they	 are	 working	 for	 were	 not	
mentioned	 specifically,	 either.	 The	 only	 information	 that	 is	 mentioned	 is	 the	
provinces	chosen	as	the	main	research	site	for	this	study.	
	
3. Freedom	of	 choice:	 Teachers	were	 given	 a	 consent	 form	 beforehand	 and	 they	
themselves	 decided	 if	 they	 would	 like	 to	 be	 interviewed.	 So	 it	 was	 entirely	
voluntary.	 I	also	 introduced	myself,	explaining	explicitly	what	 I	was	doing,	what	
my	research	was	about,	how	I	was	planning	to	conduct	and	organise	my	research	
(methodology),	what	the	possible	implications	are,	the	importance	of	the	project	









a	 questioning	 of	 the	 nationalist	 characteristics	 of	 the	 curriculum	 and/or	 the	

















from	 the	 critical	 analysis	 of	 the	 textbooks	 and	 policy	 documents	 served	 to	 help	 in	
achieving	the	goals	of	the	research.	








textbooks	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 significant,	 as	 the	 analysis	 of	 these	 textbooks	 in	 this	
chapter	provides	context	for	the	interviews.	These	two	specific	textbooks	were	chosen	
for	the	analysis,	because	these	are	believed	to	represent	the	ideology	(Kemalism)	that	is	
disseminated	 by	 the	 Turkish	 educational	 system.	 Even	 though	 quotes	 from	 other	























schools,	 as	 these	main	points	 are	 very	 likely	 to	 affect	 students	 in	 a	 negative	way.	 For	
instance,	“racism”	and	“Turkish	nationalism”	may	result	in	the	production	of	“chauvinist	
ideas”	 which	 might	 make	 students	 develop	 xenophobic	 attitudes	 towards	 “other”	






It	 has	 already	 been	 documented	 in	 Chapter	 2	 that	 the	 Turkish	 educational	 system	 is	
highly	centralised,	with	the	policies	and	the	aims	of	all	course	units	determined	by	the	
Ministry	 of	National	 Education	 itself.	 The	 Turkish	 educational	 system	 is	 dominated	 by	





every	 course	 unit,	 Atatürk’s	 reforms	 and	 principles,	 and	
Atatürk’s	nationalism	that	 is	stated	 in	the	Constitution	must	be	
treated	 as	 the	 main	 pillar	 (Article	 10	 in	 Ministry	 of	 National	
Education,	2012).	
	
As	 mentioned	 above,	 Kemalism	 is	 regarded	 as	 the	 main	 pillar	 by	 the	 law,	 and	 it	 is,	
therefore,	seen	as	an	ideology	students	must	grasp	and	follow	sincerely.	This	could	even	
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be	seen	more	clearly	in	the	teachers’	guide	for	the	Social	Sciences	course	unit	taught	to	
5th	 grade	 students.	 For	 example,	 in	 the	 description	 section	 of	 this	 course	 unit,	 it	 is	
mentioned	 that	 “the	main	 target	 of	 the	 course	 unit	 is	 to	 raise	 students	 as	 ones	who	
embrace	Kemalism,	and	grasp	the	Turkish	culture	and	Turkish	history”	(Ersöz,	2012:	10).	
Turkishness	and	the	Turkish	culture	seem	to	be	only	nation	and	culture	mentioned	in	the	
‘targets’.	 It	 could,	 therefore,	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 targets	 of	 the	 course	 units	 are	 not	
inclusive	of	other	ethnicities	and	other	 ideologies,	 that	 is	 to	say,	 the	targets	appear	to	
promote	 ‘one	 nation’	 (Turkish)	 and	 ‘one	 ideology’	 (Kemalism).	 Furthermore,	 another	
aim	mentioned	 in	 the	 book	 is	 “to	 raise	 students	who	 are	 loyal	 to	 their	 families,	 their	
nation,	 their	 homeland	 and	 Atatürk’s	 principles	 and	 revolutions	 (..)	 Students	 should	
acknowledge	the	cleverness,	 the	knowledge,	 the	talents	and	the	aesthetic	 taste	of	 the	
Turkish	 nation	 and	 the	 supremacy	 of	 these	 characteristics	 (..)”	 (ibid.,	 p.	 1,	my	 italics).	
This	aim	clearly	 shows	 the	 racist	attitudes	promoted	by	 the	aims	of	 the	 textbook	as	 it	
talks	 about	 ‘the	 supremacy	 of	 the	 characteristics	 of	 the	 Turkish	 nation’,	which	 results	
from	an	ethnocentric	approach,	as	pointed	out	by	Sumner	(1906).	Yet,	ideally,	education	
should	enable	students	to	respect	very	different	cultural	and	regional	identities/groups	
in	 the	 postmodern	 era	 and	 to	 care	 about	 the	 inclusiveness	 of	 these	 identities	 (Banks,	
2004).	
	
What	 is	 more,	 the	 excessive	 emphasis	 of	 Atatürk	 is	 also	 mentioned	 in	 the	 aims,	 the	
educational	attainments	and	the	content	of	the	Social	Sciences	textbooks	(for	5th	and	6th	
grades)	in	order	to	constantly	remind	students	that	Atatürk	was	‘the	supreme	leader	of	
Turkey’,	 as	 he	 is	 portrayed	 as	 someone	 who	 had	 an	 important	 role	 to	 play	 in	 every	
matter,	very	much	 like	a	philosopher.	For	 instance,	one	of	 the	educational	attainment	
targets	 says	 that	 “students	 should	 know	 how	 Atatürk	 has	 given	 importance	 to	




man	 (Mustafa	 Kemal	 Atatürk)	 with	 one	 ideology	 (Kemalism)	 is	 being	 imposed	 on	 all	
students	 in	 the	 Turkish	 education	 system.	 In	 fact,	 students	 are	 not	 only	 expected	 to	
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recognise	 Atatürk	 and	 his	 great	 talents,	 but	 also	 to	 think	 in	 an	 ‘Atatürk	 way’.	 For	
example,	 another	 educational	 attainment	 target	 mentions	 that	 “students	 should	
evaluate	Turkey’s	cultural,	social,	political	and	economic	relations	with	its	neighbouring	
countries	and	other	countries	from	the	perspective	of	Atatürk’s	national	foreign	policy”	
(ibid.,	 p.	 14).	 As	 a	 result,	 students	 are	 taught	 to	 be	 devotees	 of	 Atatürk,	 and	 thus	
defenders	 of	 his	 views.	 It	 appears	 that	 another	 important	 educational	 attainment,	

















television	 channels,	 newspapers	 and	 schoolyards,	 coins	 and	
banknotes.	Moreover,	 regardless	of	personal	belief,	 every	Turk	
lives	in	a	country	where	nationalism	is	part	of	standard	political	
discourses.	 Politicians,	 teachers	 and	 journalists	 appeal	 to	 the	
nation	and	Atatürk	on	a	daily	basis.		
	
As	can	be	seen	from	the	quote,	 the	 image	of	Atatürk	 is	not	 just	 in	the	textbooks	or	 in	
schools	 in	Turkey,	 it	 is	actually	everywhere	in	daily	 life,	and	is	highly	visible.	One	could	
easily	see	“the	omnipresence	of	Atatürk	images”	everywhere	in	the	public	sphere,	from	
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hospitals	 to	 schools,	 and	 from	 private	 businesses	 to	 the	 streets.	 Thus,	 “the	 visual	
symbolism”	 is	 actually	 a	 significant	 part	 of	 Atatürk	 cult.	 Likewise,	 “unique	 posters	 of	




In	 2012,	 there	 was	 a	 study	 conducted	 regarding	 the	 cult	 of	 Ataturk.	 In	 one	 of	 the	
questions	 posed	 to	 students,	 51	 out	 of	 60	 students	 said,	 “We	 owe	 our	 lives	 to	 him.”	










1. Student	 should	 embrace	 Atatürk’s	 world	 view/philosophy	
and	he/she	should	be	a	fierce	defender	of	Atatürk’s	system	
of	thought	at	the	end	of	the	course	unit.		
2. He/she	 should	 evaluate	 the	 geopolitical	 importance	 of	
Turkey	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 effects	 both	 regionally	 and	 globally	
and	 he/she	 should	 be	 aware	 of	 the	 internal	 and	 external	
threats.	
3. He/she	 should	 have	 enough	 ability	 to	 find	 solutions	 to	




think.	 Likewise,	 the	 way	 they	 look	 at	 the	 issues	 around	 the	 globe	 also	 needs	 to	 be	
Kemalist.	 It	 could,	 therefore,	 be	 assumed	 that	 students	 in	 the	 Turkish	 educational	
system	are	not	expected	to	broaden	their	horizon	while	being	educated;	 instead,	 they	
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are	expected	to	accept	a	dogmatic	ideology	that	no	one	can	criticise	within	the	system,	
and	 further	 understand	 everything	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 this	 ideology.	With	 this	 in	




In	 the	 Turkish	 educational	 system,	 the	Ministry	 of	 National	 Education	 provides	 ‘guide	




1. Teachers	 should	 teach	 the	 following	 things	 wherever	
appropriate:	 Atatürk’s	 personality,	 his	 patriotism,	 his	




of	 the	 cities	 and	 such	 celebrations	 should	 be	 used	 to	
develop	students’	sense	of	history	and	their	sensitiveness.		
3. Teachers	 should	 speak	 about	 Atatürk’s	 personality,	 his	
reforms	 and	 his	 principles	 on	 these	 specific	 dates:	 29th	 of	
October	the	Republic	Day,	23rd	April	the	Children’s	Day,	19th	
May	 the	 Day	 of	 Remembrance	 of	 Atatürk	 and	 the	 Youth’s	
Day,	13th	October	when	Ankara	was	made	the	capital	city.	
4. Having	been	 inspired	by	Atatürk’s	 sayings	 ‘Oh	Turks!	Work	
and	trust!’,	‘How	happy	is	the	one	who	says	I’m	a	Turk’	and	
‘Peace	 in	 Turkey	 and	 peace	 in	 the	world’,	 teachers	 should	
show	the	role	that	the	Turks	played	in	history,	and	how	they	




way.	 After	 all	 of	 these	 repetitions,	 Atatürk	 appears	 to	 be	 an	 idol	 of	 the	 educational	
system	in	Turkey,	who	must	be	followed	by	any	means,	and	who	cannot	be	criticised	in	
any	way.	The	third	and	fourth	points	are	about	nationalist	feelings,	patriotism,	and	again	
Atatürk’s	 personality	 and	 Kemalism.	 Lastly,	 the	 fourth	 one	 appears	 to	 be	 more	
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nationalist,	overemphasising	the	‘Turkish	nation’	and	its	achievements.	In	particular,	the	
saying	 “How	 happy	 is	 the	 one	 who	 says	 I	 am	 a	 Turk”	 appears	 to	 be	 provoking	 and	
insulting	for	other	identities,	as	this	was	also	the	last	statement	of	the	‘Student	Pledge’	
which	has	 recently	been	abolished	as	part	of	 the	democratic	 reform	package	 in	2013.	
Besides	 this,	 this	 statement	was	 also	written	 on	 the	mountains	 and	 on	 the	 streets	 of	
south	east	of	Turkey	in	order	to	remind	the	Kurdish	population	what	they	are	supposed	
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In	‘Atatürk’s	Youth	Address’,	Turkish	youth	are	given	the	responsibility	of	preserving	the	




critically	 important.	Children	began	to	be	perceived	as	 the	 ‘future	of	 society’	and	they	






meant	 the	Turkish	blood	with	 the	phrase	 ‘the	noble	blood’	here,	which	 is	 yet	another	
indication	of	the	racist	rhetoric	in	Atatürk’s	nationalist	doctrine.	
	
Another	 issue	 is	 that	 the	 textbooks,	especially	 ‘Social	Sciences’	and	 the	 ‘History	of	 the	





acts	 to	 justify	 certain	 historical	 events,	 and	 apologise	 for	 others.	 As	 mentioned	 by	
Zürcher	 (2010:	 13),	 “we	will	 not	be	 surprised	 to	 find	 that	 in	 some	places	 it	 gives	us	 a	
rather	lopsided	view	of	historical	realities.”	Therefore,	it	could	be	hypothesised	that	the	
issues	 regarding	 the	 accuracy	 and	 the	objectivity	of	 the	historical	 realities	 are	derived	
from	the	use	of	the	Nutuk	as	the	primary	source	for	the	history	of	Turkey,	since	it	is	clear	
that	 the	 history	 textbooks	 are	 full	 of	 Atatürk’s	 quotations	 taken	 from	 the	 Nutuk.	 For	
example,	in	the	‘History	of	the	Turkish	Revolution	and	Kemalism’	textbook	(Başol	et	al.,	
2012a:	87),	one	of	the	units	talks	about	the	abolishment	of	the	Sultanate.	To	justify	the	
abolishment,	 the	 following	quote	 from	the	Nutuk	 is	mentioned:	“If	we	continued	with	
the	 Sultanate	 at	 that	 time,	 that	 would	 have	 been	 the	 worst	 thing	 done	 against	 the	
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Turkish	 nation.”	 This	 is	 just	 one	 example	 of	 how	 historical	 events	 are	 justified	 using	
quotes	from	Atatürk’s	Nutuk.	
	




his	principles,	 and	his	 reforms.	 It	 could	well	 be	 claimed	 that	Atatürk	 is	 portrayed	as	 a	
‘great	 hero’	 who	 did	 the	 right	 thing	 at	 the	 right	 time,	 and	 consequently	 saved	 the	




For	 instance,	 an	 interesting	 point	 drawn	 in	 this	 unit	 regarding	 this	 is	 given	 in	 a	 small	
information	box:	“Did	you	know	Atatürk’s	interest	towards	mathematics	continued	later	
in	his	life	as	well.	The	Geometry	Book	written	by	him	is	the	best	example	of	this	interest”	
(Başol	 et	 al.,	 2012a:	 18).	 There	 are	 also	 strange	 questions	 posed	 in	 small	 information	
boxes	 in	 order	 for	 students	 to	 brainstorm.	 For	 example,	 one	of	 them	asks:	 “Why	was	





In	 Atatürk’s	 time,	 there	wasn’t	 unity	 in	 education.	 There	were	
traditional	 schools	 dominated	 by	 religious	 education,	 western	
schools,	 military	 schools,	 non-Muslim	 schools,	 and	 there	 were	
even	a	lot	of	foreign	schools	opened	up	by	foreign	states	within	
the	borders	of	the	Empire.	All	these	schools	had	their	own	aims	
and	 targets,	 and	 thus	 educated	 children	 accordingly.	However,	
the	 best	 schools	 at	 the	 time	 were	 the	 military	 schools	 where	
education	 was	 given	 by	 experts	 and	 whose	 students	 were	
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to	 lay	 the	 ground	 before	 students	 are	 taught	 about	 the	 Unification	 of	 Education	 Law	
reform,	 and	 so	 that	 they	may	 understand	 that	 the	 Unification	 of	 Education	 Law	 was	
something	highly	necessary	at	the	time.	Secondly,	military	schools	are	claimed	to	have	
been	the	best;	naturally,	Atatürk	graduated	from	a	military	school.	The	objectivity	with	
which	 historical	 events	 are	 presented	 here	 is	 questionable	 and	 are	 all	 	 	 interpreted	
according	to	Atatürk’s	own	experiences	and	ideas.	
	
In	the	second	unit	of	the	book,	there	 is	a	topic	about	the	 ‘Armenian	 issue’.	 It	basically	
justifies	what	happened	to	the	Armenians	 in	1915.	 Interestingly,	quotes	from	different	
writers	are	given	as	anecdotes.	For	instance,	there	is	a	quote	from	an	Armenian	carpet	
maker	 Karapit	 Nedeniyan	 who	 says	 that,	 “We	 used	 to	 live	 peacefully.	 We	 as	 the	
Armenians	 were	 happier	 than	 even	 the	Muslims	 (in	 the	 Ottoman	 Empire).	 They	 [NB:	
Armenians	who	fought	the	Ottomans]	used	our	youth	to	realise	their	bad	dreams,	and	
now	we	are	in	different	regions	of	the	world”	(ibid.,	p.	34),	while	in	the	same	book	it	is	






teaching	history	according	to	the	 ideological	 interests	of	 the	nation-state,	which	might	
also	be	regarded	as	an	ethnocentric	way	of	writing/fictionalising	historical	events.	













movements	 when	 Anatolia	 was	 under	 invasion	 just	 after	World	War	 I.	 On	 this	 page,	
some	resistance	movements	are	labelled	negatively	because	they	refused	to	fight	along	
with	 the	movement	 founded	 by	 Atatürk,	 so	 they	 are	 portrayed	 as	movements	 which	
were	against	the	unity	and	independence	of	Turkey.	In	other	words,	they	are	regarded	
as	‘traitors’.	For	example,	the	‘Society	for	the	rise	of	the	Kurds’	and	the	‘Society	for	the	
rise	 of	 Islam’	 are	 two	 of	 these	movements	mentioned.	 In	 the	 textbook,	 the	 former	 is	
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On	page	100,	the	clothes	that	Muslim	people	wore	at	the	time	are	discredited.	Instead,	
Western	 clothes	 are	 regarded	as	 the	markers	of	modernity	 and	 civilisation.	When	 the	
prohibition	of	the	fez	(hat)	is	mentioned,	the	modern	hat	is	promoted	as	the	necessary	
modern	 alternative.	 On	 page	 100,	 it	 further	 adds	 that,	 “The	 transformation	 of	 the	
clothes	was	done	in	order	to	strengthen	the	national	unity	and	it	made	Turkish	people	
look	 modern.”	 Thus,	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 clothes	 is	 presented	 as	 something	
directly	related	to	the	national	unity	of	the	country.	However,	the	main	issue	here	is	that	
it	 does	 not	 mention	 that	 the	 people	 at	 that	 time	 were	 forced	 to	 wear	 new	modern	
clothes	 which	 were	 defined/chosen	 by	 the	 Turkish	 state	 –	 a	 stark	 example	 of	 the	
intervention	 of	 an	 authoritarian	 state	 into	 people’s	 personal	 choices,	 and	 even	 their	
private	 lives.	This	 further	 shows	how	 the	elite-led	Kemalist	modernisation	project	was	
operating	in	a	top	down,	dictating	way.	
	
It	 can	 also	 be	 observed	 in	 the	 textbooks	 that	 religious	 figures	 and	 their	 followers	 are	
excluded	from	history	entirely.	On	the	page	102,	it	says	that	“Turkey	cannot	be	a	country	
of	sheiks,	dervishes	and	religious	 leaders.”	Even	though	sheiks,	dervishes	and	religious	
leaders	 are	 still	 part	 of	 Turkey’s	 culture,	 they	 are	 excluded	 and/or	 insulted	 with	 this	
quotation	 which	 also	 appears	 highly	 offensive.	 Besides	 this,	 another	 quote	 from	 the	
Nutuk	 on	 the	 same	 page	 reads:	 “Can	 we	 consider	 the	 people	 who	 are	 following	 the	
Sheiks,	Dedes	17,	and	Sayyids	18	as	civilised	people?”	This	statement	seems	much	more	
provocative,	labelling	Sunni	Sheiks,	Alevi	Dedes	and	Sayyids	as	‘uncivilised	people’.	In	a	
country	 where	 a	 lot	 of	 people	 follow	 Sheiks	 (or	 religious	 leaders),	 Dedes	 (or	 Alevi	
leaders)	 and	 Sayyids,	 such	 a	 statement	 only	 contributes	 to	 furthering	 discrimination	
against	those	who	hold	such	identities.	
	
In	 the	 fourth	 unit,	 the	 Sheikh	 Said	 rebellion	 and	 the	 closure	 of	 the	 Progressive	
Republican	Party	(Terakkiperver	Cumhûriyet	Fırkası,	TCF)	are	mentioned	(and	the	latter	
is	justified).	As	a	matter	of	fact,	the	TCF	and	its	followers	are	considered	narrow-minded,	
                                            
17		 Dede	is	a	religious	figure	who	leads	the	prayers	in	Alevi	Cem	houses	(Alevi	Imams).	
18		 Sayyid	is	a	religious	figure	who	comes	from	the	Prophet	Muhammad’s	family.	
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as	shown	by	a	quote	taken	from	Atatürk’s	Nutuk:	“Gentlemen!	Don’t	the	narrow-minded	
people	who	see	our	great	achievement	of	 transformation	and	also	 the	abolishment	of	
old	 institutions	along	with	 superstitions	 follow	and	protect	 the	political	party	 19	which	
declares	‘it	has	respect	for	religious	thoughts	and	beliefs’?”	(Başol	et	al.,	2012a:	106).	It	
is	 remarkable	 that	 Atatürk’s	 argument	 for	 justifying	 the	 closure	 of	 the	 TCF	 is	 via	 the	
statement	 ‘the	 TCF	 has	 respect	 for	 religious	 thoughts	 and	 beliefs’	 as	 declared	 in	 the	
party’s	constitution.	It	is	surprising	that	‘having	respect	for	religious	beliefs’	is	regarded	














with	 her	works	 on	 Turkish	 culture	 and	 anthropology.	 It	 is	 stated	 that	 the	 reason	why	
Âfet	İnan	authored	these	studies	is	because	she	had	read	that	the	Turks	were	presented	
as	second	class	people	in	French	geography,	something	she	learned	about	when	she	was	
in	 France	 in	 1928,	 and	Atatürk	 thus	 ordered	 her	 to	 investigate	 the	 Turkish	 culture	 by	
saying:	 “Our	 ancestors	 who	 founded	 great	 states	 had	 also	 great	 civilisations.	
Investigating	 this	 civilisation	 and	 informing	 the	 Turks,	 thus	 the	world	 about	 this	 great	
                                            
19		 Atatürk	 here	 refers	 to	 the	 Terakkiperver	 Cumhûriyet	 Fırkası	 (Progressive	 Republican	 Party)	
established	in	1924,	and	closed	forcefully	by	the	Turkish	state	due	to	the	fact	that	the	Constitution	of	
the	party	stated	that	“the	party	respects	religious	thoughts	and	beliefs”.	
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civilisation	is	our	duty.”	The	two	projects	completed	as	part	of	this	cultural	study	laid	the	
foundation	 for	 the	 ‘Turkish	 History	 Institution’	 (Türk	 Târih	 Kurumu)	 and	 the	 ‘Turkish	
Language	 Institution’	 (Türk	 Dil	 Kurumu).	 Atatürk	 clearly	 saw	 that	 in	 order	 to	 build	 a	




by	 Atatürk	 before	 the	 public	 to	mark	 the	 10th	 anniversary	 of	 the	 republic.	 The	 entire	
transcription	of	the	speech	is	given	in	the	fourth	unit.	The	speech	appears	to	include	a	






member	of	 the	great	Turkish	nation,	 I	 feel	 the	deepest	 joy	and	
excitement	 for	 having	 achieved	 this	 happy	 day.	 (..)	 I	 have	 no	
doubt	that	we	shall	succeed	in	this,	because	the	Turkish	nation	is	
of	excellent	character.	The	Turkish	nation	is	 intelligent,	because	
the	 Turkish	 nation	 is	 capable	 of	 overcoming	 difficulties	 of	
national	 unity,	 and	 because	 it	 holds	 the	 torch	 of	 positive	
sciences.	 (..)	 I	 must	 make	 it	 clear	 with	 due	 emphasis,	 that	 a	
historical	 quality	 of	 the	 Turkish	 nation,	 which	 is	 an	 exalted	
human	community,	is	its	love	for	fine	arts	and	progress	in	them.	
(..)	The	Great	Turkish	Nation.	 (..)You	have	heard	me	speak	on	
many	occasions	over	the	 last	 fifteen	years	promising	success	 in	
the	tasks	we	undertook.	(..)	Never	have	doubted	that	the	great,	
but	 forgotten,	 civilized	 characteristic	 and	 the	 great	 civilized	
talents	of	the	Turkish	nation,	will,	in	its	progress	henceforth,	rise	
like	 a	 new	 sun	 from	 the	 high	 horizon	 of	 civilization	 for	 the	
future.The	Turkish	nation,I	express	my	heartfelt	wish	that	you	
will	 celebrate,	 after	 each	 decade	 elapsing	 into	 eternity,	 this	
great	 national	 day,	 in	 greater	 honor,	 happiness,	 peace	 and	
prosperity.How	happy	 it	 is	 to	 say	 that	 I	 am	a	 Turk!”	 (ibid.,	 p.	
128	[my	italics]).	
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The	 Tenth	 Year	 Speech	 of	 Atatürk	 clearly	 shows	 that	 Atatürk	 believed	 that	 he	 had	
succeeded	in	creating	a	‘new	nation’.	It	is	noticeable	that	some	statements	in	the	speech	
seem	to	be	very	nationalist	and	even	 racist.	The	bold	and	 italic	 statements	above	 talk	
about	 the	 greatness,	 the	 intelligence,	 and	 the	 excellent	 characteristics	 of	 the	 Turkish	
nation.	In	other	words,	the	speech	is	all	about	the	superiority	of	the	Turkish	nation.	
	
The	 topics	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 fourth	 unit	 are	 “Atatürk	 and	 Art”,	 “Atatürk	 and	Music”,	
“Atatürk	and	Sports”	and	“Atatürk	and	Sculpture”.	Each	of	these	topics	includes	quotes	
from	Atatürk,	 informing	students	how	Atatürk	has	given	 ‘great	 importance’	 to	each	of	
these	different	areas.	However,	under	these	topics,	a	lopsided	view	of	historical	events	





this,	 however,	 villagers	 preferred	 listening	 to	 Egyptian	 and	 Lebanese	 radio	 stations	
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The	 fifth	 unit	 is	 devoted	 to	 Kemalism	 which	 is	 presented	 by	 the	 textbook	 as	 a	
philosophical	 system	 of	 thought	 (Atatürkçülük	 in	 Turkish).	 In	 this	 unit,	 Kemalism	 is	
defined	as	a	system	that	‘aims	to	go	up	to	the	level	of	modern	civilisation	in	the	light	of	
the	national	culture,	mind	and	science’	(Başol	et	al.,	2012a:	140).		The	aims	of	Kemalism	
are	also	mentioned.	For	 instance,	one	of	 these	aims	 is	 to	 ‘have	and	keep	 the	national	




What	 is	 ironic	 is	 that	 even	 though	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 criticise	 Atatürk	 within	 the	
educational	system,	it	is	mentioned	that	“Kemalism	is	not	based	on	dogmas,	instead,	it	is	
based	upon	rationalism	and	science”	(ibid.,	p.	141).	In	fact,	it	 is	not	‘legally’	possible	to	
criticise	 Atatürk/Kemalism	 even	 outside	 schools	 according	 to	 Law	 5816	 ‘Concerning	










right	 side,	 it	 says	 “Keep	 calm	 and	 Stay	 Laik	 (laic/secular)”,	 ridiculing	 the	 overstated	
- 142 - 
discourse	 of	 ‘laicism’	 within	 Kemalism.	 These	 examples	 clearly	 show	 a	 trend	 among	
younger	 generations	 in	 terms	 of	 how	 social	 media	 (especially	 Facebook	 and	 Twitter)	
















any	 threat	 against	 the	 state;	 the	 statements	 in	 the	 textbook	 thus	 seem	 open	 to	
misinterpretation	 and	 might,	 therefore,	 be	 used	 as	 a	 justification	 for	 military	
interventions	into	politics.	
	
Under	 the	 subtitle	 “How	 happy	 is	 the	 one	 who	 says	 I	 am	 a	 Turk”,	 the	 definition	 of	
Atatürk’s	 nationalism	 is	 defined	 and	 explained	 via	 his	 quotes.	 Atatürk’s	 nationalism	 is	
defined	 as	 “to	 love	 the	 nation,	 aiming	 to	 develop	 it	 and	 trying	 to	work	 for	 this	 goal.	
Atatürk’s	nationalism	principle	regards	everyone,	who	recognises	themselves	as	a	Turk	
and	who	is	proud	of	being	a	Turk	believing	the	future	of	our	history,	homeland	and	our	
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151).	It	is	also	mentioned	that	the	Independence	War	was	won	with	the	great	efforts	of	
the	Turkish	nation	relying	on	Turkish	nationalism.	Despite	these	statements	and	quotes,	
ironically,	 the	next	page	 starts	with	 the	 sentence	“Atatürk’s	principle	of	nationalism	 is	
not	based	on	racism,	because	for	him,	one	who	considers	himself/herself	as	a	Turk	is	a	
Turk	regardless	of	their	religion	and	ideology”	(ibid.,	p.	152).	In	this	case,	Turkish	identity	
is	 offered	 as	 a	 supra-national	 identity	 every	 citizen	 in	 Turkey	 is	 expected	 to	






in	 history.	 For	 example,	 the	 reconstruction	 of	 history	 and	 language	 are	 two	 of	 these	
elements;	and	they	have	been	used	in	the	Turkish	case,	too.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	they	are	
still	 being	 used	 by	 the	 Turkish	 state.	 For	 instance,	 it	 is	mentioned	 that	 “the	 elements	
that	 support	 Atatürk’s	 nationalism	 are	 national	 education,	 national	 borders,	 common	
language,	common	history,	national	culture,	the	sense	of	Turkishness	and	moral	values”	
(ibid.,	 p.	 153).	 The	 textbook	 admits	 that	 these	 elements	 are	 crucial	 for	 Atatürk’s	
nationalism,	that	is	to	say	that	Atatürk’s	nationalism,	thus	his	ideal	nation,	were	built	on	









expressed	 his	 views	 during	 this	 visit	 and	 was	 told	 by	 the	 general	 that:	 “I	 do	 not	
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understand	why	you	wear	this	hat	(referring	to	the	fez).	As	long	as	you	wear	this,	no	one	
will	have	respect	 for	your	views”	(Özcan,	2014).	At	the	end	of	this	story,	 it	 is	 told	that	
this	 conversation	affected	Mustafa	Kemal	deeply,	 and	made	him	believe	 that	 the	way	
Turkish	 people	 dressed	 was	 not	 respected,	 so	 this	 became	 the	 reason	 for	 why	 he	
revolutionised	the	way	they	dressed.	One	of	the	reasons	to	tell	students	this	story	is	that	
students	are	expected	to	leave	the	class	believing	that	the	fez	was	out-dated,	and	that	
Atatürk	did	the	necessary	thing	by	banning	 it.	 Indeed,	 the	book	 later	remarks	that	 the	
clothes	 worn	 during	 Ottoman	 times,	 such	 as	 fez,	 were	 ‘out-dated’,	 while	 Western	
clothes	are	regarded	as	‘modern’	(ibid.,	p.	92).	
	
The	Armenian	 incidents	were	mentioned	earlier	 in	 the	primary	school	 textbook,	which	
presented	the	Turkish	version	of	the	1915	events.	There	are	more	details	regarding	the	
1915	Armenian	 incidents	 in	 the	secondary	 school	 textbook.	 It	basically	 claims	 that	 the	
Armenian	 groups	 helped	 the	 Russians	 enter	 the	 Ottoman	 lands	 in	 WWI.	 They	 also	
attacked	Turkish	villages	in	the	east	of	Turkey	by	taking	advantage	of	the	on-going	war,	
and	 they	 rioted	 in	 Kayseri,	 Kahramanmaraş,	 Muş,	 Bitlis,	 Diyarbakır,	 Elazığ	 and	 Van	
provinces,	 massacring	 villagers.	 After	 giving	 this	 information,	 it	 states	 that	 the	 1915	
Deportation	Law	entered	into	force	(ibid.,	p.	23).	However,	the	other	side	of	the	story	is	
ignored	 in	 the	 textbook,	 which	 is	 that	 massacres	 of	 innocent	 Armenians	 took	 place	
during	the	‘deportation’.	It	could,	therefore,	be	hypothesised	that	the	textbook	seems	to	
impose	a	specific	judgement	on	such	a	controversial	issue	and	make	students	think	that	
the	 Armenians	 were	 entirely	 wrong	 about	 the	 ‘massacres’	 taking	 place	 in	 1915.	
Furthermore,	 page	 29	 talks	 about	 ‘harmful	 organisations’	 founded	 before	 the	 Turkish	
War	 of	 Independence	 and	 mentions	 the	 Armenian	 Hunchakian	 Organisation,	 whose	
main	aim	is	said	to	have	been	to	found	an	Armenian	state	in	Eastern	Anatolia.	Thus,	the	





school	 is	 discredited	 (ibid.,	 p.	 79);	 in	 fact,	 this	 is	 regarded	 as	 a	 threat	 to	 the	 national	
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unity	 of	 the	 country.	 It	 goes	 on	 to	 say	 that	 this	 is	 the	 reason	 why	 Mustafa	 Kemal	
transformed	 the	Turkish	education	 system	with	 the	Unification	of	Education	 Law.	This	
obviously	served	to	justify	what	had	been	done.	
	
On	 page	 86,	 there	 is	 a	 small	 information	 box	with	 a	 question	 and	 an	 answer.	 It	 asks:	
“What	type	of	people	does	the	Turkish	educational	system	want?”	and	the	answer	given	
underneath	 is:	 “The	 main	 target	 of	 the	 Turkish	 national	 education	 is	 to	 make	 each	
individual	of	the	Turkish	nation	embrace	Kemalist	principles,	the	Kemalist	interpretation	
of	 Turkish	 nationalism	 that	 is	 stated	 in	 the	 Constitution,	 the	 Turkish	 national,	 moral,	
humanist,	spiritual	and	cultural	values.	It	also	aims	to	make	them	love	their	family,	their	
homeland,	and	their	nation…”	This	looks	quite	similar	when	compared	to	the	main	goals	
of	 Turkish	 national	 education,	 which	 is	 listed	 in	 the	 policies	 of	 the	 Turkish	 national	
education.	 Therefore,	 expressions	 such	 as	 ‘Turkishness’,	 ‘Turkish	 nation’,	 ‘Kemalist	
principles’	 and	 ‘Kemalist	 nationalism’	 appear	 to	 be	 controversial	 issues	 in	 this	 text.	 In	
other	words,	 the	text	assumes	that	 there	 is	a	homogeneous	Kemalist	Turkish	group	of	
people	being	educated	 in	Turkish	schools,	 ignoring	different	ethnicities	and	 ideologies,	
which,	in	fact,	amounts	to	the	exclusion	of	‘others’	in	society.	
	






nation’.	 In	 this	 text,	one	of	Atatürk’s	quotes	 reads	 “[the]	 Islamic	world	 can	be	divided	
into	 two	 groups,	 one	 is	 the	 ignorant	 people	 constituting	 the	majority	 and	 the	 second	
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The	textbook	mentions	that	the	most	significant	person	which	impressed	Atatürk	deeply	
was	 Ziya	 Gökalp.	 It	 says	 Gökalp	 was	 one	 of	 the	 people	 who	 contributed	 a	 lot	 to	 the	
literature	 regarding	 the	 idea	 of	 Turkish	 nationalism.	 He	 affected	 Atatürk	 with	 his	
nationalist	views.	He	thought	that	education	and	economy	should	be	national,	and	that	





photos	 with	 different	 statements	 given	 underneath.	 The	 question	 is	 “Please	 use	 the	
photos	and	statements	below,	and	discuss	what	factors	affect	the	acceptance	of	an	idea	
and	 a	 leader	 by	 society.”	 Mussolini	 and	 Hitler	 are	 seen	 in	 the	 first	 photo	 and	 the	
statement	given	underneath	 is	“Italian	fascist	Mussolini	was	hanged	by	his	people	and	
the	 leader	of	 the	Nazi	Germany	Hitler	 committed	 suicide”.	 There	 is	 a	 statue	of	 Stalin,	
seen	demolished	on	the	ground	in	the	second	photo	and	it	reads:	“Communist	Russian	
leader	 Stalin’s	 statue	 demolished	 by	 the	 people	 of	 Georgia,	 2010”.	 The	 third	 and	 the	





am	 not	 a	 dictator.	 They	 say	 that	 I	 have	 power.	 Yes,	 I	 do.	 I	 can	 do	 everything	 I	want.	
However,	I	do	not	act	ruthlessly.	I	think	a	dictator	is	someone	who	subjugates	people’s	
will.	 I,	 however,	 want	 to	 rule	 not	 by	 breaking	 people’s	 hearts,	 but	 by	 winning	 them	
[over]”.		
	
This	 section	 seems	 to	 aim	 to	 make	 students	 think	 that	 Atatürk	 was	 not	 a	 ‘dictator’,	
because	the	Turkish	people	were	mourning	after	his	death	(as	seen	in	the	photo	above),	
and	 they	 still	 love	 Atatürk,	 while	 this	 is	 contrasted	 with	 other	 dictators	 such	 as	
Mussolini,	Hitler	and	Stalin	who	were	not	accepted	by	their	own	people	after	they	died	





















The	 Republic	 and	 its	 virtues	 are	 mentioned	 on	 page	 136.	 The	 textbook	 relates	 the	
Turkish	Republic	to	the	Turkish	nation,	and	further	sees	them	as	inseparable.	In	order	to	
support	 this	 argument,	 one	 of	 Atatürk’s	 statements	 is	 given,	 which	 reads:	 “We	 are	
straight	nationalists	and	Turkish	nationalists,	and	the	basis	of	our	Republic	is	the	Turkish	
nation.	 Thus,	 as	 long	 as	 the	 individuals	 of	 this	 nation	 are	 full	 of	 Turkish	 culture,	 this	
means	 that	 the	 Republic	 that	 is	 based	 upon	 this	 nation	 remains	 powerful”.	 In	 this	
section,	 it	 gives	 the	 impression	 that	 because	 the	 Republic	 is	 related	 to	 the	 Turkish	
nation,	and	because	its	life	is	bound	to	the	existence	of	the	Turkish	culture,	it	is	argued	
here	 that	 the	 Turkish	 Republic	 automatically	 excludes	 other	 nations	 living	 in	 Turkey.	







148).	 The	 attempt	 to	 redefine	 the	 meaning	 of	 Turkishness,	 however,	 has	 obscured	
assimilation	attempts	 taken	by	 the	 state.	 Furthermore,	 this	definition	does	not	 reflect	
reality,	either,	because	Atatürk’s	nationalist	speeches	and	the	nationalist	policies	of	the	
Turkish	 state,	 such	 as	 the	 attempted	 Turkification	 of	 the	 Kurds,	 clearly	 show	 that	 the	
Turkish	Republic’s	approach	 to	Turkishness	was	predicated	on	a	 ‘racial’	 sense	 in	many	












Pages	 165-171	 are	 devoted	 to	 Atatürk’s	 ‘statism’	 principle.	 All	 reforms	 and	
nationalisation	policies	of	the	Turkish	state	in	Atatürk’s	period	were	mentioned.	What	is	
remarkable	 in	 this	 section	 is	 that	 along	with	 historical	 facts	 and	policies,	 students	 are	
expected	to	accept	and	embrace	‘statism’	as	a	significant	principle	in	their	lives,	and	to	
defend	 it	 accordingly.	 Furthermore,	 the	 textbook	 relates	 the	 ‘statism’	 principle	 to	 the	









Atatürk’s	 Principles	 are	 the	 foundations	 of	 the	 new	 Turkish	
Republic.	 These	 principles	 that	 accepted	 the	 leadership	 of	
rationalism	 and	 science	 aim	 to	make	 the	 Turkish	 nation	more	
advanced	and	civilised	(…)	Therefore,	the	continuity	of	Turkey’s	
reputable	 position	 depends	 on	 Atatürk’s	 principles.	 Also,	 to	
preserve	the	national	unity	and	national	unification,	to	develop	
democracy,	 to	 maintain	 the	 prosperity	 of	 the	 people,	 and	 to	
make	 rationalism	 and	 science	 dominant	 in	 all	 areas,	 the	
protection	of	Atatürk’s	Principles	is	crucial	(ibid.,	p.	187).	
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The	quote	above	shows	that	students	and	all	citizens	in	Turkey	are	supposed	to	embrace	





- To	 avoid	 behaviours	 which	might	 harm	 national	 unity	 and	
unification	
- To	work	hard	 in	every	 field	 in	order	to	develop	the	Turkish	
Republic	











One	of	 the	 findings	 that	emerge	 from	critical	 analysis	of	 textbooks	 is	 that	 they	clearly	
promote	 the	 sanctification	 of	 Mustafa	 Kemal	 Atatürk.	 The	 excessive	 use	 of	 the	
personality	of	Atatürk	 in	 the	 textbooks	appears	 to	 construct	 and	maintain	 ‘the	 cult	of	
Atatürk’.	As	can	be	seen	in	the	textbooks,	this	automatically	leads	to	the	indoctrination	
of	 the	 Kemalist	 ideology	 into	 pupil’s	 minds.	 Kemalism	 is	 exaggerated	 and	 privileged	
above	other	ideologies	in	society.	
	
Apart	 from	Kemalism,	 ‘Turkish	 nationalism’	 is	 also	 presented	 as	 something	 that	 every	
student	 must	 embrace	 regardless	 of	 their	 ethnic	 backgrounds.	 For	 example,	 in	 every	
context	 in	 which	 the	 concepts	 ‘nationalism’	 and	 ‘patriotism’	 are	 used,	 ‘Turkish	
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nationalism’	 is	 always	 meant.	 In	 fact,	 the	 textbooks	 always	 refer	 to	 ‘nationalism’	 as	




Turkish	 nationalism	 under	 the	 guise	 of	 Atatürk	 nationalism	 (which	 is	 presented	 as	 a	
supra-national	identity	in	the	textbooks)	it	can	nonetheless	clearly	be	seen	that	‘ethnic	
nationalism’	 constitutes	 Atatürk	 nationalism.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 textbooks	 contradict	
themselves,	 claiming	 that	 Atatürk	 nationalism	 does	 not	 take	 an	 ethnic	 and	 racist	
approach,	while	 simultaneously	 referencing	 Turkishness	 in	 an	 ethnic	 sense	within	 the	
context	of	nationalism.	Likewise,	 in	a	 recent	 research	 that	 revised	all	 textbooks	within	
the	 framework	 of	 human	 rights,	 it	 has	 been	 concluded	 that	 “the	 national	 identity	 in	
textbooks	 excludes	 universal	 experience	 and	 the	 outside	 world,	 and	 is	 based	 on	 an	
understanding	 that	 looks	 at	 every	 concept	 with	 an	 ethno-centrist	 vision.	 Rather	 than	






‘obedient	 citizens’	 who	 cannot	 criticise	 the	 official	 ideology,	 Kemalism	 and	 Turkish	
nationalism,	 in	 any	 way.	 One	 of	 the	 possible	 outcomes	 of	 this	 might	 be	 that	
pupils/students	may	not	easily	develop	 critical	 thinking	 skills	 in	 an	educational	 system	
like	this.	In	fact,	as	mentioned	by	İnce	(2012),	who	studied	the	effects	of	the	ideological	
educational	 system	 on	 students’	 creativity,	 it	 appears	 that	 both	 Turkish	 and	 Kurdish	
students	 experience	 serious	 difficulties	when	 attempting	 to	 discuss	 issues	 in	 a	 critical	
way.	
	
Along	 with	 the	 ethnocentric	 approach	 that	 is	 embedded	 within	 the	 Kemalist	
interpretation	of	nationalism,	what	 is	more	striking	 is	 that	sometimes	racist	 rhetoric	 is	
also	 very	 noticeable	 in	 the	 Kemalist	 ideology.	 Textbooks	 usually	 talk	 about	 ‘the	











constituent	 parts	 of	 Turkey.	 When	 other	 ethnicities	 are	 mentioned	 in	 the	 textbooks,	
such	 as	 the	 Kurds	 and	 Armenians,	 these	 are	 always	 in	 a	 negative	 context	 of	 illegal	
organisations	plotting	the	downfall	of	the	Ottoman	Empire	for	the	sake	of	creating	their	
own	 states.	 Similarly,	 as	 Çayır	 (2014:	 119)	 puts	 it,	 statements	 in	 the	 textbook	 that	
“present	 the	 country,	 identity,	 language,	 etc.	 as	 being	 constantly	 under	 threat”	make	
students	 be	 paranoid	 about	 other	 nations,	 and	 this	 may	 further	 cause	 conspiracy	
theories	 among	 students,	 since	 the	 theory	 that	 foreign	 countries	 usually	 have	 secret	
plans	 to	 divide	 or	 destroy	 Turkey	 is	 so	 common	 in	 society	 (Zeydanlıoğlu	 and	 Güneş,	
2013).	 This	 clearly	 excludes,	 and	 even	 alienates	 ‘other’	 identities.	 Furthermore,	 this	






from	 the	point	of	Mustafa	Kemal	Atatürk	 alone,	 since	 the	Nutuk	 is	 taken	as	 the	main	
source	of	Turkish	history.	This	reinforces	the	 idea	of	an	official	history	narrative	within	
the	Turkish	educational	system	that	cannot	be	deviated	from.	












Teachers’	 views	are	 considered	very	 important	 in	 this	 thesis,	 since	 they	are	 influential	
actors	who	have	the	power	to	affect	their	students.	Furthermore,	they	are	able	to	shape	
the	 next	 generation	 of	 the	 country.	 This	 is	why	what	 they	 think	 about	 these	 issues	 is	
worth	knowing,	and	it	would	further	help	us	understand	how	these	issues	are	viewed	by	










- 154 - 
artificial	 and	exploited	by	external/foreign	powers.	 21	 For	 them,	 it	 is	 not	 true	 that	 the	









it	 does	 are	 nothing	 but	 only	 stooges	 and	 servants	 of	 the	 global	 powers”	 (Habertürk,	









ones	 who	want	 other	 people	 to	 believe	 that	 it	 does	 are	 actually	 benefiting	 from	 the	




                                            
21		 The	term	‘external/foreign	powers’	is	quite	famous	in	Turkey.	In	fact,	it	could	be	claimed	that	it	has	
become	a	myth	of	the	Turkish	political	life.	For	almost	every	issue	in	Turkey,	external/foreign	powers	
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This	 peace	 process	 is	 not	 a	 negotiation	 between	 the	 Turkish	
people	 and	 the	Kurdish	people.	 The	people	who	 represent	 the	
Kurds	 in	 the	 peace	 process	 are	 not	 the	 real	 representatives	 of	
the	Kurdish	people.	The	man	living	in	an	island	(adadaki	zat)	22	
does	not	represent	the	Kurdish	people,	he	cannot.	These	people	
have	 hidden	 agendas;	 they	 have	 different	 aims,	 like	 having	 a	
separate	 Kurdish	 state	 etc.	 They	 are	 after	 their	 own	 benefits;	






For	 Mete,	 the	 HDP,	 the	 PKK	 and	 Abdullah	 Öcalan	 seem	 to	 benefit	 from	 the	 Kurdish	
Question	and	there	is	no	point	negotiating	with	them	for	the	solution	to	this	problem.	It	
is	 obvious	 from	 responses	 that	 there	 is	 a	 tendency	 to	 believe	 that	 the	 people	 who	
represent	the	Kurds	in	Parliament	or	claim	to	fight	on	their	behalf	are	‘the	Kurdish	elites’	
who	 benefit	 from	 the	 issue	 and	 want	 the	 issue	 to	 exist	 for	 their	 own	 sake.	 Another	
teacher,	Attila,	also	claimed	that	“Kurdish	elites	have	been	talking	about	 this	 so-called	
Kurdish	problem	since	 the	1980s	and	 I	 think	 they	now	became	 successful,	 as	many	 in	
Turkey	started	thinking	that	the	Kurdish	problem	is	Turkey’s	reality.”	
	
However,	 the	 Kurdish	 elites	 are	 not	 only	 seen	 as	 problem	 creators,	 but	 also	 ‘traitors’	
who	are	controlled	by	‘external	powers’.	For	example,	Beyhan	argued	that	“this	problem	
was	 created	by	 a	 few	 rich	Kurds	who	have	 close	 relations	with	external	 powers.	 They	
have	 always	 been	 sponsored	 by	 these	 powers	 and	 it	 is	 obvious	 that	 they	 should	 act	
according	 to	 their	 ambitions.”	 Asena	 also	 claimed	 that	 “They	 fabricated	 the	 so-called	
Kurdish	 problem	 and	 they	 now	 want	 to	 solve	 it.	 The	 government	 has	 made	 some	
concessions.	It	was	said	that	there	are	demands	from	the	Kurdish	side.	I	think	these	are	
all	games	 in	order	to	divide	our	country,	Turkey.	 I	do	not	want	to	go	 into	details	here,	
such	as	[blaming]	America,	Israel	[as]	behind	all	of	this,	etc.	I	see	all	of	this	as	a	game	to	
                                            
22		 He	 is	 referring	 to	 Abdullah	 Öcalan	 here;	 Öcalan	 has	 been	 prisoned	 in	 an	 island	 called	 İmralı	 in	
Marmara	Sea	since	he	was	caught	by	the	Turkish	intelligence.	
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split	Turkey.”	It	might	be	argued	that	focussing	on	the	actors	and	not	the	problem	itself	
appears	to	be	the	main	problem	in	this	case,	as	the	matter	that	should	be	investigated	
here	 is	whether	 the	Kurdish	Question	 really	exists	or	not,	and	 this	 should	be	done	via	





study	 shows	 that	 32.8%	 of	 the	 respondents	 (the	 highest	 proportion)	 answered	 the	




Kurdish	Question	 today	 is	 a	 continuation	 of	 intervention	 by	Western	 powers	 requires	
tangible	evidences.	However,	when	Beyhan	was	asked,	“How	do	you	think	that	the	West	
supports	 the	 Kurds?”,	 she	 replied,	 “It	 is	 obvious,	 the	 weapons	 the	 PKK	 terrorists	 are	
using	 are	 Western-made.”	 The	 main	 issue	 therefore	 is	 that	 these	 teachers	 link	 the	
Kurdish	problem	to	Western	countries	(the	‘external	powers’	in	other	words),	something	
which	is	very	easy	to	do	since	the	claim	that	the	PKK	is	armed	by	Westerners	is	quite	a	
popular	 one	 in	 Turkey.	 However,	 this	 approach	 would	 be	 very	 naïve,	 as	 the	 Kurdish	
problem	itself	cannot	be	oversimplified	due	to	its	complex	cultural,	political	dimensions.	




When	 it	 comes	 to	 the	historical	 exclusion	of	Kurdish	people	 in	 Turkey,	 these	 teachers	
also	deny	this	claim	altogether.	For	example,	Asena	argued	that,		
	
I	 have	been	 a	 teacher	 for	 years,	 and	 I	 have	never	 experienced	
any	exclusion	affecting	 the	Kurdish	students	directly.	There	are	
problems	but	these	problems	are	due	to	the	fact	that	the	region	
- 157 - 
is	not	as	developed	as	the	western	part	of	the	country,	so	this	is	




not	 observe	 anything	 like	 this.	My	 Kurdish	 students	 are	 happy	 in	 their	 classes.”	 Attila	
adds,	“Some	people	want	the	Kurdish	students	to	feel	excluded,	that	is	why	some	say	so,	
but	 this	 is	 not	 the	 reality	 when	 you	 go	 to	 schools.”	 Here	 the	 views	 of	 the	 teachers	
coming	from	the	nationalist	background	appear	very	rejectionist,	claiming	that	there	is	





feeling	 excluded	 in	 the	 system	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 exclusivist	 system.	 This	 is	 further	
reinforced	 by	 the	 claim	 highlighted	 by	many	 other	 teachers	 that	 there	 is	 definitely	 a	
language	barrier	 that	Kurdish	 students	 face	when	 they	 start	 school.	Therefore,	even	 if	
the	development	level	of	the	region	is	a	factor	affecting	the	quality	of	education	and	the	
achievement	 of	 students,	 this	 does	 not	 alter	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 Kurdish	 students	 face	
integration	 problems	 in	 in	 the	 Turkish	 educational	 system,	 with	 the	 language	 barrier	
being	the	most	obvious	sign	of	this.	
	
Ceyda	 says,	 “I	 do	 not	 believe	 that	 my	 Kurdish	 friends	 share	 the	 view	 of	 those	 using	
terrorism	for	 their	own	benefits.	The	Kurdish	people	do	not	have	any	objection	to	the	




might	 be	 founded	 in	 the	 region,	 and	 they,	 therefore,	 prefer	 that	 differentiation	 to	
reassure	 themselves.	 Likewise,	 another	 teacher,	 Melike,	 argued	 that	 “The	 Kurdish	
people	are	deceived	by	the	terrorists	who	have	a	desire	to	establish	a	separate	Kurdish	
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state,	because	they	are	mostly	uneducated	and	ignorant.	So,	it	is	really	easy	to	deceive	
these	 kind	 of	 people.”	 Here	 it	 appears	 that	 there	 is	 another	 issue,	 that	 of	 labelling	







commented	 that	 “I	 am	 sorry	 to	 say	 this,	 but	we	will	 probably	 see	 a	 separate	 Kurdish	
state	at	the	end	of	this	so-called	peace	process.”	Mete	added	another	point	by	saying,	“I	
do	not	understand	 this	at	all,	 as	 there	 is	already	peace	 in	 the	 region	between	people,	
between	 the	 Turkish	 and	 the	 Kurdish	 and	 the	 Arabic	 people.	 The	 war,	 however,	 is	
between	 the	 PKK	 and	 the	 Turkish	 army.	 So	 peace	 for	 whom?	 The	 Kurds	 or	 the	 PKK	
terrorists?	 I	do	not	want	and	cannot	support	any	effort	 to	establish	peace	 for	 the	PKK	
terrorists.”	 It	 seems	 that	 there	 are	 two	 different	 points	 mentioned	 by	 the	 Turkish	
nationalist	teachers	here.	First,	the	fear	that	Turkey	will	be	divided	appears	to	drive	the	
nationalists’	feelings,	but	this	fear	seems	to	stem	from	history,	and	the	dissolution	of	the	
Ottoman	 Empire	 and	 the	 anxiety	 it	 caused	 in	 society	 afterwards.	 Furthermore,	 these	
teachers	seem	to	be	obsessed	with	the	unitary	structure	of	the	Turkish	state.	In	fact,	this	
fear	 is	still	a	commonly	shared	belief	 in	society	 in	Turkey	(Kentel	et	al.,	2007).	Second,	





                                            
23		 ‘White	Turks’	is	the	term	used	to	define	people	who	see	themselves	as	the	ones	who	could	and	even	
should	design	and	modernise	Turkey.	 It	basically	 represents	a	privileged	position	over	all	others	 in	
Turkey.	
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On	 the	 other	 hand,	 not	 all	 teachers	 see	 ‘the	 Kurdish	 elites/terrorists’	 as	 the	 sole	
perpetrators	of	 the	Kurdish	problem,	since	another	teacher,	Utku,	argued	that	“I	 think	














significant	 point	 to	mention	 is	 that	 the	 ones	 that	 deny	 there	 is	 a	 Kurdish	 problem	 in	
Turkey	prefer	to	use	inexplicit	expressions	such	as	“the	man	living	in	an	island”	or	even	
dysphemistic	ones	such	as	“baby	killer”,	both	referring	to	Abdullah	Öcalan.	Besides,	they	
refer	 intentionally	 to	 PKK	 militants	 as	 “terrorists”.	 Speaking	 of	 using	 inexplicit	 and	
dysphemistic	expressions,	it	is	also	worth	mentioning	here	that	the	expressions	used	by	
the	 media	 to	 refer	 to	 Abdullah	 Öcalan	 in	 Turkey	 was	 also	 “baby	 killer”,	 “terrorist	
chieftain”,	 and	 “leader	 of	 a	 bloody	 organisation”	 (Çelik,	 2013a).	 However,	 since	 the	
beginning	of	 the	Kurdish	opening	and	the	peace	process,	most	of	 the	media	 in	Turkey	
(newspapers	 and	 television	 broadcasts)	 have	 been	 referring	 to	 him	 simply	 Abdullah	
Öcalan.	 This	 is	 just	 an	 example	 of	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 change	 in	 state	 language	 on	 the	
language	used	by	the	media,	which	is	significant.	
	
One	great	difference	among	 the	 views	of	 the	 teachers	who	deny	 the	existence	of	 the	
Kurdish	 issue	 is	 that	when	some	were	asked	about	 the	exclusion	of	 the	Kurds,	even	 if	
they	denied	the	exclusion	(as	the	nationalists	did)	via	similar	reasons,	they	did	however	
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divert	 the	 topic	 to	 the	 exclusion	 of	 the	 Alevi	 students	 in	 the	 educational	 system.	 For	
example,	Ufuk	argued	that,	“The	exclusion	we	should	talk	about	is	not	the	exclusion	of	
an	ethnic	group,	as	this	 is	not	the	case.	 Instead,	we	should	talk	about	the	exclusion	of	
other	 religious	 groups	 such	 as	 the	 Alevis.”	 Koray	 adds,	 “The	 Alevi	 students	 have	
difficulties	 in	 this	 system	 designed	 by	 the	 Sunni	Muslims.	 If	 you	 are	 not	 a	 Sunni,	 you	
cannot	 have	 any	 sense	 of	 belonging	 to	 this	 system.”	 It	 is	 true	 that	 the	 Sunni	
interpretation	of	Islam	still	dominates	the	Religious	Culture	and	Moral	Culture	textbook,	
even	 if	content	regarding	the	Alevi	 interpretation	of	 Islam	was	added	recently.	 In	 fact,	
the	 role	 of	 the	 Presidency	 of	 Religious	 Affairs,	 an	 official	 religious	 institution,	 is	 to	
represent	the	Sunni	Islam,	appointing	Imams	for	the	mosques,	having	a	responsibility	for	
all	kinds	of	religious	issues.	So,	the	issue	is	actually	more	complex	than	it	seems,	as	the	





the	 country,	 such	 as	 reforms	 completed	 at	 the	Ak	 Party’s	 behest.	One	of	 the	 reasons	
they	do	not	support	the	peace	process	is	because	of	the	Ak	Party	itself,	since	statements	
such	as	“the	Ak	Party	 is	the	project	of	the	external	powers”	or	“the	AKP	wants	to	split	






issue	 and	 voiced	 their	 intentions	 to	 resolve	 it.	 For	 instance,	 Necmeddin	 Erbakan,	
Turkey’s	first	Islamist	prime	minister	(also	known	as	the	father	of	the	Turkish	Islamism	in	
politics)	made	important	points	in	his	party’s	fourth	convention	in	1993,	saying	that	the	
Kurds	 and	 terrorism	 are	 two	 different	 concepts	 that	 should	 be	 separated	 from	 each	
other,	that	the	problem	cannot	be	solved	through	military	means,	and	that	the	right	to	
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to	 use	 Turkish	 nationalism	 as	 the	 sole	 foundation	 of	 the	 new	
state,	 a	 policy	 that	 deliberately	 excluded	 and	 alienated	 the	
Kurds	 from	 the	 Turkish	 republic.	 To	 them,	 ethnic	 divisions	 are	
artificial;	the	Welfare	Party	naturally	contends	that	 if	 Islam	had	
formed	 the	 foundation	of	 the	 state,	 the	Kurds	would	not	have	













with	 a	 significant	 emphasis	 on	 Turkishness,	 [something]	 which	 caused	 serious	
problems.”	 Another	 teacher,	 Muhammed,	 also	 states	 that	 “Mustafa	 Kemal	 had	 the	
vision	of	creating	a	new	country	with	a	sole	nation;	and	Turkey	then	became	a	nation-
state.	 I	 think	all	problems	stem	 from	this	 status	of	modern	Turkey.	 I	mean	 founding	a	
nation-state	was	the	biggest	mistake	[and]	creating	other	mistakes	over	time.”	For	such	
people,	 nationalism	 and	 the	 nation-state	 seem	 to	 be	 two	main	 problematic	 concepts	
                                            
24		 The	Welfare	Party	was	an	Islamist	political	party	founded	by	Necmeddin	Erbakan	in	1983	and	banned	
from	politics	in	1998.	
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which	brought	about	a	new	order	in	Turkey.	There	is	certainly	credence	to	the	argument	
that	by	establishing	a	state	based	on	a	particular	nation	in	a	place	that	was	home	to	the	
multiculturalism	of	 the	Ottoman	Empire	appears	 to	be	a	 serious	mistake	made	by	 the	




the	 Turkish	 nation:	 a)	 political	 unity;	 b)	 linguistic	 unity;	 c)	








further	 imposing	 this	 single	 identity	 on	 every	 citizen	 through	 the	 institutions	 of	 the	
nation-state.	 This,	 of	 course,	 created	 a	 reaction	 amongst	 non-Turkish	 ethnic	 groups	
(Updegraff,	2012).	
	
Some	 of	 these	 teachers	 also	 reference	 Islam	 while	 discussing	 the	 Kurdish	 issue.	 For	
instance,	 Ramazan	 argued	 that	 “Unfortunately,	 Turkey	 did	 not	 previously	 accept	
ethnicities	other	 than	 the	Turkish	one.	 If	 Turkey	 respected	 Islam	and	 its	 humanitarian	
values,	the	situation	would	have	been	much	better,	because	Islam	does	not	allow	us	to	
prioritise	our	ethnicity.”	Likewise,	Ayşe	states,	“The	Kemalist	elites	considered	Islam	as	a	
scapegoat	and	wanted	 to	 replace	 it	with	 the	 idea	of	nationalism;	but	 it	 is	 strange	and	
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liberals	in	Turkey,	as	it	might	be	said	that	the	Islamists’	views	are	very	similar	to	liberal	
intellectuals	 in	 Turkey	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 Kurdish	 issue	 –	 except	 the	 emphasis	 on	
Islam.	As	an	example,	regarding	the	mother	tongue	instruction,	liberals	defend	the	view	
that	the	right	to	be	educated	in	Kurdish	language	is	part	of	basic	human	rights	and	that	it	
should	 be	 implemented.	 Similarly,	 teachers	 who	 reference	 Islam	 think	 the	 same,	 but	
their	reference	is	different	in	this	case,	as	Abdullah	mentions,	“The	Quran	makes	it	very	





and	 it	 is	 serious	 but	 this	 is	 because	 of	 its	 nationalist	 nature.	 I	 believe	 that	 if	modern	
Turkey	 had	been	 established	based	on	 Islamic	 values,	 it	would	 have	 definitely	 been	 a	
different	country	today.	At	least	we	would	not	have	had	any	of	the	problems	caused	by	
Turkish	 nationalism.”	 Likewise,	 another	 Kurdish	 teacher,	 Zahide	 also	 commented	 that	
“Turkey’s	 existing	 Kurdish	 problem	was	 the	 result	 of	 its	 nationalist	 and	 assimilationist	
policies.	The	Ottoman	Empire,	for	example,	did	not	impose	any	particular	identity	on	its	
citizens.	 This	 is	 exactly	 what	 Islam	 taught	 the	 Muslims.	 This	 should	 have	 been	
maintained	after	the	Ottomans	but	unfortunately	we	have	been	experiencing	the	bitter	
fruits	 of	 a	wrong	decision	made	 in	 the	 early	 years	 of	modern	 Turkey.”	 These	 indicate	





exist	 in	 society	with	 their	own	cultures	preserved	so	 that	different	cultures	can	 live	 in	
harmony.	
	
                                            
25		 Sünnetullah	is	an	Arabic	word	meaning	‘unchanged	rules	established	by	Allah’.	
- 164 - 
Another	related	view	that	is	worthy	of	consideration	is	that	these	teachers	also	see	Islam	
as	a	glue	that	can	be	used	in	order	to	bind	Turks	and	Kurds	together.	Ramazan	said	that	
“The	 majority	 of	 the	 Turkish	 and	 Kurdish	 people	 are	 Muslim,	 so	 we	 should	 take	
advantage	 of	 this,	 using	 Islamic	 teachings	 to	 raise	 awareness,	 promoting	 the	 idea	 of	
living	together.	Isn’t	this	what	we	have	been	doing	for	centuries?”	Speaking	of	the	role	
of	 religion,	 these	 teachers’	 views	 and	 the	 view	 of	 the	 majority	 in	 Turkey	 are	 not	
dissimilar.	 For	 example,	 a	 national	 survey	 titled	 “Public	 Perception	 of	 the	 Kurdish	
Question”	conducted	by	SETA	(Foundation	 for	Political,	Economic	and	Social	Research)	
and	 the	Pollmark	Research	Corporation	 revealed	 that	 religion	was	 considered	by	both	
the	Turkish	and	Kurdish	participants	to	be	the	“most	important	bond	which	holds	people	

















more	 than	 half	 of	 those	 surveyed	 (54%)	 commented	 that	 being	 a	 Muslim	 was	 a	
precondition	for	being	a	citizen	of	the	Turkish	state,	while	only	45%	voted	that	being	an	
ethnic	Turk	was	 required.	The	majority	also	agreed	 that	 shared	 religious	beliefs	are	of	
the	great	importance	for	coexistence	of	people	of	different	origins	(KONDA,	2007).	The	
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findings	clearly	indicate	that	the	majority	in	Turkey	sees	religion	as	a	unifying	tool,	which	
might	be	explained	by	the	fact	that	Islam	is	deeply	rooted	in	Turkey’s	culture,	that	is	to	









issues.	 For	 example,	 Hatice	 argued	 that	 “There	 is	 no	 point	 in	 rejecting	 any	 kind	 of	
dialogue	 or	 discussion.	Well,	 to	 be	 honest,	 I	 even	 think	 that	we	 could	 come	 together	
with	 the	 separatists	 and	 discuss	 the	 option	 of	 whether	 the	 Kurdish	 region	 of	 Turkey	
should	 be	 independent	 or	 not.	 Because	 I	 believe	 that	 to	 be	 open	 to	 any	 kind	 of	
discussion	 is	a	key	 factor	helping	us	understand	each	other.”	Mehmed	Akif	also	noted	
that	 “If	we	do	not	 talk	 to	each	other,	we	 create	 ‘others’,	we	 create	enemies.”	Having	
said	 that,	 the	peace	process	 is	 highly	 important	 to	 these	 teachers,	 as	Hatice	 also	 said	
that	 “…but	 I	 personally	 prefer	 living	 together	 with	 other	 ethnic	 groups	 in	 the	 same	
country,	 as	 the	 independence	 of	 the	 Kurdish	 region	 will	 only	 create	 another	 nation-
state,	 which	 I	 think	 is	 problematic.”	 Similarly,	 Abdullah	 said	 that,	 “The	 peace	 process	
gave	many	of	us	great	hope.	We	can	now	believe	 that	peace	 is	not	 far	away.”	On	 the	
other	 hand,	 while	 they	 support	 the	 negotiations	 between	 the	 government	 and	 the	
Kurdish	 side	 (Abdullah	Öcalan	 and	 the	HDP),	 they	 also	 argued	 that	 the	 peace	process	
would	 have	 been	 better	without	 the	 involvement	 of	 the	 PKK.	 For	 example,	 Ayşe	 said	
that,	“I	wish	the	Kurdish	people	could	be	represented	by	others	in	this	peace	process,	as	
I	 am	 personally	 against	 the	 mentality	 of	 the	 PKK	 and	 its	 ideals.	 I	 think	 it	 does	 not	
represent	all	the	Kurds,	but	they	started	this	war	and	they	are	now	part	of	this	process.”	
However,	 there	 is	 not	 a	 consensus	 amongst	 these	 teachers	 regarding	 the	 reasons	 for	
why	one	should	be	against	 to	 the	PKK,	as	 some	are	against	 the	PKK	because	 they	use	







do	not	 see	any	problem	here.	 If	 these	 talks	 lead	us	 to	 the	peace	 in	 the	 region,	 I	 think	
they	 can	 remain	 part	 of	 this	 reconciliation	 process.”	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Mehmed	





reason	 why	 the	 HDP	 and	 PKK	 cannot	 represent	 the	 Kurds,	 Zahir	 answered,	 “Because	
these	groups	are	secular	and	they	mostly	do	not	care	about	the	religious	Kurds	and	their	
problems.	 They	 are	 after	 their	 secular	 ideals.”	 It	 seems	 that	 the	 pro-Kurdish	 political	
party	HDP	and	 the	PKK	have	a	problem	of	 legitimacy	amongst	 some	Kurds.	This	 could	
even	be	observed	in	the	ballot	box,	as	even	though	some	Kurds	support	the	pro-Kurdish	
HDP,	many	 also	 vote	 for	 the	 Ak	 Party.	 For	 instance,	 in	 the	 2014	municipal	 elections,	












Kurdish	 nationalism	 is,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 currently	 represented	 by	 the	 HDP	 in	
parliament.	The	HDP,	however,	 could	be	considered	as	a	 local	political	party	 receiving	
most	 of	 the	 votes	 from	 eastern	 and	 southeastern	 Turkey.	 Apart	 from	 Istanbul	 and	
Tunceli	 (formerly	Dersim),	 the	HDP’s	 (formerly	BDP)	presence	cannot	be	seen	 in	other	













                                            
26  AKP:	 Ak	 Party,	CHP:	 Republican	People’s	 Party,	MHP:	Nationalist	 Action	 Party,	Diğer:	Others,	BDP:	
Peace	and	Democracy	Party	(the	predecessor	of	the	pro-Kurdish	HDP),	SP:	Felicity	Party	
- 168 - 
NO	IDEA	 11.6	 12.6	
	




















more	 than	 30	 years.	 In	 fact,	 the	 PKK’s	 ideology	was	 originally	 derived	 from	 socialism	
(Marxism-Leninism)	and	Kurdish	nationalism.	Having	said	that,	the	foundation	of	the	PKK	
by	Abdullah	Öcalan	and	its	war	against	the	Turkish	state	has	also	meant	the	evolution	of	
Kurdish	 nationalism	 over	 time.	 For	 instance,	 during	 the	 long	 armed	 conflict,	 and	
especially	 after	 the	 capture	 of	 Abdullah	 Öcalan	 by	 the	 Turkish	 state,	 PKK-inspired	
Kurdish	 nationalists	 developed	 the	 cult	 of	 Abdullah	 Öcalan’s	 as	 a	 key	 component	 of	
Kurdish	 nationalism.	 This	 ideology,	 which	 can	 be	 called	 “Apoism”	 (Apo	 is	 short	 for	
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Abdullah	and	an	endearing	name	for	Abdullah	Öcalan)	is	very	similar	to	the	personality	
cult	 of	 Ataturk	 in	 Kemalist	 ideology.	 The	 idea	 of	 one	 great	 man	 leading	 people,	 for	
example,	was	 produced	 in	Apoism,	 too.	 The	use	of	Abdullah	Öcalan’s	 pictures	 in	HDP	
rallies	 and	 in	 protests	 seems	 to	 be	 just	 the	 beginning,	 as	 Selahattin	 Demirtaş,	 the	
chairman	 of	 the	 HDP,	 argued	 in	 one	 of	 his	 speeches,	 “They	 said	 ‘You	 cannot	 hang	
Öcalan’s	 poster.’	 If	 the	 Kurds	 cannot	 hang	 Öcalan’s	 poster	 in	 Kurdistan,	 then	 where	
would	 they	 hang	 it?	We	 will	 go	 further	 and	 erect	 his	 statue,	 put	 that	 in	 your	 mind”	
(Hürriyet	 Daily	 News,	 2012a).	 It	 is,	 however,	 not	 just	 about	 pictures	 and	 statues:	 the	
unquestionable	authority	of	Öcalan	can	also	be	seen	amongst	nationalist	Kurds,	since	it	
is	almost	 impossible	 for	 them	to	criticise	Abdullah	Öcalan	 in	any	case.	Besides,	Cornell	
(2001:	40)	even	goes	 further	and	criticises	 the	“megalomania”	of	Abdullah	Öcalan	and	
the	“cult	of	personality	he	developed	around	himself”	which	considers	other	Kurds	who	
did	 not	 recognise	 Öcalan’s	 leadership	 as	 “a	 dog	 looking	 for	 a	 piece	 of	 meat.”	 This	
indicates	 that	 not	 recognising	 Öcalan’s	 leadership	 (not	 to	 mention	 criticising	 it)	 may	
result	in	the	exclusion	of	a	person	amongst	Kurdish	nationalists.		
	
The	 cult	 of	 Abdullah	 Öcalan	 is	 also	 seen	 in	 some	 Kurdish	 teachers’	 comments.	 For	
example,	one	Kurdish	teacher,	Sami,	argued	that	“Mr.	Öcalan	is	the	hero	of	the	Kurdish	
people,	that’s	how	most	Kurds	including	myself	see	him,	because	we	owe	everything	to	
him.	The	Kurds	have	acquired	all	 the	 rights	 thanks	 to	his	efforts.”	Perihan	also	added,	
“Abdullah	Öcalan	is	the	person	who	fought	for	the	rights	of	our	people	[referring	to	the	
Kurds],	 he	 is	 such	 a	 noble-hearted	man	 to	me.	 He	 has	 a	 respectable	 place	 in	 Kurdish	
people’s	hearts.”	Murat	highlighted	another	point	by	saying,	“Mr.	Öcalan	 is	very	much	
like	the	Atatürk	of	the	Kurdish	people.	Atatürk	is	considered	as	a	great	man	by	the	Turks,	
for	 us,	 it	 is	 Abdullah	Öcalan.	 Thanks	 to	 his	 efforts,	we	 are	 now	 honourable	 people	 in	
Turkey.	We	can	even	do	politics	now,	raising	our	voice	against	the	unequal	policies	and	
practices.	No	one	could	imagine	this	30	years	ago	when	the	war	started.”	These	answers	
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assimilate	 the	 Kurdish	 population	 in	 order	 to	 make	 them	 Turks.	 Cemil,	 for	 example,	
mentioned	that	“The	Kurdish	people	have	always	been	the	target	of	the	assimilationist	















Turks”	will	 not	 be	 happy	 in	 Turkey,	 and	 the	 fact	 that	many	non-Turks	 (Kurds,	Greeks,	





state’	 while	 the	 Turkish	 side	 used	 to	 say,	 ‘we	 will	 never	 let	 you	 establish	 another	
separate	 state	within	 Turkey’.	 Talking	 about	 the	 present,	 the	 Kurdish	 people	 say,	 ‘we	
want	 to	 live	 together	and	we	want	peace’	while	 the	Turkish	 state	 says	 in	a	 suspicious	
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manner	‘you	are	separatists’.	It	is	the	Kurds	who	want	peace	more.”	Indeed,	polling	data	





Kurdish	 issue.	 Some	 believe	 that	 the	 Kurds	 will	 be	 able	 to	 live	 in	 Turkey	 freely	 after	
significant	improvements	are	made	to	ensure	their	basic	rights,	while	others	think	that	
there	must	be	an	autonomous	Kurdish	 region	within	 the	borders	of	Turkey.	Cemil,	 for	
instance,	said,	“I	do	not	see	the	autonomous	Kurdish	state	as	necessary,	you	know,	as	
vital.	 I	 think	 our	 people	 would	 also	 like	 to	 live	 in	 Turkey	 but	 they	 just	 want	
improvements,	development,	and	these	kinds	of	things.	If	you	ask	the	Kurdish	people,	I	
do	 not	 think	 that	 the	majority	want	 autonomy	 or	 independence.	 But	 I	must	 also	 add	
some	 –	 even	 some	 of	 my	 relatives	 –	 do	 want	 to	 see	 either	 an	 autonomous	 or	 an	
independent	 Kurdish	 state.”	 As	 a	 matter	 of	 fact,	 most	 Kurds	 share	 Cemil’s	 view	
according	to	the	SETA	and	Pollmark	(2009)	report:	59%	of	Kurdish	respondents	do	not	
want	 a	 separate	 state,	while	 71.3%	 of	 the	 Turkish	 participants	 believe	 that	 the	 Kurds	
demand	a	separate	state,	while	only	30.3%	of	Kurdish	respondents	actuallty	shared	this	
view.	 This	 shows	 that	 the	 Turkish	 public	 opinion	 is	 based	on	wrong	 assumptions,	 and	
also	that	 the	majority	of	 the	Kurds	do	not	share	the	views	of	Kurdish	nationalists	who	
think	 that	 autonomy	 is	 necessary	 for	 a	 solution	 to	 the	 issues	 they	 face.	 For	 example,	
Doğan	commented	that,	“For	me,	the	solution	is	not	just	to	have	the	same	rights	as	the	
Turks.	The	Kurds	should	also	have	autonomous	cities	in	southeastern	Turkey,	because	it	
is	 normal	 for	 the	 Kurds	 to	 want	 to	 govern	 Kurdish	 dominated	 cities.”	 Murat	 also	
expressed	his	desire	to	see	an	autonomous	Kurdish	region	within	Turkey	by	saying,	“If	
Turkey	 becomes	 a	 federal	 state	 rather	 than	 a	 unitary	 state,	 the	 Kurdish	 region	might	
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Democratic	 confederalism	 can	 be	 described	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 self-	
administration	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 administration	by	 the	nation-
state.	 However,	 under	 certain	 circumstances	 peaceful	
coexistence	 is	 possible	 as	 long	 as	 the	 nation-state	 does	 not	
interfere	 with	 central	 matters	 of	 self-administration.	 All	 such	
interventions	would	call	for	the	self-defence	of	the	civil	society.	
Democratic	 confederalism	 is	 not	 at	 war	 with	 any	 nation-state	
but	it	will	not	stand	idly	by	at	assimilation	efforts.	Revolutionary	
overthrow	 or	 the	 foundation	 of	 a	 new	 state	 does	 not	 create	




For	Öcalan,	 certain	 power	 should	 be	 granted	 to	 local	 authorities/councils	 in	 order	 for	
them	 to	 govern	 themselves	 under	 a	 federal	 structure.	 He	 also	 thinks	 that	 founding	 a	
Kurdish	nation-state	 is	not	 the	 right	decision	because,	 for	him,	a	new	nation-state	will	
not	 guarantee	 improvements	 to	 freedoms.	 He	 concludes	 by	 highlighting	 the	 goal	 by	
saying	 that,	 “The	 goal	 is	 not	 the	 foundation	of	 a	 Kurdish	nation-state.	 The	movement	
intends	to	establish	federal	structures	in	Iran,	Turkey,	Syria,	and	Iraq	that	are	open	for	all	
Kurds	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 form	 an	 umbrella	 confederation	 for	 all	 four	 parts	 of	
Kurdistan”	(ibid.,	p.	34).	
	
Some	 teachers	 also	 think	 that	 the	 Kurds	 are	 not	 the	 only	 ethnic	 group	 facing	
discrimination	and	exclusion	within	the	educational	system.	Muhammed	commented,	“I	
personally	know	some	Assyrian	students	who	also	have	similar	difficulties	in	schools	to	








intentionally	 ignored	and	excluded	by	 the	 state.	The	nationalist	policies	of	 the	Turkish	
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Although	 the	 plight	 of	 the	 Kurds	 has	 tended	 to	 receive	 the	
greatest	 international	 attention,	 other	 groups	 outside	 the	
official	 mainstream	 of	 Turkish	 society—Islamic	 activists,	 ethnic	
and	 cultural	minority	 groups,	 and	 intellectuals	on	both	 the	 left	
and	the	right—	have	all,	at	one	time	or	another,	been	silenced	
by	the	Turkish	state.	The	root	of	this	 intolerance	is	to	be	found	
not	 in	 the	 character	 of	 the	 Turkish	 people	 or	 their	 political	
leaders	but	in	the	very	nature	of	the	Turkish	state.	
	
Drawing	upon	 the	 aforementioned	discussions,	 it	 could	well	 be	hypothesised	 that	 the	
Turkish	 state	 only	 accepted	 one	 particular	 identity	 before	 the	 1980s:	 ‘a	 national	 and	




Speaking	 of	 the	 discrimination,	most	 of	 the	 teachers	 were	 of	 the	 view	 that	 the	 Alevi	
citizens	 should	 not	 be	 exposed	 to	 any	 kind	 of	 discrimination,	 either.	 For	 them,	 the	
compulsory	 “Religious	 Culture	 and	 Moral	 Knowledge”	 course	 unit	 should	 either	 be	
elective	 or	 include	 equal	 amount	 of	 content	 from	 all	 religions/beliefs.	 Ramazan	
commented,	“I	agree	with	the	claims	that	the	Alevis	also	feel	excluded,	as	the	prevailing	
Sunni	interpretation	of	Islam	does	not	include	them.	For	example,	who	can	say	that	the	
Presidency	of	Religious	Affairs	 represents	 the	Alevis?	 I	 think	 it	does	not.”	Hatice	adds,	
“Alevis	 are	 still	 excluded	 in	 general,	 but	 I	 must	 admit	 that	 there	 have	 been	
improvements,	as	the	government	added	some	pages	to	the	Religious	Culture	textbooks	
regarding	 the	 Alevi	 interpretation	 of	 Islam.”	 As	mentioned	 earlier	 in	 this	 chapter,	 the	
Alevi	interpretation	of	Islam	is	not	officially	recognised	by	the	state.	Even	though	88.7%	
of	Muslims	are	predominantly	Sunni-Hanafi,	and	most	of	the	Kurds	are	Sunni-Shafi,	the	
Alevis	 are	 still	 the	 third	 largest	 group	 and	 the	 biggest	 religious	 minority	 in	 Turkey.	
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Despite	 this	 fact,	 it	 is	 obvious	 and	 very	 unfortunate	 that	 they	 face	 serious	 issues.	 For	
example,	“cemevi”	(pronounced	as	djemevi)	wherein	the	Alevis	gather	to	pray	is	not	yet	
recognised	 officially	 by	 the	 Turkish	 state.	 “We	 cannot	 educate	 our	 clergy.	We	 cannot	
teach	Alevism	to	our	youth”	said	Metin	Tarhan,	the	head	of	an	Alevi	association	based	in	
Istanbul	 (Hürriyet	 Daily	 News,	 2011).	 He	 further	 adds,	 “We	 have	 suggested	 to	 the	




The	Alevis,	 like	 the	 Kurds,	 have	 also	 suffered	 intimidation	 and	 even	massacred	 at	 the	
hands	 of	 the	 Turkish	 state	 in	 the	 past.	 For	 example,	 the	 infamous	 Dersim	 operation	










is	 a	 complicated	 issue	 with	 its	 political,	 cultural	 and	 educational	 dimensions.	 For	
instance,	Şirin	argued	that	“The	Kurdish	Question	is	not	something	that	can	be	solved	via	
military	actions.	This	is	what	Turkey	has	tried	so	far,	and	all	of	us	have	seen	that	this	way	
will	 never	 work.”	 Emrullah	 further	 added,	 “the	 Turkish	 governments	 should	 focus	 on	
implementing	the	necessary	reforms	 in	different	fields,	and	the	military	actions	should	
be	 ignored,	because	 the	claim	 that	 the	Kurdish	 issue	 is	a	 security	problem	has	caused	
the	death	of	thousands	so	far.	We	should	not	make	the	same	mistake,	instead	we	must	
learn	 from	 our	 mistakes.”	 The	 complexity	 of	 the	 Kurdish	 issue	 seems	 to	 be	
acknowledged	by	all	Kurdish	teachers	along	with	the	 idea	that	the	required	reforms	 in	
different	areas	of	life	should	be	implemented.	
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The	exclusion	of	the	Kurdish	identity	in	the	educational	system	is	also	acknowledged	and	




Kurds	 and	 the	 Armenians.	 Let	me	 give	 you	 an	 example.	 If	 you	






against	 non-Turks	 (Kurds,	 Armenians	 etc).	 As	 a	matter	 of	 fact,	 the	words	 “Kurds”	 and	
“Armenians”	 are	 only	 mentioned	 once	 in	 the	 “History	 of	 the	 Turkish	 Revolution	 and	
Kemalism”	 textbook	 for	 secondary	 schools	 (Özcan,	 2014)	 and	 even	 then,	 it	 is	 in	 the	
context	 of	 “the	 harmful	 organisations	 against	 national	 unity”.	 It	 talks	 about	 such	





It	 is	 interesting	to	note	that	some	of	 the	teachers	who	recognise	the	Kurdish	question	
also	used	particular	words	very	deliberately.	For	example,	all	of	them	referred	to	Atatürk	
as	‘Mustafa	Kemal’	and	never	once	mentioned	‘Atatürk’.	This	is	remarkable,	as	there	is	a	
difference	 between	Mustafa	 Kemal	 and	 Atatürk	 in	 Turkey.	 The	 fact	 that	 the	 surname	
‘Atatürk’	was	given	to	Mustafa	Kemal	after	the	foundation	of	the	Turkish	republic	makes	
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be	 an	 autonomic	 Kurdish	 region	 within	 the	 borders	 of	 the	 new	 state;	 he	 stated	
deliberately	 a	 couple	 of	 times	 that	 he	 fought	 to	 save	 the	 Sultanate	 of	 the	 Ottoman	
Empire.	 Atatürk,	 however,	 did	 not	 agree	 with	 any	 of	 these	 opinions.	 Therefore,	 the	
socialists,	the	Kurds	and	the	Islamists	of	Turkey	prefer	Mustafa	Kemal	(Kahraman,	2013).	







the	 word	 “sayın”	 were	 harshly	 criticised	 by	 their	 Turkish	 counterparts.	 In	 fact,	 the	








The	 views	 of	 Turkish	 and	 Kurdish	 teachers	 relating	 to	 the	 Kurdish	 Question,	 the	
reconciliation	process,	and	the	exclusion	of	the	Kurds	in	society	have	been	presented	in	
this	 chapter.	 This	 study	 is	 empirically	 significant,	 as	 it	 attempts	 for	 the	 first	 time	 to	
examine	 the	 views	 of	 the	 Turkish	 and	 Kurdish	 teachers	 coming	 from	 different	
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the	issue	obvious.	The	Kurdish	Question,	therefore,	remains	a	complex	and	complicated	
issue	which	 is	 seen	very	differently	by	among	different	people	 in	Turkey,	which	might	
also	explain	the	fact	that	it	has	not	been	solved	despite	more	than	30	years	of	war.		
	
Drawing	 upon	 the	 participants’	 comments	 on	 the	 Kurdish	 Question	 and	 the	 on-going	
reconciliation	process,	it	seems	that	the	Kurdish	Question	is	still	not	recognised	and	that	
the	problems	faced	by	Kurdish	people	are	still	being	ignored	according	to	almost	half	of	





said	 this,	 the	 opinions	 encountered	 here	 should	 be	 addressed	 and	 resolved,	 as	 the	




up	with	an	agreement	on	 the	problems.	On	 the	one	hand,	 the	 completely	 rejectionist	
stance	taken	by	some	teachers	against	the	actions/policies	of	the	Ak	Party	government	




mentalities	of	some	political	parties	such	as	 the	CHP	and	the	MHP,	which	are	 the	 two	
main	 opposition	 parties	 in	 Parliament.	 A	 consensus	 among	 the	 three	 main	 political	
parties	on	 the	Kurdish	Question	and	 the	 road	map	of	 the	 reconciliation	process	might	
actually	increase	public	support	for	the	solution	process	by	changing	people’s	views	on	
the	issue.	On	the	other	hand,	the	rejectionist	stance	of	some	teachers	in	terms	of	HDP’s	
and	 Öcalan’s	 involvement	 in	 the	 peace	 process	 also	 seems	 problematic.	 The	 claims	
‘religious	Kurdish	people	are	not	 represented	 in	 the	process’	might	have	grounds,	but	
requiring	the	dismissal	of	the	HDP	and	Öcalan	from	the	reconciliation	process	does	not	
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appear	 to	 be	 a	wise	move	 if	 peace	 is	what	 is	 being	 sought.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 religious	
Kurdish	 representatives	 communicating	 with	 the	 government	 and	 delivering	 the	






talk	 to	 their	 colleagues	 in	 their	 free	 time,	 based	 on	 their	 ideological	 preferences	 and	
political	views.	It	seems	that	the	diversity	of	opinions	is	seen	as	a	rather	negative	thing	
here.	This	should,	however,	be	regarded	as	a	significant	opportunity	as	it	offers	differing	






quite	 obvious	 that	 they	 otherise	 people	 who	 do	 not	 think	 like	 them.	 Otherisation	
automatically	 creates	 barriers	 preventing	 people	 from	 even	 communicate	 with	 one	
another,	so	this	is	obviously	a	major	problem	among	teachers.	
	
The	 findings	 show	 that	 religion	 is	 considered	 an	 important	 element	 of	 the	 solution	
process,	as	almost	half	of	those	interviewed	mentioned	the	importance	of	Islam	and	the	
role	it	plays	in	bringing	people	together.	They	believe	that	the	majority	of	the	Kurds	and	
the	 Turks	 care	 about	 Islam	 and	 this	 might,	 therefore,	 play	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	
reconciliation	process.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	after	the	beginning	of	the	Kurdish	Opening,	
the	 government	 used	 religion	 to	 this	 end,	 and	 Friday	 Sermons	 emphasising	 the	
importance	of	unity	and	peace	were	delivered	across	all	mosques	in	Turkey.		
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The	findings	from	this	study	also	 indicate	that	there	are	different	cults	of	personalities	
developed	within	 individual	 ideological	approaches.	For	 instance,	having	 looked	at	 the	
teachers’	 responses,	 the	 cult	 of	 Mustafa	 Kemal	 Atatürk	 seems	 to	 have	 triggered	 the	




Although	 it	was	mentioned	 before	 that	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 study	may	 not	 necessarily	
reflect	Turkey	as	a	whole	and	might	not	be	generalised	due	to	the	fact	that	the	study	is	
after	all	a	case	study,	it	can	still	be	reasonably	suggested	that	the	findings	of	the	chapter	
indicate	 that	 teachers’	 opinions	 largely	 reflect	 the	 general	 public	 perception	 of	 the	
Kurdish	Question	in	Turkey	(SETA	and	Pollmark,	2009).	This	is	partly	because	the	sample	
was	selected	on	purpose.	The	findings	of	this	study,	therefore,	suggest	that	the	views	of	
teachers,	 like	 many	 others	 in	 society,	 are	 shaped	 or	 influenced	 by	 their	 ideological	
and/or	 political	 background.	 What	 is	 interesting	 in	 this	 case	 is	 that	 teachers’	 views	
remain	 anchored	 along	 ideological	 lines,	 even	 after	 having	 worked	 in	 a	 Kurdish	
dominated	city	for	a	long	time.	
	
Finally,	having	 looked	at	 the	 interviewee	 responses	 towards	 the	 reconciliation	process	
between	the	Ak	Party	government	and	the	Kurdish	side	(the	HDP	and	Abdullah	Öcalan),	
the	 majority	 seems	 to	 support	 this	 process,	 even	 though	 some	 teachers	 generally	
oppose	 it.	 Although	 there	 are	many	 disagreements	 regarding	 how	 the	 peace	 process	























but	 there	 are	 two	major	 views	 amongst	 teachers	 regarding	 how	 it	 should	 actually	 be	
used.	Some	suggested	that	education	should	be	used	to	improve	the	sense	of	belongings	
of	all	Turkish	citizens	to	the	Turkish	state	regardless	of	their	ethnic	and	religious	identity,	
while	 others	 claimed	 that	 education	 should	 be	 used	 to	 educate	 the	 Kurdish	 young	
generation	 in	 order	 to	 prevent	 them	 joining	 the	 PKK	 (Kurdistan	 Workers’	 Party)	 as	
fighters.	
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On	the	one	hand,	 for	example,	Melike	commented,	“Education	 is,	of	course,	 the	most	
important	 weapon	 to	 solve	 this	 problem.	 (..)	 What	 should	 be	 done	 is	 to	 pay	 more	
attention	to	the	Kurdish	populated	areas	and	make	sure	that	the	Kurdish	youth	are	well	
educated	 just	 as	 the	 Turkish	 youth	 in	 the	 western	 part	 of	 Turkey.	 This	 will	 definitely	
make	a	change	and	further	prevent	Kurdish	youth	from	joining	the	terrorists.	27”	Ceyda	
also	 shared	 Melike’s	 view	 and	 added,	 “If	 we	 can	 give	 the	 Kurdish	 people	 a	 better	
education	 and	make	 their	 economic	 circumstances	 better,	 there	will	 be	 no	 reason	 to	
rebel	 against	 Turkey.”	 Another	 teacher	 Mete	 also	 claimed	 that	 “..the	 quality	 of	
education	 in	 the	southeast	of	Turkey	and	the	poor	 infrastructure	conditions	as	well	as	
the	financial	problems	left	the	Kurdish	people	no	other	choice.”	During	this	discussion,	
some	 teachers	 used	 contemptuous	words	 for	 the	 Kurds.	 For	 instance,	 Beyhan	 argued	
that	 “the	 Kurds	 living	 in	 rural	 areas	 are	 quite	 uncivilised.	 Our	 state	 must	 offer	 an	
opportunity	through	education	in	order	for	them	to	be	civilised	(medenî)	people.”		
	





(see	 Zeydanlıoğlu,	 2008,	 Sagnic,	 2010).	 Some	 Turks	 see	 themselves	 as	 the	 ‘main	






existing	 curriculum	 are	 dominated	 by	 Turkish	 nationalism,	 the	 only	 possible	
consequence	 of	 the	 aforementioned	 assumption	 is	 that	 the	 Kurds	 having	 a	 better	
education	 probably	 become	 better	 Turks.	 This,	 in	 fact,	 echoes	 back	 to	 the	 “Kurdish	
                                            
27		 She	is	referring	to	the	armed	Kurdish	organisation,	PKK	(Kurdistan	Workers’	Party).	
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Report”	prepared	by	İsmet	Pasha	28	in	1925	where	suggested	that	“There	is	actually	no	




individuals	 speaking	 it	 or	make	 these	 individuals	 change	 their	mother	 tongue.	 Turkey	
tries	to	change	the	mother	tongue	of	the	Kurds	and	make	Turkish	their	mother	tongue”.	




Thirdly,	 there	 also	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 denial	 of	 the	Kurdish	Question	 altogether	 in	 some	
respects.	 Some	 Turkish	 teachers,	 for	 example,	 highlighted	 the	 social	 and	 economic	




region,	 and	 that	 the	 quality	 of	 education	 cannot	 be	 compared	 to	 the	 western	 part	
either.	This	is	because	more	qualified/experienced	and	accomplished	teachers	generally	
tend	 to	prefer	working	 in	more	developed	cities.	Having	 said	 this,	 the	Kurdish	 issue	 is	




peace/reconciliation	 process	 in	 order	 for	 the	 Kurds	 to	 have	 an	 improved	 sense	 of	
belonging	 to	 the	 Turkish	 state,	 based	 on	 the	 ideal	 that	 this	 could	 satisfy	 the	 Kurdish	
people	by	providing	an	inclusive	education.	Mehmed	Akif,	for	instance,	commented	that	
“the	Kurdish	people	have	been	experiencing	a	cultural	assimilation	for	decades.	So	I	am	
                                            
28		 İsmet	Pasha	was	literally	the	‘second	man’	after	Atatürk	in	the	early	days	of	the	Republic.	He	became	
President	of	Turkey	after	Atatürk	passed	away.	




will	 also	benefit	 from	 this.	Why	are	we	waiting	 then?”	Emrullah	also	 commented,	 “As	
Sheikh	 Edebali	 29	 said,	 ‘make	 the	 human	 live	 that	 the	 state	 can	 stand’	 If	 you	 cannot	
satisfy	your	people,	your	state	cannot	stand	firmly.”	It	seems	that	these	teachers	expect	
the	 Turkish	 state	 to	 take	 concrete	 steps	 for	 its	 own	 citizens	 to	 make	 Turkey	 a	 more	






Well,	 it	 is	 actually	 the	 Turkish	 state’s	 responsibility	 to	 improve	
its	 citizens’	 rights	 by	 making	 changes	 in	 education	 policies.	
Issues	 such	 as	 the	mother	 tongue	 instruction	 and	 the	 existing	
curriculum	 are	 being	 discussed	 seriously	 by	 many	 people	
including	 teachers,	 activists,	 journalists	 etc.	 (..)	 I	 as	 a	 Kurd	will	
not	request	any	 improvement	from	the	Turkish	state.	 If	 it	does	





in	 every	 situation.	 Despite	 the	 latest	 efforts	 made	 by	 the	 Turkish	 state,	 which	 has	
improved	the	status	of	the	Kurdish	people	 in	Turkey	 in	 important	ways,	these	types	of	
teachers	 continue	 blame	 the	 state	 for	 not	 acting	 sincerely	 and	 not	 making	 enough	
efforts	 to	 solve	 the	 Kurdish	 issue.	 This,	 however,	might	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 fact	 that	
these	people	were	literally	the	‘victims’	of	the	Turkish	state	in	the	past,	as	their	language	
was	stolen	from	them,	their	culture	was	forgotten,	their	identity	was	ignored,	and	even	
                                            
29		 Sheikh	Edebali	was	a	 spiritual	 leader	who	 inspired	and	 influenced	Osman	Gazi,	 the	 founder	of	 the	
Ottoman	Empire.	
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their	existence	went	unrecognised	by	the	state.	Therefore,	many	Kurds	in	general	have	
negative	 feelings	 about	 the	 Turkish	 state,	 and	 it	 is	 true	 that	 this	 negative	 perception	
needs	to	be	repaired	by	the	Turkish	state.	Having	said	that,	some	Kurdish	teachers	went	
even	further	and	they	justified	the	violent	actions	of	the	PKK,	just	because	they	think	the	














general	 elections,	 the	 idea	 that	 this	 problem	 should	 be	 solved	 in	 Parliament	 via	
discussions	with	other	elected	members	from	different	political	standpoints	should	have	
been	 strengthened.	 This	 is	 because	 when	 there	 is	 a	 legitimate	 and	 legal	 method	 of	
discussing	 human	 rights	 issues	 and	 violations,	 sticking	 to	 violent	methods	 in	 order	 to	




Considering	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 clashes	 between	 the	 Turkish	 state	 and	 the	 Kurdish	
insurgents	have	 restarted,	 it	 seems	 that	 the	disarmament	of	 the	PKK	at	 this	 stage	 is	a	
crucial	 condition	 to	 bring	 the	 permanent	 peace	 to	 the	 Kurdish	 region.	 Even	 though	
Öcalan	 urged	 the	 PKK	 to	 lay	 down	 arms	 earlier	 in	 2015,	 the	 group	 has	 delayed	 this	
process	 and	 even	 argued	 that	 Öcalan	 is	 not	 able	 to	 call	 for	 disarmament	 while	 he	
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remains	in	prison	(Middle	East	Eye,	2015).	It	could,	therefore,	be	claimed	that	the	PKK’s	
persistence	 in	preserving	 the	organisation’s	armed	capacities	played	a	negative	 role	 in	





Drawing	 upon	 the	 comments	 of	 the	 interviewees,	 the	 majority	 of	 those	 interviewed	
seem	to	be	in	favour	of	the	use	of	education	in	the	peace	process	 in	order	to	improve	
the	 lives	 of	 Kurdish	 people	 and	 their	 rights.	 It	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 the	 Turkish	
government	ought	to	grant	the	Kurds	more	rights	in	education,	such	as	allowing	mother	





by	 removing	 the	 themes/contents	 related	 to	 Turkish	 nationalism	 and	 the	 official	
ideology	 of	 Kemalism	 from	 the	 curriculum,	 and	 to	make	 it	 inclusive	 of	 all	 ethnic	 and	
religious	 groups	 of	 Turkey.	 It	 is	 quite	 normal	 that	 this	 process	 will	 take	 time,	 but	 a	
detailed	 timetable	 could	 be	 produced	 even	 at	 this	 stage	 in	 order	 to	 organise	 the	
required	 reforms,	 and	 to	make	 people	 become	 used	 to	 the	 changes.	 These	 could	 be	
spread	out	over	 time	 instead	of	 implementing	unplanned	and	random	reforms.	This	 is	
because	the	uncertainty	over	what	was	going	to	be	done	during	the	peace	process	was	
actually	 one	 of	 the	 more	 serious	 mistakes	 made	 by	 the	 Turkish	 state,	 since	 this	
ambiguity	made	the	process	more	fragile	as	both	Turkish	and	Kurdish	people	were	not	
aware	 of	 what	 was	 being	 planned	 for	 the	 future.	 Furthermore,	 having	 no	 detailed	
timetable	 of	 the	 reforms	 to	 be	 implemented	 might	 have	 raised	 doubts	 among	 PKK	
activists	about	the	decision	to	disarm.	
	





Modern	 Turkey	was	 founded	on	 the	bases	of	 Turkish	nationalism	 that	was	built	 upon	
three	 main	 pillars:	 one	 nation	 (Turks),	 one	 language	 (Turkish),	 and	 one	 homeland	
(Turkey).	However,	 the	 ideal	of	having	single	 language	dates	back	to	the	 late	Ottoman	
period.	After	the	French	Revolution	and	its	effect	of	nationalism	on	the	Ottoman	Empire,	
some	 Turkish	 intellectuals	 and	 politicians	 came	 up	with	 an	 ideology	 of	 ‘Turkism’	 as	 a	
means	of	 saving	 the	Empire,	 after	 the	perceived	 failures	of	 the	 ideologies	of	 Islamism	
and	Ottomanism	respectively.	They	had	no	doubt	that	the	existence	of	a	strong	nation	
was	required	to	form	a	strong	and	modern	state.	The	Turkish	language	was,	of	course,	at	
the	 heart	 of	 discussions	 about	 the	 Turkish	 nation-building	 purposes.	 The	 arguments	
around	 the	 necessity	 of	 having	 a	 single	 language	 (Turkish)	were	made	 by	 the	 Turkish	
nationalist	political	party,	the	Committee	of	Union	and	Progress	(CUP)	as	part	of	a	policy	
of	 Turkification	 (Türkleştirmek)	 which	 was	 one	 of	 their	 main	 aims.	 Besides,	 the	
significance	 of	 the	 Turkish	 language	 in	 order	 to	 build	 a	 unified	 Turkish	 nation	 was	
highlighted	by	famous	writers	at	the	time	such	as	Ziya	Gökalp	and	Namık	Kemal.	
	




theoretical	 father	 of	 Turkish	 nationalism.	 Accordingly,	 the	 Turkish	 nationalist	 ideals	 of	
Gökalp	flourished	under	the	Kemalists’	rule.	Alastair	Bonnett	(2004:	74-76)	has	claimed	
that	 Turkish	 nationalism	 in	 the	 Kemalist	 single	 party	 period	 “deployed	 a	 form	 of	
orientalism	 in	 which	 the	 East	 is	 cast	 as	 a	 separate	 and	 primitive	 realm,	 to	 be	
distinguished	 from	 both	 the	West	 .	 .	 .	 as	 a	model	 .	 .	 .	 and	 ‘the	 Turk’	 as	 an	 idealised	
ethno-national	identity”.	As	part	of	the	idealisation	policy	of	the	Turkishness,	the	Turkish	
language	was	also	accepted	as	an	ideal	language	that	should	be	spoken	in	public.	Public	
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campaigns	 such	 as	 “O	 Citizen!	 Speak	 Turkish!”	 (Vatandaş!	 Türkçe	 Konuş!)	 were	 also	
promoted	 by	 the	 Kemalists.	 Furthermore,	 along	 with	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 official	
“Turkish	 Language	 Organisation”	 (Türk	 Dil	 Kurumu),	 research	 on	 the	 origins	 and	
significance	 of	 Turkish	 language	 were	 encouraged	 and	 further	 commissioned	 by	 the	




Mustafa	 Kemal	 Atatürk,	 founder	 of	 the	 Republic,	 always	 stressed	 the	 importance	 of	
Turkish	language	to	the	Turkish	nation.	For	instance,	he	once	said,	“The	language	of	the	
Turkish	 nation	 is	 Turkish.	 Turkish	 is	 the	 most	 beautiful,	 the	 richest,	 and	 can	 be	 the	
easiest	 language	 in	 the	world”	 (İnan,	 1998:	 351).	 Speaking	before	 the	public	 in	Adana	
province	in	1931,	he	also	delivered	the	following	speech:	
	
Being	a	Turk	 is	 to	speak	 the	Turkish	 language.	The	person	who	
claims	 to	 be	 part	 of	 the	 Turkish	 nation	 must	 above	 all	 speak	
Turkish	 in	 any	 case.	 It	 would	 not	 be	 right	 to	 believe	 a	 person	
who	claims	to	be	attached	to	the	Turkish	ideals	but	at	the	same	
time	s/he	does	not	speak	Turkish.	However,	there	are	more	than	
20.000	 citizens	 in	 Adana,	 who	 do	 not	 speak	 Turkish.	 If	 the	
Turkish	 Hearths	 30	 tolerate	 this,	 and	 if	 the	 Turkish	 youth,	
political	and	social	organisations	remain	insensitive	to	the	issue,	
this	situation	that	has	existed	for	at	least	a	century	will	continue.	
What	 will	 be	 the	 consequence	 of	 this?	 Gentlemen!	 In	 any	 of	
your	 dark	 days,	 these	 people	 might	 collaborate	 with	 other	
people	who	 speak	another	 language,	and	might	act	against	us.	
The	major	 target	of	 the	Turkish	Hearths	 is	 to	make	people	 like	
these	 real	 Turks	 who	 speak	 our	 language.	 These	 are	 the	 true	
Turkish	citizens	(Toros,	1981:	61;	my	translation).	
	
This	 speech	 clearly	 shows	 the	 level	 of	 intolerance	 against	 publicly	 spoken	 languages	
                                            
30		 “Turkish	Hearths”	was	the	nationalist	organisation	founded	in	1912	in	order	to	promote	the	Turkish	
nation-building	 policies.	 After	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 Turkish	 Republic,	 they	 joined	 with	 the	
Republican	People’s	Party	(Cumhuriyet	Halk	Partisi	–	CHP)	by	direct	orders	of	Atatürk.	











International	 agreements	 all	 highlight	 the	 notion	 that	 ethnic	 communities	 should	 be	
provided	with	different	rights,	which	include	cultural,	political	as	well	as	linguistic	rights.	
For	 example,	 Article	 2(1)	 of	 the	Universal	 Declaration	 of	 Human	Rights	 clearly	 stated,	
“Everyone	 is	 entitled	 to	 all	 rights	 and	 freedoms	 set	 forth	 in	 this	 Declaration,	 without	
distinction	of	any	kind,	such	as...	language.”	In	the	Turkish	educational	system,	the	only	
official/legal	 language	of	 instruction	 in	public	 schools	 is,	 however,	 still	 Turkish.	Having	
said	 that,	 Kurdish	 was	 allowed	 in	 Turkish	 public	 schools	 as	 an	 elective	 course	 unit	 in	
2012,	as	part	of	the	Kurdish	Opening	process.	What	is	more,	in	2014,	Kurdish	instruction	






Since	 the	 only	 recognised	 language	 of	 instruction	 in	 public	 schools	 is	 Turkish,	 it	 then	
becomes	 necessary	 to	 ask:	 What	 are	 the	 negative	 effects	 of	 the	 compulsory	 Turkish	
instruction	 on	 the	 Kurdish	 students	 and	 their	 culture?	How	does	 it	 affect	 the	 Kurdish	
students’	 academic	 performance	 in	 both	 regular	 school	 and	 national	 exams?	 The	
answers	 to	 these	 questions	 will	 reveal	 the	 consequences	 of	 a	 lack	 of	mother	 tongue	
instruction	for	Kurds.	




have	 personally	 seen	 a	 lot	 of	 Kurdish	 pupils	 who	 started	 school	 with	 absolutely	 no	






one	 of	 the	 interviewees	 even	 admitted	 that	 one	 of	 his	 students	 graduated	 from	 8th	
grade,	 though	they	had	very	 little	Turkish.	Furthermore,	 the	responses	of	a	number	of	
teachers	 also	 showed	 that	 this	problem	 sometimes	affects	 students’	 attendance	quite	
negatively.	 These	 comments	 show	 that	 there	 exists	 a	 serious	 question	 about	 the	
integration	 of	 Kurdish	 pupils	 in	 schools	when	 they	 do	 not	 know	 any	 Turkish.	 Another	





This	 was	 my	 dream,	 but	 given	 that	 I	 was	 not	 as	 proficient	 in	
Turkish	 when	 comapared	 to	 a	 native	 Turk,	 I	 could	 not	 get	
enough	marks	 in	the	university	entrance	exam,	and	 I	ended	up	
becoming	a	teacher	because	of	my	results.	(..)	I	consider	myself	
as	 a	 lucky	 person,	 because	 many	 other	 Kurdish	 young	 people	




to	 help	 them	 improve	 their	 Turkish	 (..)	 but	 they	 simply	 cannot	
compete	with	their	native	Turkish	peers.	
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Zahir’s	 comment	 clearly	 shows	 the	 desperate	 situation	 of	 the	 Kurdish	 pupils	 and	how	
they	are	affected	by	 the	Turkish	 instruction.	Furthermore,	Sami	mentioned	one	of	 the	
specific	reasons	why	Kurdish	pupils	do	worse	than	their	Turkish	peers	in	national	exams:	
	
A	 lot	 of	 my	 Kurdish	 students	 were	 not	 good	 at	 the	 national	
exams.	This	 is	not	because	they	are	not	good	at	Math	etc.,	but	
because	they	do	not	understand	the	questions,	or	some	Turkish	





was	 shocked,	because	 this	was	very	easy	 for	 them,	but	when	 I	
asked	why	 they	 could	 not	 solve	 the	 problem,	 I	 found	 out	 that	




their	educational	 journey	and	 that	 they	are	 swimming	against	 the	 stream	during	 their	
journey	within	the	Turkish	educational	system.	In	fact,	a	recent	report	published	by	the	
MoNE	revealed	that	students	in	the	east	and	southeast	of	Turkey	are	underperforming	
compared	 to	 their	 peers	 living	 in	 other	 parts	 of	 Turkey.	 The	 average	 score	 of	 the	
southeast	of	Turkey	 in	“every	subject”	 in	 the	national	examination	 for	 the	entrance	of	
high	 schools	 is	 significantly	 lower	 than	 any	 other	 region	 of	 Turkey.	 For	 instance,	 the	
average	score	for	the	“History	of	the	Turkish	Revolution	and	Kemalism”	is	53,04	 in	the	
southeast	of	Turkey,	while	it	is	64,04	in	the	Marmara	region.	Likewise,	the	average	score	
for	 “Turkish”	 is	 57,56	 in	 the	 southeast	 of	 Turkey,	whereas	 it	 is	 69,45	 in	 the	Marmara	
region	 (Ministry	 of	 National	 Education,	 2015:	 9-15).	 These	 results	 clearly	 indicate	 the	
struggles	of	the	Kurdish	students	in	national	examinations.	With	these	results	in	mind,	it	
could	 be	 concluded	 that	 lack	 of	 Kurdish	mother	 tongue	 education	 –	 along	with	 other	
reasons	 such	 as	 the	 economic	 ones	 –	 affects	 Kurdish	 students’	 performances	 quite	
negatively,	 which	 further	 creates	 a	 huge	 inequality	 between	 Kurdish	 and	 Turkish	
students	in	national	examinations.	
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This	 fact	 was	 not	 denied	 by	 any	 teacher,	 but	 some	 blamed	 the	 Ministry	 of	 National	
Education	(MoNE)	responsible	and	guilty	for	this	issue.	For	example,	Koray	commented	
that	“the	difficulties	the	Kurdish	pupils	face	when	they	start	school	are	very	obvious,	but	
the	MoNE	 is	 doing	 absolutely	 nothing	 about	 this	matter.	 These	 students	 surely	 need	
extra	support	during	their	education.”	Some	others,	such	as	Attila,	also	highlighted	the	
importance	of	more	support	 in	 the	pre-school	period	 in	order	 for	Kurdish	pupils	 to	be	
able	 to	 get	 used	 to	 the	 school	 system	 and,	 more	 importantly,	 to	 the	 language.	 It	 is	
apparent	that	the	Kurdish	pupils	who	face	integration	problem	because	of	their	mother	
tongue	do	 indeed	need	extra	support	 in	order	to	compete	with	their	Turkish	peers,	as	
they	 are	 expected	 to	 take	 the	 same	 national	 tests	 (for	 secondary	 schools	 and	
universities)	 when	 they	 finish	 pre-university	 schooling.	 These	 teachers	 are	 right	 to	
mention	that	the	MoNE	does	not	seem	interested	in	addressing	these	issues,	since	the	
students	 experiencing	 difficulties	 cannot	 access	 any	 official	 support	 provided	 by	 the	
MoNE,	 unless	 teachers	 themselves	 want	 to	 give	 private	 lessons	 and/or	 extra	 support	
voluntarily	 outside	 school	 times.	 Having	 said	 that,	 the	 main	 problem	 with	 these	
teachers’	 perceptions	 is	 that	 they	 do	 not	 seem	 to	 be	willing	 to	 see	 the	 usefulness	 of	




Educational	 integration	 is,	 in	 fact,	 very	 important.	 For	 example,	 in	 Kosovo,	 authorities	
have	 introduced	a	catch-up	class	programme	for	 some	minority	groups	such	as	Roma,	






the	 beginning	 of	 their	 educational	 careers,	 most	 likely,	 tend	 to	 be	 less	 successful	
academically	 when	 compared	 to	 other	 students	 facing	 no	 similar	 barriers.	 Thus,	 the	
integration	problem	caused	by	the	 lack	of	mother	tongue	 instruction	creates	a	serious	
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handicap	 for	 Kurdish	 students,	 and	 this	 further	 adversely	 affects	 their	 careers.	 As	
pointed	 out	 by	 the	 Kurdish	 teacher	Murat,	 the	 percentage	 of	 the	 Kurdish	 pupils	who	
know	no	Turkish	when	they	start	school	is	more	than	60%	in	rural	areas,	while	the	figure	








class.	 And	 what	 I	 have	 been	 observing	 for	 years	 is	 that	 these	
people	 also	 have	 more	 or	 less	 the	 same	 difficulties	 and	
problems	 as	 the	 Kurdish	 people	 do.	 But	 I	 think	 they	 are	more	
organised	 than	 the	 Kurds.	 For	 example,	 they	 also	 complain	
about	 the	 difficulties	 caused	 by	 the	 Turkish	 instruction	 in	
schools.	 However,	 they	 have	 weekend	 schools	 in	 their	
neighbourhoods	and	the	Assyrian	pupils	attend	these	schools	to	
learn	 their	mother	 tongue	well	and	 in	a	proper	organised	way,	
and	 they	 are	 also	 taught	 about	 their	 religion,	 which	 is	
Christianity,	 because	 as	 you	 know,	 the	 Turkish	 educational	
system	does	not	teach	much	about	Christianity	and	their	beliefs.		
	
What	 this	 quote	 clearly	 indicates	 is	 that	 the	 Assyrian	 people	 also	 have	 problems	
regarding	 the	 maintenance	 of	 their	 language	 and	 their	 religion.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	
Turkish	education	excludes	them,	too.	It,	therefore,	seems	that	the	main	issue	appears	











Teachers	were	 also	 asked	 about	 the	 current	 developments	 in	 the	 Turkish	 educational	
system	 such	 as	 the	 elective	 Kurdish	 course	 unit	 and	 Kurdish	 instruction	 in	 private	
schools,	and	how	these	affect	Kurdish	students	and	parents.	According	to	the	majority,	




pupils,	 because	 they	 can	 also	 learn	 their	 language	 along	 with	






Of	 course	 this	 is	 something	 good.	 I	 can	 see	 how	 this	 makes	
Kurdish	 pupils	 happy	 in	 our	 school.	 I	 think	 there	 is	 nothing	
wrong	with	it.	These	people	learn	English	as	a	second	language,	
so	 it	 is	normal	 that	 they	also	 learn	 their	own	 language	 (…)	but	





units	 in	middle	 schools,	 something	which	 is	 optimistic;	 however	 one	 of	 the	 problems	
that	emerges	from	their	responses	is	that	they	use	the	elective	Kurdish	course	units	as	
an	 excuse	 for	 the	 rejection	of	 the	mother	 tongue	education.	 They	 appear	 to	 consider	
anything	that	might	damage	the	dominant	position	of	Turkish	in	education	negative,	as	
the	 Turkish	 teacher	 Utku	 stated	 that	 “as	 long	 as	 Turkish	 remains	 the	 language	 of	
instruction	 in	 all	 schools,	 students	 can	 learn	 any	 language.	 This	 might	 be	 Kurdish,	
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think	 about	 this	 a	 decade	 ago,	 but	 it	 is	 now	 a	 reality.	 (…)	
However,	 one	 of	 the	 problems	 here	 is	 that	 students	 start	
learning	Kurdish	 in	middle	 schools,	 like	after	4	 years	 they	 start	
school,	 and	 I	 think	 this	 is	 very	 late	 to	 learn	 a	mother	 tongue,	
because	 these	 pupils	 already	 know	 it,	 they	 just	 need	 to	 know	
how	to	read	and	write,	and	learn	the	grammar	etc.	
	
Similarly,	a	Kurdish	 teacher,	Zahir	who	also	 teaches	Kurdish	 in	 their	 school	 stated	 that	
“Kurdish	people	are	very	happy	about	these	elective	course	units,	but	Kurdish	should	be	
taught	earlier	in	primary	school.	I	teach	Kurdish,	and	I	can	see	that	my	students	are	very	
eager	 to	 learn	 it,	 they	are	very	happy	 in	 that	 class.	 I	 also	 teach	 ‘Social	 Studies’	 course	
unit,	and	their	mood	is	different	in	that	case.”	Zahir	also	added	another	important	point	
by	highlighting	the	importance	of	mother	tongue	education:	“This	move	must	be	seen	as	






It	 is	 good	 that	 Kurdish	 pupils	 can	 learn	 Kurdish	 in	 schools,	 but	
not	enough.	(…)	My	students	are	very	happy	in	Kurdish	classes,	I	
cannot	 tell	 you	 how	 happy	 they	 are.	 They	 are	 very	 active,	
communicating	 each	 other	 confidently.	 (…)	 This	 is	 normal,	
because	 people	 need	 to	 understand	 that	 this	 is	 our	 mother	
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tongue,	we	can	express	ourselves	 in	Kurdish	much	better.	 (…)	 I	
must	 say	 that	 I	 am	 also	 worried.	 My	 gut	 tells	 me	 that	 these	
course	 units	 are	 only	 for	 show	 in	 order	 to	 prevent	 Kurdish	
people	getting	mother	tongue	education	in	Kurdish.			
	
Similarly,	Doğan,	also	 said	 that	 “this	 is	 just	a	 formality.	The	Turkish	government	 is	not	
sincere	on	this.	The	elective	Kurdish	course	unit	 is	 just	to	delay	Kurdish	people’s	rights	
like	the	mother	tongue	education”.	Even	though	some	Kurdish	teachers	see	this	move	as	
a	 ‘formality’,	 most	 of	 them	 support	 the	 elective	 Kurdish	 course	 units,	 but	 they	 also	
criticise	 it.	 One	 of	 the	 criticisms	 is	 that	 Kurdish	 should	 be	 taught	 earlier	 in	 primary	
school.	 In	 the	existing	 system,	 the	elective	Kurdish	course	units	are	offered	 to	5th,	6th,	
and	 7th	 grade	 students.	 In	 this	 case,	 in	 primary	 school	 (the	 first	 four	 years),	 Kurdish	
pupils	move	away	from	their	mother	tongue	(spoken	language)	to	try	to	 learn	Turkish,	








As	 mentioned	 earlier,	 Kurdish	 instruction	 was	 made	 legal	 in	 private	 schools	 by	 the	
Turkish	 government	 in	 2014.	 The	 majority	 of	 the	 teachers	 interviewed	 criticised	 this	
reform,	and	seem	to	agree	with	the	notion	that	allowing	Kurdish	 instruction	 in	private	
schools	 is	 not	 a	 positive	 development.	 For	 instance,	 Murat	 said	 that	 “this	 [making	
Kurdish	instruction	legal	in	private	schools]	definitely	does	not	make	any	sense,	because	
there	are	already	elective	Kurdish	course	units	offered	in	schools,	so	I	do	not	understand	
the	 point”.	 Similarly,	Melike	 commented	 that,	 “The	 Turkish	 government	made	 a	 huge	
mistake	by	allowing	Kurdish	instruction	in	private	schools,	because	the	PKK	and	Kurdish	
nationalists	 can	 now	 open	 a	 private	 school	 where	 they	 can	 teach	 all	 course	 units	 in	
Kurdish.	How	can	we	be	so	sure	that	they	do	not	teach	things	like	Abdullah	Öcalan	or	the	
PKK”.	 These	 teachers	 seem	 to	be	 completely	 against	 any	 further	 improvement	on	 the	
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Kurdish	 language	 apart	 from	 the	 elective	 Kurdish	 course	 units	 which	 is	 sufficient	 for	
them.		
	
Nonetheless,	 the	majority	 of	 those	 interviewed	 think	 that	making	 Kurdish	 instruction	
legal	 in	 private	 schools	 was	 a	 ‘controversial’	 reform.	 For	 example,	 Sami	 stated	 that	
“allowing	Kurdish	 instruction	 in	private	 schools	 is	 not	 an	 actual	 reform	 for	me.	 This	 is	
because	if	you	know	the	Kurdish	people	and	their	financial	circumstances,	you	can	then	
understand	how	ridiculous	this	is.	(…)	Most	of	the	Kurdish	people	living	in	the	southeast	
of	 Turkey	 cannot	 afford	 to	 send	 their	 children	 to	 private	 schools”.	 Likewise,	 Şirin	
commented	that	“people	in	this	region	do	not	even	send	their	children	to	public	schools,	




This	 is	 just	 to	 show	 everyone	 that	 they	 implemented	 an	 important	 reform	 about	 the	
mother	tongue	education,	but	this	is	not	the	case”.	
	
These	 teachers	 are	 clearly	 against	 the	 Kurdish	 instruction	 in	 private	 schools,	 because	
they	believe	that	this	reform	is	practically	 inadequate.	It	seems	that	they	have	a	point,	
because	 despite	 the	 latest	 change	 of	 law	 paving	 the	way	 for	 instruction	 in	 Kurdish	 in	




as	 the	 school	 was	 deemed	 to	 have	 opened	 without	 obtaining	 a	 permit	 from	 the	
Provincial	 Directorate	 of	 National	 Education.	 After	 these	 incidents,	 the	 necessary	
application	 to	become	a	 legal	private	 school	was	made	 to	 the	 local	 authority,	 but	 the	
Directorate	 have	 not	 yet	 approved	 the	 application,	 as	 they	 suggested	 that	 ‘further	
                                            
31		 The	 school	 was	 named	 after	 Ferzad	 Kemanger	 who	 was	 a	 human	 rights	 activist	 in	 Iran.	 He	 was	
executed	there	on	charges	of	collaborating	with	the	Kurdish	organisations.	
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elements	 are	 required	 to	 be	 approved’.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 Ferzad	 Kemanger	 primary	
school	 remains	 open,	 and	 it	 now	 fully	 functions	 despite	 its	 ambiguous	 and	 unofficial	
status	(Al	Jazeera	Turk,	2015).	
	
The	 abovementioned	 incident	 might	 also	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 Ak	 Party	
government	 has	 always	 maintained	 a	 type	 of	 nationalist	 discourse	 since	 it	 came	 to	
power	 in	 2002.	 This	 nationalist	 discourse	 of	 the	Ak	 Party	was	 softened	during	 certain	
periods,	 but	 it	 has	 never	 gone	 away	 completely.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 it	 became	 visible	
during	 important	 times	of	 crises.	As	 a	matter	of	 fact,	 in	 a	 recent	 interview	 conducted	
with	 President	 Erdoğan,	 he	 was	 asked	 ‘do	 you	 find	 some	 demands	 like	 the	 mother	
tongue	instruction	extreme?’,	to	which	he	responded:	
	
Well,	 did	 we	 make	 their	 mother	 tongue	 elective	 in	 schools?	
That’s	 all.	 What	 else	 should	 be	 done?	 They	 say	 ‘it	 should	 be	
compulsory’.	 Could	 this	 really	 happen?	 This	 country	 has	 an	
official	 language.	 In	 Western	 countries,	 let	 alone	 the	 mother	
tongue	 of	 different	 ethnicities	 being	 compulsory,	 they	 do	 not	
even	 allow	 elective	 course	 units	 in	 different	 mother	 tongues,	
despite	 the	 fact	 that	 this	actually	exists	 in	 the	European	Union	
acquis.	We	already	made	Kurdish	elective	 in	 schools,	 they	now	
want	to	make	that	course	unit	compulsory.	These	demands	will	
go	 on	 incessantly.	 Why?	 Because	 they	 are	 not	 sincere	 and	
honest	(Bila,	2015).	
	
This	quote	 is	 a	 functional	 example	of	 the	nationalist	 discourse	within	 the	Ak	Party,	 as	




solidarity	 of	 the	 state.	 Likewise,	 another	 prominent	 Ak	 Party	 MP,	 Burhan	 Kuzu,	 also	
stated	that	he	 is	against	 the	mother	 tongue	 instruction	because,	 for	him,	“the	mother	
tongue	instruction	will	break	the	peace	in	Turkey.”	He	further	said,	“Not	only	Kurds	have	




be	baseless,	 since	 the	Kurds	are	 the	 second	biggest	ethnic	group	with	a	population	of	





question	 as	 it	 is	was	only	 after	 the	 significant	 decrease	 in	 support	 for	 the	Ak	Party	 in	
Kurdish	dominated	cities	in	the	2009	local/municipal	elections	which	cost	the	Ak	Party	a	
number	of	major	Kurdish	cities	that	were	formerly	headed	by	them.	After	then,	the	Ak	
Party	 saw	 that	 it	 was	 necessary	 to	 address	 the	 Kurdish	 concerns	 more	 seriously	 and	
more	 directly,	 which	 resulted	 in	 the	 official	 introduction	 of	 the	 so-called	 ‘Kurdish	
Opening’	in	2009	(Larrabee,	2013).	
	
Having	 looked	at	 the	 statements	and	practice	mentioned	above,	 it	 seems	 that	making	
Kurdish	instruction	in	private	schools	 legal	could	well	be	considered	merely	a	formality	











                                            
32		 He	is	referring	to	‘mother	tongue’.	
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It	has	been	noted	in	the	United	Nations	Human	Development	Report	(2004)	that	there	is	
“…no	 more	 powerful	 means	 of	 ‘encouraging’	 individuals	 to	 assimilate	 to	 a	 dominant	
culture	 than	 having	 the	 economic,	 social	 and	 political	 returns	 stacked	 against	 their	
mother	 tongue.	 Such	 assimilation	 is	 not	 freely	 chosen	 if	 the	 choice	 is	 between	 one’s	
mother	 tongue	 and	 one’s	 future”	 (p.	 33).	Moreover,	 it	 has	 also	 been	 highlighted	 that	
“limitations	 on	 people’s	 ability	 to	 use	 their	 native	 language	 –	 and	 limited	 facility	 in	
speaking	 the	 dominant	 or	 official	 national	 language	 –	 can	 exclude	 people	 from	
education,	 political	 life	 and	 access	 to	 justice.”	 It	 is	 clear	 from	 the	 above	 that	 people	
should	not	be	put	in	a	position	where	they	must	choose	either	their	mother	tongue	or	




to	preserve	 their	privilege	over	others,	 and	do	 so	by	establishing	a	 certain	hegemonic	
position	above	others,	as	Tollefson	and	Tsui	(2003:	197-98)	neatly	illustrates:	
	
The	 effort	 by	 one	 language	 group	 to	 seek	 hegemony	 may	
contain	 within	 it	 the	 seeds	 of	 a	 cycle	 of	 resistance	 and	
repression.	Hegemonic	policies	make	compromises	 increasingly	







Some	 became	 very	 angry	 and	 some	 felt	 a	 bit	 uncomfortable	 while	 talking	 about	 the	
issue	of	mother	tongue	instruction.	For	instance,	Melike	argued:	
	
Mother	tongue	education	seems	very	 innocent	at	first,	but	 it	 is	
actually	 very	 complex	 and	 the	 application	 of	 mother	 tongue	
education	should	be	different	and	unique	in	different	countries,	
based	on	their	circumstances.	In	Turkey,	for	example,	I	fear	that	
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the	 possible	 application	 of	 the	mother	 tongue	 instruction	may	
divide	 the	 country,	 as	 one	 thing	 is	 obvious:	 language	 binds	 us	
together.		
	
Amongst	 some	 teachers,	 the	 fear	 that	 Turkey	might	 be	 divided	was	 very	 visible	while	
discussing	 the	 mother	 tongue	 education	 issue.	 They	 thought	 that	 this	 step	 would	
probably	 lead	 to	 an	 autonomous	 Kurdish	 region,	 which	 will	 indeed	 result	 in	 the	
foundation	 of	 an	 independent	 Kurdish	 state.	 In	 fact,	 their	 ideological	 reactions	 were	
sometimes	unusual.	 For	example,	a	Turkish	 teacher,	Tarkan,	 commented	 that	 “Let	me	
tell	you	the	real	target	lying	behind	the	mother	tongue	education.	With	this,	it	is	obvious	










participants	 (academics,	 teachers	 and	 students)	 agreed	 with	 the	 view	 that	 Turkey’s	
current	political	atmosphere	is	not	ideal	for	mother	tongue	instruction	in	Kurdish	at	the	
moment.	 15%	 of	 those	 who	 supported	 this	 view	 think	 that	 Kurdish	 mother	 tongue	




mother	 tongue	 instruction	 would	 increase	 racism	 in	 Turkey.	 Others	 suspected	 that	 if	
Kurdish	is	made	the	language	of	instruction	in	public	schools,	this	will	only	divide	Turkey	
into	 two	parts,	 a	western	 and	eastern	part,	 because	with	 this	 change	 there	would	be	
two	entirely	different	 languages	dominating	at	either	side	of	Turkey,	with	people	from	
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both	sides	not	able	to	understand	each	other	(Aydın	and	Özfidan,	2014).	This	shows	that	
there	 are	 many	 teachers,	 academics	 and	 university	 students	 in	 Turkey,	 who	 think	 in	
parallel	with	some	of	the	interviewees	of	this	study.	Having	said	that,	one	of	the	ironies	
with	 such	 responses	 is	 that	 they	 mostly	 state	 that	 mother	 tongue	 education	 is	 a	







Report	 (2004:	 107)	 “multicultural	 countries	 often	 need	 a	 three-language	 formula:	 i)	 a	
national	 or	 official	 state	 language,	 ii)	 a	 lingua	 franca	 (a	 bridge	 language)	 to	 facilitate	
communications	among	different	groups	–	in	some	cases	the	official	language	serves	this	






language.	Of	 course,	 these	 children,	 as	 citizens	 of	 this	 country,	will	 also	 learn	 Turkish	





There	are	many	examples	of	 the	application	of	 the	mother	tongue	 instruction	 in	more	
than	one	language	within	a	country,	and	Turkey,	therefore,	could	choose	what	is	best	for	
                                            
33		 Democratic	Society	Congress	was	 founded	 in	2007	 in	Diyarbakır	 in	order	 to	unite	all	Kurdish	NGOS	
under	one	umbrella.	





There	 are	 many	 countries	 in	 the	 world	 which	 permit	 mother	 language	 education	 in	
language	other	 than	 the	official	 language	of	 the	 state.	 For	 instance,	 in	Spain,	minority	
communities	 are	 allowed	 education	 in	 their	mother	 languages,	while	 Spanish	 remains	
the	 official	 language	 that	 everyone	 is	 supposed	 to	 know.	 This	 is	 mentioned	 in	 the	
Spanish	Constitution:	
	
3.1—Spanish	 is	 the	 official	 language	 of	 the	 State.	 All	 Spanish	
citizens	have	 the	duty	 to	 know	Spanish,	 as	well	 as	 the	 right	 to	
use	it.		
3.2—Other	languages	spoken	in	Spain	will	be	official	languages,	
along	 with	 Spanish,	 in	 their	 respective	 Autonomous	
Communities,	in	accordance	with	their	Autonomous	Statutes.		
3.3—The	different	linguistic	traditions	in	Spain	are	an	important	
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National,	 ethnic,	 cultural,	 linguistic	 or	 religious	 groups	
traditionally	present	in	Kosovo	that	are	not	in	the	majority,	such	
as	 the	 Kosovo	 Serb,	 Kosovo	 Turk,	 Kosovo	 Bosniak,	 Roma,	
Ashkali,	 Egyptian,	 Gorani	 and	 other	 communities	 (OSCE,	 2009:	
1).	
		







in	 towns	 like	 Prizren,	 Prishtina,	 Mamuşa	 and	 Gjilan,	 since	 Turkish	 is	 regarded	 as	 the	
official	 language	 of	 the	 Prizren	 municipality	 at	 the	 local	 level	 where	 the	 Turkish	





languages	 in	 Canada.	 Pupils	 have	 a	 right	 to	 choose	 to	 be	 educated	 in	 one	 of	 these	
languages	 in	many	places	 across	Canada.	 Even	pupils	whose	mother	 tongue	 is	 English	
can	 choose	 French	 as	 the	 language	 of	 instruction.	 Thus,	 although	 English-French	
bilingualism	 is	 becoming	 very	 common	 in	 Canada,	 it	 is	 significant	 that	mother	 tongue	
education	in	these	different	languages	are	provided	by	the	state	(Churchill,	2003).	
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Çelik	(2013b)	also	states	that	in	Finland,	Swedish	pupils	gain	their	education	in	their	own	
language	 in	 places	 where	 the	 Swedish	 population	 are	 dominant.	 All	 these	 examples,	
along	with	others	that	not	mentioned	in	this	study,	show	that	a	number	of	countries	in	
the	 world	 are	 trying	 hard	 to	 make	 their	 educational	 systems	 inclusive	 of	 different	
minority	ethnic	groups	by	providing	 them	with	 linguistic	 rights	 such	as	mother	 tongue	
education.	 Furthermore,	 these	 examples	 also	 indicate	 that	 enabling	 people	 to	 receive	
mother	 tongue	education	 in	different	 languages	within	one	state	 is	quite	possible	and	
even	beneficial	for	many	nation-states	–	contrary	to	what	has	been	argued	by	teachers	









community	 there.	 For	 instance,	 Melike	 commented	 that	 “the	 Turkish	 community	 in	
Germany	had	a	 lot	of	difficulties	associated	with	assimilation	 in	 the	past,	but	 they	did	
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tongue	 instruction	are	not	the	Kurdish	public,	 these	people	are	
the	 terrorists.	 They	 have	 a	 plan	 to	 divide	 our	 country.	
Nonetheless,	 Turkish	 people	 in	 Germany	 do	 not	 have	 such	
sneaky	plans.	 I	want	 to	 say	 this:	 If	we	give	 these	 terrorists	 the	











language	 –	were	 ignored	 and	 suppressed	 by	 the	 Turkish	 state	 for	 so	 long.	 Therefore,	
ignoring	 the	 violation	 of	 this	 basic	 human	 right	 might	 actually	 have	 greater	
consequences	for	Turkey.	
	
The	 fact	 that	 the	 Kurdish	 teachers	 are	 underrepresented	 in	 the	 Turkish	 educational	
system	 was	 also	 used	 by	 some	 teachers	 as	 a	 reason	 for	 not	 implementing	 mother	
tongue	instruction	in	public	schools.	Some	teachers	stated	that	even	though	the	mother	




Of	 course	 I	 support	 mother	 tongue	 education	 in	 any	 other	
language	aside	from	Turkish,	of	course,	if	there	is	a	demand.	But	
Kurdish	 instruction	 does	 not	 seem	 to	me	 very	 realistic.	 Turkey	
















The	 views	 of	 Turkish	 and	 Kurdish	 teachers	 on	 issues	 such	 as	 the	 effects	 of	 Turkish	
instruction	and	the	mother	tongue	education	have	been	presented	in	this	chapter.	This	
chapter	attempts	for	the	first	time	to	examine	different	views	from	a	variety	of	teachers	
coming	 from	 different	 social,	 political	 and	 religious	 backgrounds	 regarding	 language	










If	 we	 compare	 the	 views	 of	 the	 teachers	 examined	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter	 with	 this	
present	one,	it	could	well	be	said	that	there	are	consistencies	in	teachers’	responses	in	
terms	of	their	stance	on	educational	issues	(such	as	mother	tongue	education)	too.		For	
instance,	 in	 the	previous	 chapter	 some	 teachers	were	of	 the	opinion	 that	 the	Kurdish	
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The	 use	 of	 education	 for	 the	 peace	 process	was	 supported	 by	 all	 teachers.	 However,	
some	supported	 the	use	of	 it	 in	order	 to	assimilate	 the	Kurds	and	 ‘to	solve’	 the	 issue,	





have	 serious	 adaptation	 problems,	 which	 affect	 their	 mood	 and	 their	 academic	
performance	in	a	very	negative	way.	However,	despite	the	consensus	on	the	recognition	
of	this	issue,	teachers	gave	very	different	reasons	for	the	causes	of	this	problem.	Some	
accused	 the	 Turkish	 state	 of	 not	 providing	 enough	 support	 to	 these	 students,	 while	
some	 claimed	 that	 this	 could	 only	 be	 solved	 by	 letting	 them	 access	 mother	 tongue	
education;	 some	 others	mentioned	 that	 these	 problems	 are	 apparent	 because	 of	 the	
region’s	 underdevelopment.	 It	 can	 however	 be	 argued	 that	 all	 these	 factors	 have	 an	
impact	on	students.	
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It	 has	 been	 acknowledged	by	 all	 teachers	 that	 nothing	 is	 being	done	by	 the	MoNE	 to	
support	pupils	who	 face	 language	barriers	 in	 the	 system.	As	 it	 stands,	 there	 is	neither	
pre-school	 support	 or	 after	 they	 begin	 school,	 and	 they	 thus	 face	 very	 serious	 issues.	
Some	teachers	thought	that	pre-school	support	is	vital,	because	these	students	need	to	
be	helped	to	adapt	to	a	new	situation	that	they	are	not	aware	of,	while	others	argued	
that	 although	 students	 need	 support	 before	 school,	 the	 ideal	 thing	 to	 do	 is	 to	 allow	
Kurdish	pupils	to	gain	their	education	in	Kurdish	from	the	outset.	
	
Offering	 elective	 Kurdish	 course	 units	 in	 middle	 schools	 are	 considered	 to	 be	 a	
progressive	development	by	almost	all	 teachers,	 something	which	 is	a	 remarkable	and	






to	 teach	 the	elective	 ‘Kurdish’	course	unit,	even	 though	they	are	normally	qualified	 to	
teach	 the	 ‘Social	 Studies’	 course	 unit.	 As	 a	matter	 of	 fact,	 some	 teachers	 even	 stated	
that	these	optional	course	units	cannot	be	offered	to	students	 in	many	middle	schools	
due	to	the	lack	of	Kurdish	teachers.	There	are	two	reasons	for	this:	Kurdish	teachers	are	
underrepresented	 in	 the	 educational	 system,	 and	 there	 is	 also	 lack	 of	 (enough)	





Some	 teachers	 seem	 to	 have	 some	 kind	 of	 dilemma	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 mother	 tongue	
education.	 They	 actually	 looked	 very	 nervous	 while	 the	 interviews	 were	 being	
conducted.	 They	usually	 support	mother	 tongue	 education	 in	 different	 languages,	 but	
when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 Kurdish	 case	 in	 Turkey,	 they	 hesitate	 and	 answer	 in	 a	 rather	
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uncomfortable	way.	 At	 times	 it	 appears	 as	 though	 their	 nationalist	 ideology	 does	 not	
allow	them	to	express	their	real	views	on	the	issue,	though	these	views	may	actually	be	







nation	 and	 nationalism.	 It	 was	 stated	 that	 language	 is	 an	 important	 element	 in	 the	
creation	of	a	nation,	and	thus	nationalism.	For	 instance,	as	highlighted	by	Davis	(1967:	
150)	 “the	 common	 fate	 [of	 a	 nation]	 is	 primarily	 a	 common	 history;	 the	 common	
national	 character	 involves	 almost	 necessarily	 a	 uniformity	 of	 language.”	 This	 chapter	
shows	that	some	teachers	considered	the	uniformity	of	language	to	be	very	important.	
For	this	reason,	many	argued	that	mother	tongue	instruction	in	Kurdish	in	public	schools	





Another	 relevant	 finding	 here	 is	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 terms	 ‘assimilation’	 and	
‘integration’,	something	that	 is	frequently	discussed	in	the	literature	on	education	too.	
In	 this	 chapter,	 a	 few	 teachers	 were	 in	 favour	 of	 assimilation,	 while	 the	 majority	
supported	 integration.	 However,	 as	 mentioned	 earlier,	 integration	 could	 sometimes	
become	a	gentler	version	of	assimilation.	For	example,	according	to	the	assimilationist	
ideology,	 some	 of	 the	 rights	 of	 minority	 ethnic	 groups	 or	 immigrants	 could	 well	 be	
limited,	and	the	purpose	of	this	is	“the	eventual	elimination,	by	education	or	decree,	of	
all	but	one	language,	which	is	to	remain	the	national	language”	(Jacob	and	Beer,	1985:	
2).	 On	 the	 contrary,	 as	 stated	 by	 Bourhis	 (2001),	 according	 to	 the	 integrationist	




to	be	 taught	 to	everyone	 in	public	 schools	 (which	may	 include	ones	providing	mother	
tongue	 education	 in	 different	 languages)	 might	 mean	 a	 kind	 of	 ‘soft	 assimilation’,	
because	 this	 idea	 sometimes	 establishes	 the	 hegemonic	 position	 of	 the	 ‘official	
language’	spoken	by	the	majority	over	other	languages	spoken	by	the	minority	(Uçarlar,	
2009).	Therefore,	this	point	should	be	taken	into	consideration	by	the	Turkish	state.	











Kemalism	 has	 been	 the	 official	 national	 ideology	 of	 Turkey	 since	 its	 foundation.	 As	
mentioned	 in	 the	 earlier	 chapter,	 Kemalist	 ideology	 has	 flourished	 in	 Turkey	 after	
Atatürk	 died,	 and	 remains	 the	 official	 ideology	 of	 the	 Turkish	 state,	 maintaining	 its	







streets	of	 every	 city	 in	 Turkey.	 It	 is	 obvious	 that	Atatürk	has	 a	ubiquitous	presence	 in	
public	places.	As	Glyptis	 (2008:	 356)	notes,	 “Atatürk’s	 face	appears	on	posters	behind	
supermarket	 counters,	 in	 barbershops	 and	 video	 stores,	 in	 bookshops	 and	 banks;	
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The	 cult	 of	 Atatürk	 is	 a	 crucial	 part	 of	 the	 Kemalist	 ideology,	 which	 was	 initially	
established	in	the	1930s	when	Atatürk	was	still	alive.	For	example,	the	first	examples	of	
statues/monuments	 across	 Turkey	 were	 encouraged	 by	 Atatürk	 himself	 as	 he	 clearly	
made	himself	out	 to	be	the	unquestionable	 leader,	 referring	to	himself	as	 the	 ‘eternal	
chief’	 (ebedî	 şef)	even	during	his	own	time.	Having	said	 that,	 the	establishment	of	 the	
cult	 of	 the	 Atatürk	 personality	 was	 completed	 by	 his	 followers	 (including	 the	 Turkish	
armed	 forces,	 which	 is	 a	 fierce	 defender	 of	 the	 Kemalist	 ideology)	 after	 his	 death.	
Zürcher	(2007:	182)	explained	this	as	follows:	
	
…[six	 principles	 of	 Kemalism]	 formed	 the	 state	 ideology	 of	
Kemalism	and	the	basis	for	indoctrination	in	schools,	the	media	
and	the	army.	Sometimes	Kemalism	was	even	described	as	the	
‘Turkish	 religion’.	 Nevertheless,	 as	 an	 ideology	 it	 lacked	
coherence,	 and	 more	 importantly,	 emotional	 appeal.	 The	
ideological	 void	 [which]	 was	 filled	 to	 some	 extent	 by	 the	
personality	 cult	 which	 grew	 up	 around	 Mustafa	 Kemal	 during	






interpret	 different	 phenomena	according	 to	his	 ideas.	 Kemalism	 is	 considered	 to	be	 a	
taboo	which	should	not	be	questioned	within	the	classroom	environment	according	to	








ideology	 that	 is	 embedded	 in	 the	existing	 curriculum	plays	 a	 role	 in	 shaping	 students’	







effects	 of	 the	 Kemalist	 ideology	 on	 pupils	 will	 also	 be	 examined.	 After	 this,	 the	 next	
section	examines	 the	 “official	history	narratives”	and	how	 teachers	 teach	 these	 in	 the	
classroom.	 The	 fourth	 section	 of	 the	 chapter	 will	 specifically	 analyse	 the	 nationalist	
themes	in	the	textbooks.	 In	the	fifth	section	of	the	chapter,	what	teachers	think	about	
how	students	are	 shaped	by	 the	existing	 system	will	be	discussed.	 Finally,	 in	 the	 sixth	
section,	the	views	of	teachers	on	the	so-called	‘Student	Pledge’	34	will	be	examined.	
	












more	 logical	way.	 (..)	 Yes	 I	mean	 the	way	we	do	 it	 now	 seems	
not	 to	 be	 logical	 to	me.	We	 just	 teach	 his	 personality	 and	 the	
Kemalist	 ideology	 right	 now,	 we	 should	 teach	 about	 his	 ideas	
like	how	his	nationalist	idea	created	this	country	from	nothing.	
                                            
34		 Student	 Pledge	was	 a	 controversial	 nationalist	 “oath”	 that	 used	 to	 be	 recited	 by	 pupils	 every	 day	
before	school.	The	issues	about	the	Pledge	will	be	discussed	in	detail	later	in	this	chapter.	




I	 think	 that	our	 textbooks	mention	Atatürk	more	 than	enough.	
Nevertheless,	 I	do	not	agree	with	 the	opinion	 that	Atatürk	and	
his	 ideology	 should	be	 removed	 from	our	 textbooks.	No,	 if	we	
do	that,	that	would	mean	we	do	not	appreciate	what	he	did	for	








Atatürk	 and	 even	 Kemalism,	 but	 his	 ‘nationalist’	 ideas.	 They	 believe	 that	 Atatürk’s	
personality	 is	 definitely	 exaggerated	 in	 the	 curriculum,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 love	
Atatürk,	but	the	exaggeration	in	terms	of	nationalist	ideas	in	the	curriculum	seems	to	be	
fine	 with	 them.	 In	 fact,	 some	 teachers	 such	 as	 Tarkan	 even	 said	 that	 “…educational	
attainments	 and	 themes	 involving	 Turkish	 nationalism	 should	 actually	 be	 increased	 in	
order	to	make	students	embrace	Turkish	nationalism.”	In	this	regard,	the	some	Turkish	




so	 I	 don’t	 see	 any	 problem	 in	 mentioning	 Atatürk	 in	 our	
textbooks,	 but	 it	 is	 quite	 popular	 to	 attack	 Atatürk	 nowadays,	
and	 this	 especially	 has	 been	 the	 case	 since	 the	AKP	 came	 into	
power	 in	 2002.	 So	 the	 political	 atmosphere	 of	 the	 country	 is	
now	 open	 for	 criticism	 of	 Atatürk.	 They	 abolished	 the	 Student	
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We	 will	 teach	 Atatürk	 to	 our	 children	 as	 long	 as	 the	 Turkish	
nation	lives	in	these	lands.	It	is	our	duty	to	do	so.	(..)	I	personally	






modern	 lifestyle	 for	 them,	 without	 whom	 these	 would	 not	 have	 been	 achieved.	 The	
difference	 here	 between	 these	 teachers	 who	 shared	 very	 similar	 views	 on	 previous	











Mustafa	 Kemal	was	 the	person	 leading	 the	 Independence	War	
of	Turkey.	He	was	certainly	a	successful	general.	However,	apart	
from	 these	 facts,	 he	 was	 not	 a	 good	 man	 in	 my	 opinion.	 We	
know	for	sure	that	he	was	a	dictator	causing	the	deaths	of	many	
innocent	people	for	the	sake	of	creating	the	new	secular	state	in	
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To	be	honest	with	you,	 I	hate	Atatürk.	He	was	 the	person	who	






fact	 that	 the	 Kurds	 have	 suffered	 a	 lot	 since	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 Turkish	 Republic.	
These	 include	policies	 such	as	 forced	assimilation	 attempts	 that	were	 implemented	 in	
the	first	instance	directly	by	Mustafa	Kemal	Atatürk.	Another	significant	difference	that	
emerges	from	the	responses	is	that	some	Turkish	teachers,	unlike	the	Kurdish	ones,	gave	






Mustafa	 Kemal	 was	 no	 different	 to	 Hitler	 and	 Mussolini.	 (..)	 I	









these	 leaders	 viewed	minority	groups	unfavourably	within	 their	 states.	As	a	matter	of	
fact,	in	his	recent	book	Atatürk	in	the	Nazi	Imagination,	Ihrig	(2014)	claims	that	Atatürk	
and	his	new	(Turkish)	state	–	along	with	the	nationalist	policies	implemented	at	the	time	
–	 were	 taken	 very	 seriously	 by	 Adolf	 Hitler	 in	 nationalist	 sense	 while	 he	 created	 the	
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Third	Reich.	 Ihrig	 further	asserts	 that	Hitler’s	nationalist	policies,	his	views	on	minority	
groups	 in	 Germany	 and	 his	 attempt	 to	make	 himself	 an	 unquestionable	 leader	 called	





On	 the	 other	 hand,	 some	 other	 teachers	 also	 commented	 on	 Atatürk’s	 authoritarian	





himself…	 (..)	 In	 particular,	 Mustafa	 Kemal’s	 stance	 against	
religion	was	 very	unpleasant.	He	 tried	 to	 remove	 Islam	and	 its	
symbols	 from	 the	 public	 sphere	 in	 Turkey	 and	 he	 partly	










Mustafa	 Kemal	 and	 Kemalism	 because	 they	 regard	Mustafa	 Kemal’s	 policies	 towards	
religion	 as	 unacceptable.	 In	 fact,	 pious	Muslim	people	 in	 general	 do	 not	 view	Atatürk	
very	 favourably	within	 society	 in	 Turkey,	 and	 the	main	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 the	 fact	 that	
Atatürk’s	stance	against	religion	was	not	very	positive.		
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In	 his	 book	 named	 Atatürk:	 An	 Intellectual	 Biography,	 Hanioğlu	 (2011a)	 claimed	 that	
Atatürk	was	not	 completely	 against	 religion,	 despite	being	an	atheist.	 Instead,	he	was	
very	 pragmatic	 about	 it.	 According	 to	 him,	 he	 used	 Islam	 in	 times	when	 it	 served	 his	
purpose	such	as	during	the	War	of	Independence	and	in	the	process	of	the	formation	of	




That	 is	why	 he	 established	 the	Directory	 of	 Religious	 Affairs	 (Diyanet	 İşleri	 Başkanlığı)	
under	his	 secular	authority,	 and	he	 further	 commissioned	 Islamic	 scholars	 to	 translate	
the	Quran	(Holy	Book	of	Islam)	and	Hadith	(Prophet	Muhammad’s	Sayings)	into	Turkish.	
In	 fact,	 he	 even	dared	 to	 change	 the	Adhan	 (Call	 to	 Prayer)	 from	Arabic	 to	 Turkish	 in	
order	to	Turkify	Islam.	The	aforementioned	examples	show	a	man	trying	to	use	religion	
for	specific	purposes,	such	as	promoting	Turkish	nationalist	ideals,	rather	than	someone	
trying	 to	 destroy	 it.	 Having	 said	 this,	 Mustafa	 Kemal	 attempted	 to	 secularise	 Turkish	




the	 textbooks	 such	 as	 the	Religious	 Culture	 and	Moral	 Knowledge	 (e.g.	 see	 Kutlutürk,	
2012)	include	sections	like	“Atatürk	and	Religion”	in	which	Atatürk’s	positive	comments	
on	 Islam	 and	 the	 Prophet	 Muhammad	 are	 mentioned	 with	 quotes	 like	 “Religion	 is	
necessary.	 Nations	 without	 religion	 cannot	 survive”	 and	 “We	 have	 [such]	 a	 strong	
religion”	(see:	Meral,	2015).	Yet,	it	needs	to	be	borne	in	mind	that	there	were	different	
‘Atatürks’;	 there	was	 the	one	during	 the	 Independence	War,	 and	 then	another	during	
the	process	of	the	establishment	of	the	new	Turkish	Republic.	Before	the	war	was	won,	
Atatürk	 seemed	 to	 be	 a	 religious	 person,	 giving	 sermons	 on	 Fridays	 in	 the	mosques,	
constantly	claiming	that	he	was	trying	to	save	the	Sultanate	and	the	Caliphate.	However,	
it	 is	 known	 that	 he	 told	 one	 of	 his	 closest	 friends	 of	 his	 secret	 plans	 and	 his	 hidden	
agenda	 even	 during	 the	war	 (Dündar,	 2008).	 In	 fact,	 he	 later	 explained	 himself	 in	 his	
book,	Nutuk	(the	Address)	why	he	would	pretend	to	be	a	defender	of	the	Sultanate	and	
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the	Caliphate:	1)	it	was	easier	to	recruit	people	to	fight	in	the	war	this	way	2)	he	thought	
that	 people	 were	 not	 ready	 for	 his	 radical	 and	 revolutionist	 views	 during	 the	 war	
(Atatürk,	1970).	However,	Atatürk’s	stance	against	Islam	after	the	foundation	of	Turkey	
changed	radically.	He	tried	to	Turkify	Islam	in	a	ruthless	way,	because	he	seems	to	have	










the	 Turkish	 educational	 system,	 I	 argue	 that	 it	 is	 more	 appropriate	 to	 call	 it	 the	
“Islamisation	of	 themes”	which	were	 already	 present	 in	 textbooks.	 This	 is	 because,	 in	









were	 talking	 about	 Atatürk	 at	 home,	 criticising	 him	 by	 using	
some	 harsh	 phrases	 such	 as	 ‘katil’	 (killer).	 He	 said	 he	 started	
crying	while	 they	were	discussing	 this	 and	when	he	was	 asked	
what	 he	 was	 crying	 about,	 he	 told	 them	 “Because	 you	 are	
criticising	 Atatürk	 but	 I	 love	 him.	 Why	 are	 you	 doing	 this?”	
When	he	told	me	all	of	this,	 I	actually	 felt	very	bad.	This	 is	 just	
one	 example,	 there	 are	many	 examples	 showing	 that	 students	
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On	the	other	hand,	 this	example	also	shows	that	 the	effects	of	 the	 implementation	of	
the	ideology-driven	national	education	on	the	Kurds	are	very	serious,	as	the	story	above	
shows	 the	ways	 in	which	 the	 Kemalist	 propaganda	within	 education	 could	 potentially	
foment	a	negative	relationship	within	Kurdish	families.	In	addition	to	a	possible	conflict	








Live	 Abdullah	 Öcalan”	 when	 the	 phrase	 is	 used	 without	 a	
specific	name	by	a	Kurd.	Of	course,	 I	got	very	angry	and	asked	
his	 parents	 to	 come	 to	 the	 school	 as	 soon	 as	 possible.	 When	
they	 came,	 I	 was	 very	 straightforward,	 telling	 them	 this	 is	




filled	with	 hate	 against	 us.	 This	 is	 one	 of	 the	 reasons	why	we	
must	teach	these	children	the	importance	of	national	values.	
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Kemalism’	 course	 unit,	 my	 Kurdish	 student	 asked	 me	 “My	
teacher!	Did	Atatürk	really	kill	 Islamic	scholars?”	A	pupil	at	that	
age	cannot	ask	a	question	like	this	without	someone	telling	him	
this	 kind	 of	 information.	 I	 guessed	 he	 might	 have	 heard	 this	
from	his	family.	
	
This	 quote,	 a	 slightly	 different	 version	 of	 the	 former	 one,	 also	 indicates	 a	 similar	
probable	“parents-teachers	(family-school)	conflict”.	These	further	suggest	that	schools	
are	 seen	 as	 one	 of	 the	 main	 departments	 of	 the	 state	 wherein	 the	 dictation	 of	 the	
hegemonic	 ideology	 takes	 place;	 teachers	 are	 seen	 as	 the	 agents	 of	 the	 educational	
authority	which	operates	in	a	way	that	leads	to	the	assimilation	of	all	citizens	other	than	
Turks.	On	 the	other	hand,	 these	examples	 can	also	be	 interpreted	as	examples	of	 the	
reactions	of	Kurdish	parents/families	 to	such	designs,	as	 it	 seems	that	Kurdish	parents	
try	 to	 neutralise	 or	 at	 least	minimise	 the	 negative	 impacts	 of	 the	 Turkish	 educational	
system	on	their	children.	It	is	quite	normal	for	Kurdish	families	to	show	a	reaction	in	this	
case,	 as	 they	 may	 be	 worried	 that	 their	 children	 might	 be	 assimilated	 into	 the	
hegemonic	culture,	that	is,	Turkishness.	
	
On	 the	other	 hand,	 the	phrase	 “Biji	 Serok”	 used	by	Melike’s	 student	 offers	 a	window	
into	 another	 crucial	 issue	 –	 that	 is	 the	 reproduction	 of	 the	 hegemonic	 culture	 in	 a	
dominated	community	 in	a	different	 form.	 In	 this	case,	 the	 idea	of	having	“one”	great	
leader	 for	 the	 Turks	 (Atatürk)	 seems	 to	 be	 reproduced	 within	 the	 Kurdish	 national	
movement	 for	 the	Kurds	 (Abdullah	Öcalan).	This	can	be	seen,	 for	example,	 in	 the	new	
curriculum	 and	 textbooks	 recently	 introduced	 by	 the	 Partiya	 Yekîtiya	 Demokrat	
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(Democratic	Union	Party	–	PYD),	the	Syrian	affiliate	of	the	PKK,	in	the	regions	they	rule	in	
Northern	 Syria.	 The	 newly	 introduced	 curriculum	 is	 causing	 controversy	 over	 its	
promotion	of	Abdullah	Öcalan	and	his	ideological	tenants,	as	well	as	for	including	biased	
information.	 Indeed,	 other	 Kurdish	 political	 parties	 in	 the	 region,	 such	 as	 the	 Kurdish	
National	 Council	 (KNC),	 accuse	 the	 PYD	 of	 implementing	 a	 curriculum	 that	 is	 too	
ideological	 (Syria	 Direct,	 2015).	 The	 new	 textbooks	 include	 sections	 such	 as	 “Öcalan	
Philosophy”,	with	long	passages	devoted	to	Abdullah	Öcalan’s	saying	and	including	many	
photographs	 of	 him.	 Therefore,	 as	mentioned	 by	 the	 secretary	 of	 the	West	 Kurdistan	
Teachers’	Union,	Jian	Zakaria,	this	ideology-driven	national	curriculum	has	the	potential	
to	 foster	 a	 kind	of	 “totalitarian	 ideology”	within	 classrooms	 “by	 sanctifying	 the	 leader	
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The	 creation	 of	 a	 new	 “cult”	 of	 Abdullah	 Öcalan	 within	 Kurdish	 nationalism	 might	
actually	be	explained	by	 the	Kurds’	 reaction	 to	 the	hegemonic	Turkish	culture	and	the	
cult	of	Atatürk	that	is	visible	everywhere	in	Turkey,	ranging	from	schools	to	streets.	As	a	




For	 example,	 I	 remember	 we	 were	 reading	 a	 poem	 about	
Atatürk	in	the	textbook	once	and	my	Kurdish	student	told	me	in	
front	 of	 the	 class	 “Atatürk	 is	 not	my	 leader,	 my	 real	 leader	 is	
Abdullah	Öcalan”.	 I	can	certainly	understand	how	they	can	feel	
like	 this	 with	 our	 current	 education	 system.	 I	 suppose	 I	 also	





(2012),	one	of	 the	 teachers	 interviewed	commented	 that	 “the	 textbooks	 talk	about	 ‘a	
Turkish	child’	in	poems.	Some	students	argue	against	it,	saying	that	it	should	actually	be	
‘all	 children’…”	 (p.	 34).	 Likewise,	 some	 of	 the	 teachers	 interviewed	 in	 this	 study	
mentioned	that	 they	witnessed	many	times	 that	some	Kurdish	students	used	to	recite	
the	 latter	 statement	 in	 the	 Student	 Pledge	 (which	 has	 now	 been	 abolished	 by	 the	






might	 well	 be	 influenced	 by	 the	 cult	 of	 Atatürk	 narratives	 in	 a	 cognitive	 sense.	 To	
illustrate	this,	Turkish	columnist	Hakkı	Yalçın	wrote	an	article	in	2010,	publishing	some	of	
the	 letters	 written	 by	 primary	 school	 pupils	 to	 Atatürk	 himself	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	


















compare	 the	 perceptions	 of	 Turkish	 and	 Kurdish	 pupils.	 My	
Turkish	students	would	admire	Atatürk,	they	would	simply	 love	
him	and	I	did	not	have	any	problem	regarding	teaching	Atatürk	
or	 anything	 like	 that,	 but	my	Kurdish	 students	 seem	 confused,	
and	 I	 sometimes	 feel	 awkward	 when	 teaching	 –	 you	 know	 –	
Atatürk,	his	life,	his	principles	et	cetera.	(..)	Well,	I	think	Kurdish	
pupils	 already	 have	 an	 idea	 about	 Atatürk	 before	 they	 start	
school,	because	many	Kurdish	 families	dictate	 to	 their	 children	
that	 Atatürk	 was	 a	 bad	 man.	 I	 am	 against	 the	 ideology	 of	




This	 comment	 draws	 a	 clear	 distinction	 between	 Turkish	 and	 Kurdish	 pupils	 on	 their	
perception	of	Mustafa	Kemal	Atatürk.	One	of	the	issues	that	emerges	from	these	is	that	
while	 Kurdish	 pupils	 might	 potentially	 react	 to	 the	 ideological	 culture	 dominated	 by	
Kemalism	 and	 its	 interpretation	 of	 nationalism,	 which	 is	 constructed	 through	 the	
ideology-driven	 educational	 system,	 Turkish	 pupils	 seem	 to	 tend	 towards	
internalising/embracing	 the	 ideology,	 including	 the	 aggrandisement	 of	 Atatürk’s	
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personality	 and	 the	 exaggeration	 of	 his	 ideology,	 Kemalism,	 with	 its	 nationalist	 and	
sometimes	 even	 racist	 discourse.	 In	 her	 postgraduate	 work	 titled	 Reading	 of	 Turkish	
Modernisation:	Primary	School	Children’s	Perception	of	Atatürk,	Elmas	(2007)	examined	
Turkish	primary	school	pupils’	perception	of	Atatürk	constructed	both	 in	 the	schooling	
environment	 and	 in	 daily	 life.	 The	 study	 mentions	 the	 main	 keywords	 used	 by	
participants	when	talking	about	Atatürk	as	“saver”	(20	times),	“leader”	(19	times),	“sun”	
or	 “light”	 (18	 times)	 “clever”	 or	 “intelligent”	 (18	 times)	 respectively	 (ibid.,	 p.	 41).	 She	
further	stated	that	the	current	education	system	in	Turkey,	with	a	huge	reference	to	the	










If	 I	 can	breathe,	 I	owe	 it	 to	you.	Unfortunately	 there	are	 still	 a	
number	of	people	who	dare	 to	call	 you	 traitor.	They	are	 lower	







how	 to	 be	 a	 human.	 But	 there	 are	 some	 people	 who	
misunderstand	your	principles	and	 ideas.	 I	am	sure	your	bones	
are	aching	in	your	grave.	I	am	a	second	year	student	in	a	dental	
school.	 (…)	 I	 am	 sure	 you	 will	 reincarnate	 (reenkerne	 olursun)	
one	day.	I	am	waiting	for	that	day.	It	will	be	a	lot	of	fun.	Atam,	
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please	cut	off	your	peace	and	do	something.	You	can	do	it.	I	am	




These	 examples	 only	 show	 how	 ‘the	 cult	 of	 Atatürk’	 that	 is	 promoted	 by	 the	 Turkish	
state,	 and	 that	 is	 visible	 in	 public	 places	 might	 make	 people	 even	 ‘paranoid’.	 Thus,	




a	 strong	 sense	 of	 Turkish	 nationalism	 which	 becomes	 internalised,	 and	 2)	 to	 make	
Kurdish	pupils	become	assimilated	into	the	Turkish	culture,	by	making	them	forget	their	
language	and	culture,	which	usually	 leads	 to	 them	becoming	passive	persons	who	are	
ashamed	 of	 being	who	 s/he	 is	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 This	 eventually	makes	 them	become	
very	 different	 people	 who	 feel	 a	 deep	 hatred	 against	 the	 hegemonic	 Turkish	 culture	
after	they	finish	their	schools	and	go	to	university.	
	
With	 the	 rise	 of	 both	 Turkish	 and	 Kurdish	 nationalism	 in	 society,	 the	 polarisation	
between	the	Turkish	and	Kurdish	nationalists	becomes	more	visible.	Therefore,	it	could	
be	argued	 that	Turkey’s	efforts	 to	maintain	a	unitary	 state	entity,	which	 is	one	of	 the	
major	goals	of	 the	Turkish	educational	 system	and	one	of	 the	obsessions	 in	 society,	 is	
actually	 feeding	 the	 idea	 of	 separatism	more	 than	 the	 idea	 of	 unity.	 It	 is,	 therefore,	





Another	 matter	 regarding	 Turkish	 history	 textbooks	 is	 something	 called	 the	 ‘official	
history’	 (resmî	 tarih).	 In	 Turkey,	 history	 that	 is	 told	 in	 the	 textbooks	 is	 known	 as	 the	
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‘official	 history’,	 which	 is	 written	 according	 to	 the	 Kemalist	 ideology	 and	 especially	
Atatürk’s	book	‘the	Address’	(Nutuk).	Many	historians	in	Turkey	believe	that	any	history	
narrative	that	 is	based	on	Nutuk	is	actually	single-sided	because	the	Address,	the	main	
source	 of	 the	 official	 history,	was	 actually	 a	 speech	 given	 by	 Atatürk	 in	 Parliament	 in	




told	 in	Turkish	history	 textbooks.	 Interestingly,	 those	who	teach	history-related	course	
units	 use	 different	 methods	 in	 teaching	 so	 as	 to	 circumvent	 what	 they	 perceive	 as	
biased.	 Therefore,	 even	 though	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Turkish	 National	 Education	 (MoNE)	
strictly	 controls	 both	 the	 production	 and	 the	 distribution	 of	 the	 textbooks	 taught	 in	
Turkish	 schools,	 it	 appears	 that	 many	 teachers	 are	 not	 solely	 dependent	 upon	 the	
textbooks	given	by	the	MoNE.	They	are	in	fact	eager	to	use	different	materials,	such	as	






course	 unit,	 I	 usually	 tell	 my	 students	 that	 some	 of	 the	
information	 given	 in	 the	 textbook	 is	 absolutely	 biased	 and	 a	
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I	 teach	them	what	 I	am	supposed	to	do	 in	the	classroom,	but	 I	
recommend	 them	 some	 history	 books,	 novels,	 and	 memoirs,	
and	 I	 further	chat	with	 them	 in	Kurdish	 to	discuss	 these	 things	
out	of	the	school,	which	is	not	illegal.	
	










us	 teaching	 is	 sometimes	 done	 differently	 in	 classrooms	 when	 compared	 to	 what	 is	




Those	 who	 are	 teaching	 a	 different	 version	 of	 history	 by	 challenging	 the	 “official	
history”,	 however,	 take	 a	 huge	 risk	 here	 by	 teaching	 what	 is	 not	 in	 the	 textbooks,	
because	 in	 case	 of	 a	 complaint	 to	 the	 principal,	 teachers	would	 likely	 first	 receive	 an	
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in	the	classroom.	In	an	interview	after	the	incident,	the	teacher	further	claimed	that	the	
school	administration	put	huge	pressure	on	teachers	and	students,	and	that	some	of	his	
colleagues	 used	 to	 punish	 their	 students	merely	 because	 they	 spoke	 Kurdish	 to	 each	
other	or	sang	a	song	in	Kurdish	(Radikal,	2014).	This	is	undoubtedly	one	of	the	practical	
examples	 showing	 the	 degree	 of	 intolerance	 in	 Turkish	 schools	 towards	 any	 kind	 of	
“difference”	 that	 is	not	 tolerated	within	 the	 frame	of	 the	educational	policies	and	 the	
curriculum.	
	
Another	 point	 worthy	 of	 mention	 is	 that	 teachers	 face	 a	 complicated	 dilemma	 in	
teaching	what	is	written	in	the	textbooks	against	what	they	believe	to	be	true.	Based	on	
teachers’	responses,	it	seems	that	they	feel	quite	uncomfortable	in	both	cases	since	on	



























We	 should	 of	 course	 teach	 our	 history	 and	 the	 person	 who	
created	 it	 [referring	to	Atatürk).	What	 is	wrong	with	this?	(..)	 If	






the	 National	 Security	 Information	 course	 unit	 was	 recently	
removed.	Teaching	students	[about]	Atatürk	and	Kemalism	does	
not	 make	 any	 sense	 in	 the	 21st	 century.	 If	 this	 was	 in	 Hitler’s	
time,	 I	 would	 have	 understood	 it	 (..)	 We	 should	 focus	 on	
teaching	 more	 common	 values	 that	 everyone	 in	 this	 society	
would	benefit	from.	
	
As	 argued	 by	 those	 advocating	 the	 second	 position,	 the	 “History	 of	 the	 Turkish	
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Nationalist	 themes	 are	 everywhere	 in	 the	 textbooks,	 they	 are	







national	 education	 (he	 laughs)...	 I	 do	 not	 understand	why	 this	
should	 be	 wrong.	 Other	 countries	 also	 want	 to	 educate	 their	






These	 two	 comments	 reflect	 the	main	 positions	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 the	
nationalist	 themes	 in	 the	 textbooks.	 The	 former	 quote	 represents	 the	 first	 position	
which	argues	that	nationalist	themes	are	overemphasised	in	the	current	textbooks,	and	
that	 this	 is	 a	 huge	 mistake,	 while	 the	 latter	 represents	 the	 second	 position	 which	





the	 Turkish	 state	 is	 their	 personal	 property,	 exemplified	 by	 the	 comment	 mentioned	
earlier	 “...if	 they	 do	 not	 like	 it,	 they	 can	 go	 wherever	 they	 like.”	 Using	 this	 kind	 of	




of	 Atatürk,	 but	 also	with	 its	 nationalist	 discourse,	 too.	 Turkish	 nationalism	within	 the	
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Kemalist	 ideology	 is	 very	 visible	 and	powerful;	 indeed,	one	of	 the	 six	 pillars	 Kemalism	
was	 built	 upon	 is	 nationalism.	 However,	 “nationalism”	 within	 the	 Kemalist	 discourse	
appears	 to	 be	 an	 ambiguous	 concept,	 which	 is	 usually	 referred	 to	 as	 “Atatürk	
nationalism”,	as	stated	in	the	Turkish	Constitution	too.	
	
Some	 teachers	 defend	 the	 assumption	 that	 Atatürk	 nationalism	 is	 not	 based	 on	
ethnicity,	 instead,	 it	 is	 rather	a	supranational	 identity	 that	 is	 inclusive	of	every	Turkish	
citizen,	as	they	claim	that	Atatürk	defined	the	Turkish	nation	as	something	constituted	
by	 every	 Turkish	 citizen.	 Having	 looked	 at	 the	 textbooks,	 Atatürk	 nationalism	 is	 –	
similarly	–	defined	as	being	inclusive	of	all	ethnicities,	and	not	being	racist.	Nevertheless,	
when	the	textbooks	mention	the	Turkish	nation,	they	do	talk	about	it	within	a	historical	
context	 with	 a	 specific	 focus	 on	 the	 “Turkish	 ethnicity”,	 and	 they	 further	 talk	 about	
“external	 Turks”	 living	 in	 other	 countries.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 Turkish	 nation	 and	
Turkishness	 are	 clearly	 mentioned	 as	 an	 ethnic	 identity	 in	 the	 textbooks.	 Therefore,	
even	though	 it	 is	claimed	that	 the	Turkishness	 is	not	an	ethnic	entity,	 it	 is,	per	contra,	
mentioned	very	visibly	that	it	is	an	identity	that	is	only	related	to	the	Turks,	and	Atatürk	
nationalism	 thus	 automatically	 becomes	 an	 ethno-cultural	 nationalism	 in	 this	 case.	











Considering	 the	ethno-cultural	nationalism	that	 is	embedded	within	Kemalist	 ideology,	
which	is	referred	to	as	Atatürk	nationalism,	the	Kurdish	people	appear	to	be	the	victims	











really	 shocked	 and	 did	 not	 know	 what	 to	 say.	 This	 memory	
usually	 comes	 to	 my	 mind	 and	 makes	 me	 very	 sad.	 (..)	 [the	
student]	was	Kurdish	(he	then	laughs).	
	
Likewise,	 Can	 et	 al.	 (2012:	 32)	 mentions	 another	 similar	 example	 given	 by	 a	 Kurdish	
teacher	working	in	Istanbul:	
	
One	 of	 my	 students	 was	 always	 denigrating	 the	 Kurds	 in	 the	
classroom,	saying	things	like	“They	kill	our	soldiers.	They	are	bad	
people”,	words	that	are	full	of	hate.	I	later	met	his	mother.	She	
told	 me	 that	 she	 was	 a	 migrant	 and	 her	 husband	 is	 actually	
Kurdish.	I	was	astonished.	I	learned	that	he	also	argues	with	his	
father	 when	 his	 father	 talks	 with	 his	 mother	 on	 the	 phone	 in	
Kurdish,	saying	“Why	are	you	speaking	in	Kurdish.	Shut	up.	I	do	
not	 want	 to	 hear	 that.”	 I	 am	wondering	 whether	 there	 is	 any	
other	 ethnic	 group	 that	 hates	 its	 own	 ethnicity.	 (..)	 Being	
Kurdish	is	regarded	as	being	unsuccessful	and	ignorant.	
	
It	has	also	been	mentioned	 in	 the	 same	study	 that	a	Kurdish	mother	 living	 in	 Istanbul	
said	that	her	son	wants	her	not	to	wear	a	white	headscarf	when	she	goes	to	school	to	
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takes	some	time	to	understand	what	is	going	on	around	you	(..)	I	





I	 see	 with	 my	 own	 eyes	 that	 a	 lot	 of	 students	 who	 finish	 the	





the	 majority	 of	 teachers.	 With	 regards	 to	 the	 definition	 of	 the	 specific	 type,	 there	
appears	to	be	three	main	positions:	1)	The	majority	of	the	teachers	interviewed	were	of	




promotes	only	one	 type	of	person,	 that	 is	 a	 Sunni-Turk.	 To	exemplify	 these,	 a	 Turkish	
teacher,	Abdullah,	said:	
	





Especially	 with	 the	 AKP	 government,	 our	 education	 system	 is	
now	 promoting	 the	 type	 of	 a	 rather	 religious	 character.	 (..)	
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It	is	very	obvious	that	if	you	are	not	a	Turk	and	a	Sunni-Muslim,	
this	 then	 means	 you	 are	 not	 wanted	 within	 this	 education	
system	 which	 wishes	 to	 teach	 only	 why	 students	 should	 be	 a	
Turk	and	embrace	the	Sunni	interpretation	of	Islam.	
	
Considering	 the	 goals	 of	 the	 Turkish	 educational	 system	 and	 the	 contents	 of	 the	
textbooks	used	in	education,	the	third	position	seems	to	be	closer	to	reality	than	others,	
because	it	could	well	be	hypothesised	that	the	Turkish	educational	system	promotes	the	














The	 Student	 Pledge	 was	 a	 practical	 example	 of	 how	 the	 primary	 school	 pupils	 were	
constantly	reminded	of	the	main	(ideological)	philosophy	of	the	Turkish	education,	every	
day,	which	dictated	 to	 them	what	 type	of	 person	 they	needed	 to	be.	 The	Pledge	was	
always	treated	as	a	controversial	issue	that	was	at	the	centre	of	the	heated	debates	on	
Turkish	nationalism.	However,	 it	was	 finally	 abolished	 in	2013	as	part	of	 a	democratic	
reform	package	 introduced	by	 the	 Turkish	 government	within	 the	 frame	of	 the	peace	
process	aiming	at	solving	the	Kurdish	Question	(Milliyet,	2013).	The	decision	to	abolish	
the	Pledge	led	to	the	discussions	on	the	national	characteristics	of	the	Turkish	education	
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on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 arguments	 about	 the	 necessity	 of	 preserving	 national	 values	
against	the	government’s	actions	on	the	other.	There	were	two	major	reactions	to	the	
reform	 act:	 1)	 Some	 approved	 of	 the	 government’s	 decision,	 saying	 that	 this	 was	 a	
necessary	 step,	 while	 2)	 some	 others	 criticised	 the	 decision,	 claiming	 that	 the	 main	
purpose	of	this	action	was	to	damage	the	Turkish	nation.	
	







at	 all.	 It	 was	 full	 of	 Turkish	 nationalism.	 Some	 of	 the	 Kurdish	
pupils	 in	my	schools	did	not	recite	it,	but	even	those	who	were	






The	 Student	 Pledge	 was	 a	 symbol	 in	 my	 opinion.	 It	 was	 the	
symbol	 proving	 that	 Turkey’s	 past	 was	 not	 different	 from	
Mussolini’s	 Italy	 or	 Hitler’s	 Germany.	 (..)	 It	 was	 definitely	 out-





The	 main	 problem	 with	 the	 Pledge	 was	 actually	 the	 last	 two	
phrases.	 No	 one	 is	 supposed	 to	 dedicate	 their	 existence	 to	
another	ethnic	group.	This	evoked	the	idea	that	the	Turkishness	






is	 obvious	 that	 statements	 such	 as	 “My	 existence	 shall	 be	 dedicated	 to	 the	 Turkish	
nation”	(Varlığım,	Türk	varlığına	armağan	olsun)	and	“How	happy	is	the	one	who	says	I	
am	a	 Turk”	 (Ne	mutlu	 Türk’üm	diyene)	 are	problematic	 in	 the	 context	of	 Turkey.	As	 a	
matter	 of	 fact,	 the	 latter	 also	 used	 to	 be	 carved	 into	 mountains	 in	 South	 Eastern	
provinces;	 these	 were	 also	 later	 removed	 from	 mountains	 (see	 Figure	 8.2).	 In	 this	
regard,	 the	 interpretation	 given	 by	 Turkish	 writer	 Ahmet	 Altan	 (2009)	 of	 the	 last	
statement	 in	 the	Pledge	 is	worthy	of	consideration	here,	arguing	as	he	did	 that	 it	was	
part	 of	 the	 Turkish	 state’s	 message	 to	 the	 Kurds:	 “If	 you	 want	 to	 be	 happy	 in	 this	
country,	you	need	to	be	Turkish.”	The	 lived	experiences	of	many	prove	this	point.	The	
fact	that	some	teachers	noticed	that	Kurdish	pupils	would	sometimes	finish	the	Pledge	
by	 changing	 the	 last	 statement	 to	 “How	happy	 is	 the	one	who	 says	 I	 am	a	 Kurd”	 (Ne	













- 239 - 
for	Turkish	education.	Having	said	 that,	 it	 could	also	be	argued	that	 its	 removal,	while	
satisfying	ethnic	groups	such	as	the	Kurds,	functioned	in	a	way	that	made	the	necessary	
broader	discussion	of	nationalist	discourse	more	difficult.		The	Student	Pledge	was	only	






national	 ideology	 of	 Kemalism	 dominating	 the	 national	 education	 system	 and	 the	
existing	curriculum	have	been	thoroughly	discussed.	Students’	perceptions,	actions	and	
reactions	 have	 also	 been	 examined,	 with	 the	 experiences	 and	 anecdotes	 given	 by	
teachers.	Having	looked	at	the	responses	of	the	interviewees,	the	negative	effects	of	the	





Atatürk.	 Furthermore,	when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	cult	of	Atatürk	and	 the	Kemalist	 ideology	
that	are	embedded	within	the	Turkish	educational	system,	the	overwhelming	majority	of	
the	 interviewees	 including	 the	 ones	who	 had	 rather	 nationalist	 views	 on	most	 of	 the	
issues,	 agreed	with	 the	 idea	 that	 there	 is	 certainly	 an	overemphasis	 on	 these	matters	
within	both	the	curriculum	and	the	textbooks.	
	
One	 of	 the	 striking	 findings	 of	 this	 study	 is	 that	 a	 number	 of	 teachers	 actually	 prefer	
teaching	 some	 course	 units	 such	 as	 History	 of	 the	 Turkish	 Revolution	 and	 Kemalism	
according	to	their	own	preferred	teaching	style,	and	including	the	teaching	of	things	that	
contradict	 the	 current	 curriculum.	 Even	 though	 the	 way	 teachers	 do	 this	 varies,	 the	
majority	argued	that	they	see	the	current	historical	narrative	as	constructed	via	a	single-
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sided	 view	 of	 historical	 events,	 so	 they	 would	 like	 to	 offer	 their	 students	 different	
narratives	of	history.	Having	said	 that,	a	great	many	of	 these	 teachers	expressed	 their	
worries	about	the	national	exams	where	students	will	be	asked	about	content	derived	
from	 the	official	 curriculum.	 Therefore,	 teachers	 said	 they	 could	not	 ignore	 the	entire	






all	 the	 characteristics	 of	 Turkish	 nationalism,	 such	 as	 the	 cult	 of	 a	 leader	 and	 the	





One	 of	 the	 interesting	 findings	 is	 that	 the	 excessive	 emphasis	 on	 the	 cult	 of	Mustafa	
Kemal	 Atatürk,	which	 often	 leads	 to	 the	 sanctification	 of	 his	 person,	 appears	 to	 have	
some	 undesirable	 impact	 on	 the	 Turkish	 pupils,	 too.	 Given	 the	 fact	 that	 Atatürk	 is	
portrayed	 as	 an	 extraordinary	 person	 and	 a	 near	 super-hero	 in	 textbooks,	 the	
relationship	between	 students	 and	Atatürk	becomes	even	more	 complicated	and	 thus	
more	 controversial	 than	 is	 usually	 admitted.	My	 findings	 are	 consistent	with	 those	 of	






Moreover,	 all	 teachers	 supported	 the	 view	 that	 Turkish	 education	 moulds	 the	 same	
calibre	of	students.	This	finding	seems	to	be	consistent	with	those	of	a	recent	study	that	












key	 issues	 in	 the	 Turkish	 educational	 system,	 the	 relationship	 between	 “power”	 and	
“knowledge”,	as	characterised	by	Foucault	(1978),	may	be	considered,	and	especially	his	
argument	about	the	link	between	knowledge,	which	is	created	by	discourse,	and	power.	
In	 the	Turkish	 case,	 knowledge	 is	 created	by	 the	Kemalist	 nationalist	 discourse,	which	
then	 becomes	 “power”	 shaping/determining	 relationships	 amongst	 individuals	 within	















In	 this	 thesis,	 I	 aimed	 to	 examine	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 Turkish	 educational	
system	and	the	Kurdish	Question	by	exploring	teachers’	accounts	of	the	experiences	of	
Kurdish	pupils’	 in	Turkish	education,	and	the	effects	of	the	 ideological	characteristic	of	





30	 (Turkish	 and	Kurdish)	 teachers	 from	different	 social	 and	political	 backgrounds.	 The	
subjects	were	 chosen	 because	 for	 us	 teachers	 are	 assumed	 to	 be	 the	 actors	with	 the	
best	 understanding	 of	 what	 Turkish	 education	 looks	 like	 in	 theory	 and	 how	 it	 is	
practiced,	 and	 finally	 how	 this	 affects	 pupils.	 Apart	 from	 interviews,	 the	 data-set	 also	
included	an	in-depth	critical	analysis	of	Turkish	textbooks	covering	near	history	and	the	
review	 of	 the	 current	 educational	 policy	 documents,	 which	 shape	 the	 national	
curriculum.	In	so	doing,	I	sought	answers	to	three	main	questions,	which	are	as	follows:	
	
1.	What	 is	 the	 relationship	 between	 nationalism,	 the	 Turkish	 educational	 system,	 the	
curriculum,	language	of	instruction	and	Kurdish	pupils’	experience	of	primary	education?	
	
2.	 How	 does	 the	 nationalist	 educational	 system	 (which	 is	 dominated	 by	 the	 national	
ideology	 of	 Kemalism),	 the	 curriculum,	 and	 language	 of	 instruction	 affect	 Kurds,	 and	
thus	the	broader	Kurdish	Question	in	Turkey?	







conclusions	 based	 on	 my	 analysis	 in	 this	 study.	 The	 main	 findings	 presented	 in	 this	
chapter	are	given	and	discussed	under	three	main	sections	designated	according	to	the	
research	 questions.	 I	 then	move	 on	 to	 the	main	 implications	 of	my	 research	 for	 both	
academic	 and	 political	 debates,	 with	 the	 appropriate	 literature	 and	 current	 debates	
mentioned.	Then,	 I	 intend	 to	make	some	recommendations	based	on	my	 findings	and	
conclusion	about	what	should	be	done	 in	 the	 field	of	education	 in	order	 to	be	able	 to	
better	address	the	issues	raised	by	this	study.	Moreover,	I	address	what	the	implications	
of	the	findings	could	mean	for	different	actors	such	as	educators,	politicians	and	policy	






of	 the	 issues	 that	 are	 examined	 in	 this	 thesis.	 Chapter	 2	 has	 tried	 to	 theorise	 the	
relationship	 between	 education	 and	 nationalism	 by	 examining	 the	 views	 of	 Rousseau	
and	 Herder	who	 both	 influenced	 the	 national	 educational	 systems	 around	 the	world.	
Then,	 the	 rise	 of	 nationalism/nationalist	 ideas/nationalist	 movements	 has	 been	
mentioned	with	a	number	of	examples	 from	different	countries	given.	At	 the	end,	 the	
Turkish	 educational	 system	 was	 analysed	 thoroughly.	 Chapter	 3	 has	 looked	 at	 both	
Turkish	 and	 Kurdish	 nationalism	 in	 Turkey,	 with	 the	 historical	 overview	 of	 both	
nationalisms	given.	Also,	Turkey’s	Kurdish	Question	was	explained	within	the	context	of	
Kurdish	nationalism	that	developed	in	Turkey.	Chapter	4	gave	a	detailed	summary	of	the	
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methodology	 used	 in	 this	 thesis.	 Chapter	 5	 has	 attempted	 to	 thoroughly	 analyse	 the	
‘History	of	the	Turkish	Revolution	and	Kemalism’	textbooks	taught	in	schools	along	with	
other	 textbooks.	 Chapter	 6	 explored	 teachers’	 perceptions	 about	 Turkey’s	 Kurdish	
Question	 in	 general,	 and	 the	 views	 of	 the	 teachers	 given	 in	 this	 chapter	 on	 issues	
surrounding	the	Kurdish	Question,	such	as	the	Kurdish	Initiative	and	the	peace	process.	
Chapter	7	exclusively	looked	at	the	educational	issues/challenges	Kurdish	pupils	face	in	






What	 is	 the	 relationship	between	nationalism,	 the	Turkish	educational	 system,	existing	
curriculum,	language	of	instruction	and	Kurdish	pupils’	experience	of	primary	education?	
	
It	 has	 been	 documented	 in	 earlier	 chapters	 that	 the	 Turkish	 educational	 system	 (the	
existing	 curriculum	 and	 textbooks)	 is	 highly	 dominated	 by	 the	 national	 ideology	 of	
Kemalism,	 which	 also	 results	 in	 a	 Turkish	 nationalist	 discourse	 permeating	 the	
curriculum.	 The	 values	 the	 Turkish	 educational	 system	 propagates	 do	 not	 reflect	 the	
multicultural	 characteristic	 of	 Turkey,	 where	 a	 range	 of	 different	 ethnic	 groups	 exist:	
such	as	the	Kurds,	Armenians,	Circasians,	Lazs	and	Greeks	(among	others).	This	appears	
to	 be	 a	 serious	 issue	 in	 Turkish	 education,	 which	 causes	many	 problems	 for	minority	
students,	and	 in	our	 case	Kurdish	pupils,	 in	both	 schools	and	 their	daily	 lives	 (e.g.	 see	




It	 has	 been	 accepted	 by	 the	 majority	 of	 interviewees	 that	 Kurdish	 pupils	 are	 being	
affected	by	the	nationalist	characteristics	of	the	Turkish	educational	system	in	different	
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ways,	which	will	be	discussed	in	detail	later	in	this	chapter.	Having	said	that,	despite	this	
acceptance,	 one	 of	 the	most	 striking	 findings	 of	 this	 study	 is	 that	 almost	 half	 of	 the	
teachers	 interviewed	did	not	 recognise	 the	existence	of	a	specifically	 ‘Kurdish	 issue’	 in	
Turkey.	 Indeed,	 some	 teachers	 deny	 that	 there	 is	 a	 Kurdish	 problem.	 This	 is	 quite	
significant,	 as	 public	 opinion	 in	 Turkey	 regarding	 the	 Kurdish	 issue	 has	 changed	
considerably,	 in	 a	 very	 positive	way	 in	 the	 recent	 past	 –	 from	 non-recognition	 to	 the	
recognition	 of	 the	 issue	 ever	 since	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 Kurdish	 Initiative	 by	 the	
government.	However,	teachers	who	work	in	the	east	and	southeast	of	Turkey	and	are	
directly	observing	the	problems	faced	by	Kurdish	pupils	prefer	to	ignore	it.	One	possible	
explanation	of	 this	might	 be	 that	 these	people	 are	most	 probably	 Turkish	 nationalists	
and	this	means	that	they	are	more	likely	to	deny	that	the	Turkish	state	did	not	and	does	
not	 treat	 Kurds	 justly.	 My	 impression	 from	 the	 interviews	 is	 that	 to	 those	 teachers	




as	 recognising	 the	 existing	 issue	 is	 very	 likely	 to	 lead	 to	 a	 possible	 attempt	 for	 the	
solution.	
	
Another	 factor	 that	 is	 affecting	 Kurdish	 pupils	 is	 that	 the	 only	 language	 of	 instruction	
allowed	in	public	schools	is	Turkish.	It	has	been	pointed	out	by	the	majority	of	teachers	
interviewed	 that	 Kurdish	 pupils	 face	 serious	 issues	 in	 schools	 because	 of	 this	 and	
struggle	 to	achieve	 their	best	–	 something	which	 impacts	 their	 grades	as	well	 as	 their	
personalities.	This	confirms	the	research	of	Coşkun	et	al.	(2010).	The	challenges	Kurdish	
pupils	 face	 when	 they	 start	 school,	 possessing	 either	 little	 or	 no	 Turkish,	 has	 been	
acknowledged	by	all	teachers	unanimously.	Because	there	is	no	support	provided	by	the	
Ministry	 of	 National	 Education	 (MoNE),	 the	 orientation	 period	 takes	 a	 lot	 longer	 for	
these	students	due	to	their	mother	tongue	being	Kurdish.	
	
The	 national	 ideology	 of	 Kemalism	 appears	 to	 have	 a	 huge	 impact	 on	 Kurdish	 pupils.	
Since	students	are	supposed	to	embrace/internalise	the	 ideology	of	Kemalism	in	every	
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way,	 its	 effects	 on	 Kurdish	 youth	 go	 beyond	 the	 school	 environment,	 affecting	 their	
families	 and	 causing	 problems	 in	 their	 daily	 lives.	 This	 is	mainly	 because	 the	 Kemalist	
ideology	 that	 is	 embedded	 in	 the	 education	 system	 is	 meant	 to	 shape	 students’	
personalities	 by	 making	 all	 of	 them	 sincere	 and	 even	 fierce	 Kemalists	 expected	 to	
interpret	 what	 is	 going	 around	 the	 world	 from	 the	 Kemalist	 perspective.	 This	 finding	
confirms	the	research	of	Elmas	(2007)	who	studied	the	effects	of	Kemalism	on	Turkish	
pupils	and	found	out	that	 it	has	a	hugely	negative	 impact	similar	to	the	ways	 in	which	





are	 two	main	 reasons	 for	 this	 negative	 impact,	which	 are	 1)	 the	 excessive	 use	 of	 the	
Kemalist	rhetoric	in	the	curriculum,	with	the	cult	of	Atatürk	dominating	textbooks,	2)	the	




leads	 to	 polarisation	 between	 these	 groups	 later	 in	 their	 lives.	 This	 thesis,	 therefore,	
suggests	 that	 the	 polarisation	 existing	 in	 society	 in	 Turkey	 is	 fuelled	 by	 the	 Turkish	
national	educational	system.	
	




that	 relating	 to	 the	 reproduction	 of	 their	 language	 and	 literature.	 In	 fact,	 this	 study	
concludes	 that	 the	education	 system	actually	 aims	 at	 assimilating	 the	Kurdish	 identity	
into	the	Turkish	one,	the	latter	being	seen	as	a	supra-identity	in	the	curriculum,	as	well	
as	by	the	Constitution	of	Turkey.	
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On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 Kurdish	 identity	 appears	 to	 be	 affected	 by	 the	 nationalist	 and	
assimilationist	 characteristics	 of	 the	 Turkish	 educational	 system,	 as	 the	 challenges	





task,	 because	 the	 textbooks	 taught	 in	 Turkish	 schools	 do	 not	 mention	 the	 Kurdish	
culture,	music,	 language	 and	 literature	 at	 all.	 Thus,	 Kurdish	 youth	 do	 not	 learn	 about	
their	culture	like	Turkish	students	do	while	completing	compulsory	education.	
	




Turkish	 education	 also	 has	 a	 rather	 undesirable	 impact	 on	 parents.	 According	 to	
teachers,	the	current	status	of	the	Turkish	education,	wherein	the	othering	of	minorities	
is	 entrenched,	 creates	 a	 degree	 of	 discouragement	 among	 Kurdish	 parents.	
Consequently,	they	do	not	even	want	to	send	their	children	to	public	schools.		
	




The	 findings	 of	 this	 research	 clearly	 show	 that	 the	 nationalist	 characteristics	 of	 the	
Turkish	 education,	 such	 as	 the	 nationalist	 themes	 in	 the	 existing	 curriculum	 and	 the	
domination	 of	 the	 Kemalist	 nationalist	 ideology,	 negatively	 affect	 Kurdish	 pupils	 in	 a	
rather	serious	way.	After	the	initial	shock	they	face	when	they	begin	school	in	trying	to	
adapt	to	the	Turkish	language,	they	go	through	an	intensive	process	that	simply	leads	to	
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the	indoctrination	of	a	certain	ideological	perspective	on	every	issue	that	they	encounter	
in	 their	 studies,	 because,	 as	 this	 research	 showed,	 textbooks	 actively	 promote	 the	
indoctrination	of	the	Kemalist	nationalist	ideology.	
	
An	 in-depth	critical	analysis	of	 the	 textbooks	 reveals	 that	 there	 is	a	domination	of	 the	
monolithic	ethno-nationalist	approach,	along	with	the	Kemalist	ideology	in	all	textbooks.	
In	this	regard,	ethnic	groups	other	than	Turks	are	not	only	excluded,	but	also	negatively	
portrayed.	 This	 appears	 to	 be	 the	most	 serious	 issue	 in	 the	 textbooks.	 Therefore,	 the	
degree	of	diversity	existing	in	society	and	the	multicultural	structure	of	the	country	are	




issues	 facing	 Kurdish	 pupils:	 1)	 the	 difficulties/challenges	 they	 face	 due	 to	 language	
barriers	 as	 they	 try	 to	 adapt	 to	 the	 new	 schooling	 environment	 where	 their	 mother	
tongue	 is	 not	 spoken,	 2)	 the	 feeling	 that	 their	 ethnic	 identity	 is	 insignificant	 when	
measured	against	the	supremacy	of	the	Turkish	national	identity	that	is	promoted	in	the	






that	the	language	of	 instruction	is	Turkish.	 It	 is	significant	that	a	 lot	of	Kurdish	pupils	–	












issues	 for	 Kurdish	 pupils.	 In	 their	 first	 years	 of	 schooling,	 Kurdish	 pupils	 experience	 a	
kind	of	conflict.	Findings	suggest	 that	 they	do	not	 like	 the	school	due	to	 the	problems	
that	 they	 experience;	 however,	 12-years	 of	 compulsory	 education	 and	 their	 future	
career	aspirations	prevent	most	of	 them	from	dropping	out.	This	might	have	a	 further	
negative	 impact	on	 their	 psychological	well-being.	 This	 finding	 seems	 to	be	 consistent	
with	the	research	of	Romaine	(1994:	206)	who	stated	that	“children	who	do	not	come	to	
school	 with	 the	 kind	 of	 cultural	 and	 linguistic	 background	 are	 likely	 to	 experience	
conflict.”	
	




taught	 (such	 as	 the	 nationalist	 themes	 praising	 Turkishness	 and	 Atatürk)	 or	 they	 risk	
causing	 issues	 at	 home	 by	 disagreeing	 with	 their	 parents	 while	 defending	 what	 they	
learn	 at	 school	 (such	 as	 defending	 Atatürk	 and	 Kemalism).	 These	 situations	 have	 the	






Moreover,	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Education	 does	 not	 have	 ‘compensatory	 education’	
programmes	 for	 students	who	do	not	know	any	Turkish.	 It	 thus	appears	 that	 they	are	
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being	 ignored	 by	 the	 educational	 authorities.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 very	 important	 for	 the	
MoNE	to	address	this	issue.	
	
The	 findings	 of	 the	 research	 revealed	 that	 the	 elective	 Kurdish	 course	 units	 were	 a	
promising	 development.	 Furthermore,	 it	 also	 seems	 that	 Kurdish	 pupils	 and	 Kurdish	
parents	are	quite	happy	with	 these	classes.	 In	 fact,	 it	has	been	reported	that	students	
are	very	enthusiastic	in	Kurdish	classes.	Therefore,	this	further	indicates	how	beneficial	
the	mother	 tongue	 instruction	 in	public	 schools	would	be	 for	both	Kurdish	pupils	 and	
their	 parents.	 However,	 despite	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 elective	 course	 units	 for	 other	




tend	 to	 defend	 the	 PKK’s	 imprisoned	 leader,	 Abdullah	Öcalan,	 probably	 because	 their	
families	tell	them	to	do	so,	as	reported	by	some	teachers.	This	causes	another	significant	
issue	to	emerge,	which	is	the	creation	of	another	cult	of	personality	within	the	secular	
Kurdish	 nationalist	movement.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 national	 characteristics	 of	 the	 Turkish	
educational	 system	 makes	 Kurds	 more	 nationalists,	 which	 is	 ironic.	 In	 this	 regard,	
‘Apoism’	 (Apo	 is	 the	 honorific	 name	 for	 Abdullah	 Öcalan)	 appears	 to	 be	 just	 another	
version	 of	 ‘Kemalism’.	 This	 thesis	 suggests	 that	 these	 two	 ideologies	make	 Turks	 and	





What	 do	 teachers	 think	 about	 the	 Kurdish	 Question,	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 nationalist	
Kemalist	educational	system	on	the	Kurds,	and	how	do	they	respond	to	these	in	practice?		
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First	and	foremost,	this	thesis	shows	that	the	views	of	teachers	who	were	 interviewed	
generally	 reflect	 the	 views	 of	 their	 ideological	 positioning	 in	 society.	 In	 this	 regard,	
teachers	do	not	think	in	a	radically	different	way	than	most	of	people	in	society	(that	is,	
from	their	 respective	 ideological	 ‘positions’).	Furthermore,	what	 is	more	remarkable	 is	
that	the	polarisation	of	different	ideological	positions	in	society	does	even	exist	among	
teachers.	 In	 fact,	 it	 sometimes	 becomes	 worse,	 because	 teachers	 sharing	 different	
ideological	positions	and	political	opinions	do	not	talk	to	each	other,	which	is	something	
that	 is	 not	 common	 in	 society.	However,	more	 educated	 people	 –	 especially	 teachers	






the	 fact	 and	 then	 interpret	 it	 according	 to	 their	 world-views.	 In	 so	 doing,	 they	
sometimes	 distort	 the	 facts	 by	 re-interpreting.	 This	 is	 definitely	 one	 of	 the	 visible	
impacts	of	their	ideological	commitments	on	their	thinking.	
	
The	 finding	 that	many	 teachers	 use	 their	 own	 judgement	while	 teaching	 their	 course	
units	certainly	shows	the	power	of	teachers	as	instructors.	Even	though	the	Ministry	of	
National	 Education	 in	 Turkey	 strictly	 controls	 educational	 arrangements,	 such	 as	 by	
preparing	the	centralised	curriculum,	the	approval	and	distribution	of	all	textbooks	and	
even	 preparing	 teachers’	 guide	 books	 to	 keep	 teachers	 under	 control,	 it	 seems	 that	
teachers	 remain	 powerful	 actors	 inside	 the	 education	 system	 in	 Turkey.	 Although	 the	




Especially	 those	 teaching	 the	 ‘History	 of	 the	 Turkish	Revolution	 and	Kemalism’	 course	
unit	 tend	to	use	secondary	sources	more	than	other	 teachers.	This	 is	because	most	of	
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the	teachers	interviewed	believed	that	history-related	course	units	generally	give	biased	
information	 about	 historical	 events.	 They	 mostly	 talked	 about	 ‘the	 official	 history’	 (a	
rather	 famous	 phrase)	 to	 explain	 how	 history	 –	 especially	 the	 history	 of	 the	 Turkish	
Republic	–	was	written	by	the	Turkish	state	using	Atatürk’s	book	‘the	Address’	(Nutuk)	as	
the	 main	 source.	 This	 evokes	 the	 ideas	 of	 Rousseau	 (1985)	 who	 suggested	 the	
construction	 of	 a	 ‘national	 history’	 in	 order	 to	 create	 a	 ‘national	 identity’	 was	 a	
necessary	 part	 of	 the	 education	 system.	 Considering	 all	 of	 these,	 the	 official	 history	
narrative	appears	to	result	in	the	construction	of	history,	and	the	deconstruction	of	it	at	
the	same	time.	Teachers	who	do	not	believe	the	official	history	feel	obliged	to	teach	an	
alternative	 version	 of	 historical	 events,	 which	 culminates	 in	 the	 deconstruction	 of	
historical	events	taught	in	the	textbooks	that	are	primarily	based	on	the	official	history	






because	 students	 are	 asked	 about	 these	 things	 when	 taking	 national	 examinations	
necessary	 for	 admittance	 into	 high	 school.	 The	 dilemma	 here	 is	 to	 choose	 either	











concerned,	 teachers	 usually	 appear	 to	 think	 in	 line	with	 their	 political	 and	 ideological	
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backgrounds.	 However,	 besides	 this,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	majority	 of	 teachers	 expressed	
their	support	for	the	Kurdish	Initiative	is	quite	a	positive	finding.	
	
Another	 noteworthy	 finding	 that	 emerged	 from	 this	 study	 is	 that	 the	majority	 of	 the	
teachers	 support	 the	 attempts	 to	 create	 a	 multicultural	 learning	 environment,	 thus	
multicultural	education,	even	though	some	of	the	Turkish	teachers	defend	the	existing	
educational	 system	and	 the	nationalist	 characteristics	 of	 the	 Turkish	 education.	 These	
findings	are	consistent	with	data	obtained	in	the	research	of	Söylemez	and	Kaya	(2014)	







debates.	 In	 so	doing,	 I	hope	 to	offer	a	new	 insight	 to	 the	 issue	both	academically	and	
politically.	 The	 contribution	 of	 this	 research	 to	 the	 academic	 literature	 is	 actually	
expected	 to	 help	 people	 better	 understand	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 Turkish	





also	 gives	 a	 detailed	 account	 of	 Kurdish	 pupils’	 experiences	 based	 on	 their	 teachers’	
observations,	which	 is	quite	unique.	What	 is	more,	 teachers	were	 specifically	 selected	
from	the	eastern	and	southerneast	part	of	Turkey,	 their	observations	and	experiences	
are	 assumed	 to	 be	 more	 accurate.	 Furthermore,	 as	 the	 sample	 was	 selected	 from	 a	
many	different	provinces	in	the	east	and	southeast	of	Turkey	such	as	Siirt,	Mardin,	Van,	
Batman,	Tunceli,	Bingöl,	Diyarbakır,	Şırnak,	Bitlis,	Muş,	Ağrı	and	Hakkari,	the	issues	that	






Turkey’s	 ‘Kurdish	Question’	 is	 definitely	 one	of	 the	most	 heated	debate	 topics	 among	
academics	 in	 Turkey.	 Even	 many	 have	 studied	 the	 Kurdish	 Question	 from	 different	
perspectives,	 there	was	 little	 interest	 into	 the	 effects	 of	 Turkish	 education	on	Kurdish	





focusing	on	education	and	 ideology,	discrimination	and	human	rights	 in	 the	education	
system	 (see	 Elmas,	 2007,	 Çayır,	 2010,	 Çayır	 and	 Alan,	 2012,	 İnce,	 2012,	 Çayır,	 2014)	
education	and	 its	 relation	with	 the	non-Turks	 (Fırat,	2010,	Çayır,	2015),	 and,	 in	 recent	
years,	the	issue	of	mother	tongue	education	in	languages	other	than	Turkish,	particularly	
relating	 to	 the	 Kurdish	 language	 (see	 Coşkun	 et	 al.,	 2010,	 Aydın	 and	 Özfidan,	 2014,	
Arslan,	2015).	Thus,	 this	 research	 is	believed	to	be	an	 important	step	and	a	source	for	
those	 who	 would	 like	 to	 further	 study	 the	 experiences	 of	 Kurdish	 pupils	 in	 Kurdish	
inhabited	cities.	
	
The	 findings	 of	 this	 study	 confirm	 many	 other	 studies	 conducted	 in	 the	 same	 field.	
Generally,	 the	 effects	 of	 Kemalism	 and	 the	 idea	 of	 Turkish	 nationalism	 seem	 to	 have	
pretty	 much	 the	 same	 (negative)	 effects	 on	 primary	 school	 pupils	 regardless	 of	 their	
ethnicity	(see	Elmas,	2007).	Likewise,	the	challenges	that	Kurdish	pupils	face	in	schooling	
are	 also	 very	 similar,	 whether	 they	 live	 in	 the	west	 or	 east	 parts	 of	 the	 country	 (see	
Coşkun	et	al.,	2010).	Having	said	that,	there	are	more	issues	relating	to	language	in	the	
south-eastern	part	of	Turkey	when	compared	 to	Kurdish	pupils	 living	 in	western	cities	





the	 findings	 relating	 to	 the	 relationship	 between	 Kurdish	 pupils,	 their	 parents	 and	





is)	 when	 they	 come	 to	 speak	 with	 their	 teachers,	 because	 they	 do	 not	 want	 their	
teachers	and	classmates	to	find	out	that	they	are	actually	ethnically	Kurdish.	One	of	the	
possible	explanations	for	this	feeling	is	that	Kurdish	pupils	are	negatively	affected	by	the	
curriculum	 that	 promotes	 Turkish	 nationalism,	 including	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 superiority	 of	
the	 Turkish	 identity	 and	 the	 ‘privilege’	 that	 one	 has	 to	 feel	 for	 being	 Turkish.	 On	 the	
other	hand,	in	the	eastern	and	south-eastern	parts	of	Turkey,	the	relationship	between	
Kurdish	parents	and	 teachers	 is	much	more	complicated.	This	 is	because,	especially	 in	
rural	 areas,	 most	 of	 the	 parents	 (especially	 mothers)	 do	 not	 speak	 Turkish	 at	 all	 (or	
speak	 only	 very	 little).	 This	 study	 revealed	 that	 some	 teachers	 do	 not	 interact	 with	
students’	parents	because	of	the	 language	barrier,	and	the	ones	who	do	communicate	
with	 them	 do	 so	 via	 the	 use	 of	 interpreters.	 Therefore,	 the	 difference	 here	 is	 that	





more,	 this	 research	 also	 acts	 as	 an	 invitation	 to	 other	 academics	 to	 conduct	 more	
research	 in	 eastern	 and	 south-eastern	 Turkey	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 other	 issues	
affecting	the	Kurdish	students-parents-pupils	relationship	better.	
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9.3.2.	Implications	of	the	research	for	political	debates	
	
Politically,	 the	 Kurdish	Question	 is	 undoubtedly	 one	 of	 the	most	 challenging	 issues	 of	
modern	Turkey.	It,	in	fact,	has	influenced	the	political	landscape	in	Turkey	for	more	than	
30	 years,	 as	 the	 conflict	 between	 the	 PKK	 insurgents	 and	 the	 Turkish	 state	 has	 had	 a	
devastating	impact	on	the	people	of	Turkey	and	thus	the	Turkish	state.	For	this	reason,	
the	 Ak	 Party	 government	 embarked	 upon	 the	 negotiation	 process	 with	 the	 Kurdish	
insurgents,	 including	 the	 imprisoned	 leader	 Abdullah	 Öcalan	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Kurdish	
Initiative	 introduced	 in	 2009.	 This	 radical	 decision	 could	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	




solved	 through	 military	 means.	 The	 Kurdish	 Opening	 was,	 therefore,	 meant	 to	 be	 a	
comprehensive	 initiative	 that	 aimed	 to	 approach	 the	 Kurdish	Question	 from	 different	
perspectives.	 As	 explained	 in	 the	 earlier	 chapters	 of	 this	 thesis,	 education	 was,	
unfortunately,	 not	 given	a	priority	 in	 this	 important	process.	 It	 seems	 that	 two	of	 the	
few	 reforms	 implemented	 in	 the	 field	 of	 education	 during	 the	 process,	 such	 as	 the	
abolition	 of	 the	 Student	 Pledge	 and	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 Kurdish	 mother	 tongue	




This	 research	 suggests	 that	 education	 in	 Turkey	 needs	 to	 undergo	 a	 radical	 reform	
process.	There	 is	an	obvious	need	for	a	more	detailed	analysis,	and	more	discussion	 is	
required	in	order	to	make	the	education	system	more	inclusive,	less	centralised	and	thus	
more	 flexible.	 There	 are	 indeed	 a	 lot	 of	 issues	 with	 the	 current	 Turkish	 educational	
system,	and	 the	most	 important	 seems	 to	be	 the	 ideology	 that	 is	 embedded	within	 it	
and	which	dominates	the	curriculum	and	textbooks.	First	and	foremost,	the	ideological	
characteristics	of	the	Turkish	education	ought	to	be	changed	completely.	Kemalism	and	
- 257 - 
its	 interpretation	 of	 Turkish	 nationalism	 should	 be	 treated	 as	 any	 other	 ideology	 that	
exists	 in	 society.	 In	other	words,	 the	national	 ideology	of	Kemalism	should	not	be	 the	
‘official’	 ideology	 in	 Turkey,	 which	 appears	 to	 be	 the	 biggest	 cause	 of	many	 negative	
effects	in	society.	
	
However,	 the	 influence	of	Kemalism	should	not	be	 taken	 lightly	 in	 this	process,	which	
means	 that	 it	 should	 be	 accepted	 that	 all	 of	 these	 reforms	 discussed	 here	 cannot	 be	
done	 overnight,	 which	 is	 understandable,	 given	 that	 Kemalism	 is	 a	 strong	 ideology	
backed	by	the	Turkish	state,	and	one	that	has	a	strong	influence	on	the	majority	of	the	
people	 in	 Turkey,	 since	Atatürk	has	 always	been	 venerated	by	 the	majority	 in	 Turkey.	
Having	said	that,	the	findings	of	this	thesis	strongly	suggest	that	as	long	as	the	Kemalist	
ideology	 remains	as	 the	official	 ideology	 influencing	education,	 the	 issues	 that	Kurdish	
pupils	face	in	both	schools	and	in	their	daily	lives	will	remain	unsolved.	
	
This	 thesis,	 therefore,	 strongly	 suggests	 that	 the	 Turkish	 educational	 system	 urgently	
needs	 to	 adopt	 a	 ‘post-Kemalist	 paradigm’.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 a	 paradigm	 shift,	 the	 new	
educational	 philosophy	 should	 be	 developed	 according	 to	 the	 idea	 of	
multiculturalism/anti-racism.	 As	 mentioned	 by	 González	 (2008),	 this	 is	 because	 in	 a	
multicultural	 educational	 system,	 students	 tend	 to	 consider	 the	 existence	 of	 other	




The	 main	 problem	 here,	 however,	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 fact	 that	 politicians’	 actions	 are	
normally	 based	 on	 their	 voters’	 expectations,	 and	 it	 could	 well	 be	 argued	 that	 the	
overwhelming	majority	of	the	electorate	in	Turkey	will	probably	react	in	a	very	negative	
way	 to	 any	 attempt	 to	 make	 radical	 changes	 in	 the	 education	 system,	 particularly	
regarding	the	character	of	Mustafa	Kemal	Atatürk	or	his	 ideology.	Considering	this	and	
the	popularity	of	the	 image	of	Atatürk	 in	society,	this	radical	transformation	can	easily	
be	 spread	 over	 time	 and	 done	 in	 a	 way	 which	 lets	 public	 opinion	 evolve	 in	 a	 more	










Another	 thing	 the	 Turkish	 government	 ought	 to	 do	 is	 to	 investigate	 the	 issues	
mentioned	in	this	thesis	in	a	more	detailed	way,	by	inviting	the	parents	of	Kurdish	pupils	
to	 the	 table	 for	 discussion	 and	 recommendations,	 along	 with	 teachers,	 educational	
authorities/experts,	 politicians	 and	 non-governmental	 organisations.	 Indeed,	 such	 a	








a	model	 for	 Turkey	 to	 develop	 its	 own	 policy	 towards	 its	 Kurdish	minority.	 However,	
unlike	the	Basque	model,	as	the	Catalan	case	showed,	embittered	minorities	are	likely	to	
develop	 a	 micro-nationalist	 system	 against	 the	 dominant	 hegemonic	 system.	 This	
appears	to	be	a	serious	issue	to		consider	while	developing	a	bilingual	educational	model	
for	 the	 Kurdish	 minority	 in	 Turkey,	 because	 in	 the	 case	 of	 a	 similar	 scenario	 to	 the	
Catalan	example,	ethnic	groups	other	 than	Kurds,	such	as	Turks	and	Arabs,	might	 face	
similar	problems	in	Kurdish	inhabited	provinces,	as	in	the	Catalan	case.	In	this	case,	it	is	
worth	 asking:	 is	 a	 desire	 for	 mother	 tongue	 education	 part	 of	 an	 argument	 for	
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bilingualism	 as	 an	 educationally	 inclusionary	 strategy	 or	 is	 it	 part	 of	 a	 Kurdish	 nation-
building	 project?	 The	 responses	 of	 some	 teachers	 who	 advocated	 for	 the	 Kurdish	
mother	 tongue	 education	 seemed	 to	 defend	 the	 bilingual	 educational	 model	 for	 the	






bilingual	 educational	model	 in	 Turkey	would	 certainly	 reduce	 the	 exclusion	of	 Kurdish	
people	both	in	education	and	in	wider	society.	In	this	regard,	on	the	one	hand,	Turkish	
might	be	taught	as	a	second	language,	with	Kurdish	being	the	language	of	instruction	in	
Kurdish	 inhabited	 provinces,	 which	 would	 contribute	 the	 integration	 of	 the	 Kurdish	
minority.	On	 the	other	 hand,	 Kurdish	might	 be	offered	 as	 a	 second	 language	 in	 other	
provinces	 where	 the	 language	 of	 instruction	 is	 Turkish,	 which	 would	 make	 Turkish	
students	develop	positive	attitudes	towards	the	Kurdish	identity	and	Kurdish	culture.	35	
In	 this	 regard,	 it	 appears	 that	 public	 opinion	 would	 also	 not	 object	 to	 the	
implementation	 of	 the	 bilingual	 educational	model,	 since	 the	 Kadir	 Has	 (2015)	 survey	
has	shown	that	45.5%	of	Turks	and	87.4%	of	Kurds	polled	thought	that	mother	tongue	
education	 in	 Kurdish	 is	 required.	After	 all,	 as	 discussed	earlier,	 the	 implementation	of	
such	a	model	firstly	requires	‘the	revision	of	the	curriculum	and	textbooks’	in	order	not	
to	promote	the	 idea	of	one	 ideology	(Kemalism)	and	one	ethnic	 identity	 (Turkishness),	




The	 reform	 suggestions	 discussed	 above	 also	 necessitate	 the	 decentralisation	 of	 the	
educational	system	in	Turkey,	which	is	no	easy	task	given	that	the	current	system	is	very	
                                            
35		 For	the	implementation	of	a	similar	model	in	the	Basque	region,	Spain,	see	GARDNER,	N.	2000.	The	
Basque	Language	in	Education	in	Spain,	Ljouwert/Leeuwarden,	Mercator-Education.		
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centralised	 with	 everything	 in	 education	 is	 controlled	 strictly	 by	 the	 MoNE.	 This	 is	
because	the	decentralisation	of	the	educational	policies	and	curriculum	would	definitely	
ease	 the	 development	 of	 flexible	 curriculum	 programmes	 specifically	 designed	 to	
address	the	needs	of	different	regions	 in	Turkey.	This	would	also	pave	the	way	for	the	
foundation	of	an	autonomous	Kurdish	structure	in	the	Kurdish	inhabited	provinces.	The	
establishment	 of	 such	 structure	 in	 the	 Kurdish	 region	 would	 make	 the	 policy-making	
process,	 the	 implementation	 of	 educational	 policies,	 and	 the	 preparation	 of	 the	
curriculum	along	with	 the	textbooks	much	easier	and	quicker,	which	appears	 to	be	an	
efficient	way	of	implementing	multicultural	policies	in	a	diverse	society.	In	fact,	the	Kadir	
Has	 (2015)	 survey	 revealed	 that	 the	majority	of	 Kurds	 (33.3%)	 stated	 that	 they	would	




probably	 a	 result	 of	 the	 reforms	 implemented	 during	 the	 Kurdish	 Initiative,	 and	 the	
positive,	promising	atmosphere	that	the	peace	process	brought	about	in	the	region.	
	
Indeed,	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 policies	 discussed	 above	 including	 the	 bilingual	
model	and	the	autonomous	structure	definitely	require	a	long	period	of	time	to	first	lay	
the	 necessary	 groundwork.	 For	 example,	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 Kurdish	 mother	
tongue	instruction	or	bilingual	model	in	Turkish	schools,	a	sufficient	number	of	teachers	
are	needed	 to	 first	 receive	 the	necessary	 training,	 on	 top	of	 the	production	of	 lots	 of	
teaching	 materials.	 As	 pointed	 out	 by	 Cummins	 (2000),	 in	 order	 to	 establish	 the	
necessary	 infrastructure	 for	 bilingual	 educational	 system,	 the	 training	 of	 bilingual	
teachers	 is	 of	 the	 paramount	 importance	 and	 is	 something	 which	 takes	 a	 long	 time.	
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The	 findings	 of	 this	 research	 revealed	 the	 seriousness	 of	 the	 issues	 facing	 Kurds,	 and	
thus	 	 strongly	 suggests	 the	 need	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 required	 reforms/actions	
discussed	 above	 in	 order	 for	 a	 permanent	 solution	 to	 emerge.	 However,	 the	 most	




succeed	 in	 both	 their	 school	 exams	 in	 schools	 and	 national	 examinations.	 This	 action	
appears	to	be	crucial	and	of	paramount	 importance	in	order	to	close	the	gap	between	
Kurdish	and	Turkish	pupils	 in	 terms	of	 their	academic	attainment.	Having	 said	 that,	as	
mentioned	 earlier,	 this	 will	 definitely	 not	 be	 the	 final	 or	 permanent	 solution	 for	 the	
issues	 and	 challenges	 facing	 Kurdish	 pupils,	 but	 they	might	 at	 the	 least	 benefit	 in	 the	
short	term.	In	this	case,	there	might	be	two	possible	actions	for	the	Ministry	of	National	





In	 the	 introduction	 chapter,	 I	mentioned	what	motivated	me	 to	 specifically	 study	 the	





What	 is	more,	 I	 looked	 at	 the	 issue	 of	 creativity	 in	 the	 Turkish	 educational	 system	 in	
relation	 to	 the	 ideology	 of	 Kemalism	 in	 my	MA	 dissertation,	 and	 the	 findings	 clearly	
showed	 the	negative	effects	of	 the	nationalist	 Kemalist	 ideology	which	dominates	 the	
educational	 system,	 affecting	 Kurdish	 and	 Turkish	 students	 alike	 in	 high	 school,	 and	
causing	the	exclusion	of	Kurdish	students	within	the	existing	system.	This	was	another	
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reason	 that	motivated	me	 to	examine	how	 the	exclusion	of	 the	Kurds	occurs	 in	more	
detail.	
	
The	 findings	 of	 this	 research	 made	 me	 more	 convinced	 that	 the	 nationalist	 Kemalist	
Turkish	 education	 system	has	 a	 very	 negative	 impact	 on	 Kurdish	 pupils.	 In	 fact,	 some	
experiences	 of	 Kurdish	 pupils	 –	 such	 as	 the	 way	 they	 are	 influenced	 by	 the	 Kemalist	




which	may	even	 lead	 to	 a	 suspension,	 also	 surprised	me	greatly.	As	 a	 trainee	 teacher	
however	 I	 did	 not	 observe	 any	 kind	 of	 tension	 between	 teachers	 who	 had	 different	
ideologies.	However,	this	research	revealed	that	the	teachers	interviewed	for	this	study	






Turkish	 national	 education	 on	 the	 Kurds.	 The	 findings	 of	 this	 study	 has	made	 several	
contributions	 to	 the	 current	 literature.	 First,	 it	 has	 provided	 a	 deeper	 insight	 into	 the	
exclusion	of	Kurdish	pupils,	 especially	ones	 living	 in	 the	 rural	 areas	 in	 the	eastern	and	
south-eastern	 regions	of	Turkey,	within	 the	national	educational	 system	and	providing	
strong	empirical	confirmation	that	the	issues	in	education	do	not	only	have	an	impact	on	
Kurdish	pupils’	academic	achievements,	but	also	affect	their	relations	with	their	families,	
their	daily	 lives,	and	even	 their	personalities.	These	 findings	add	 to	a	growing	body	of	
literature	on	the	issues/challenges	minority	ethnic	and	religious	students	face	in	schools	
and	 in	 wider	 society.	 Thus,	 the	 empirical	 findings	 of	 this	 study	 provided	 a	 new	
understanding	of	how	teachers	experience	different	issues	in	schools,	how	they	handle	






evidence	 for	how	Kurdish	pupils	 are	affected	by	 the	Kemalist	 ideology	and	 the	 cult	of	
Atatürk.	 Finally,	 it	 can	 be	 concluded	 that	 one	 of	 the	 strengths	 of	 this	 study	 is	 that	 it	
represents	a	comprehensive	examination	of	all	major	factors	–	teachers,	the	curriculum,	
policy	documents,	 educational	 attainments	 and	 textbooks	 –	 that	might	possibly	 affect	
Kurds.	
	
Despite	 the	promising	 results,	 this	 research	 is	 primarily	 based	upon	 the	effects	 of	 the	
Kemalist	national	education	on	Kurdish	pupils	in	the	early	years	of	education,	that	is,	in	
primary	and	middle	schools.	Thus,	 further	research	 is	required	to	assess	the	 long-term	
impacts	 of	 the	 Turkish	 educational	 system	 on	 Kurdish	 students	 in	 high	 schools	 and	
universities.	 Furthermore,	 because	 the	 Kurds	 have	 been	 considered	 as	 an	 ethnic	
minority	 in	 this	 study	 (something	which	has	 traditionally	 been	denied	officially	 by	 the	
Turkish	 state)	 it	 would	 be	 interesting	 to	 compare	 the	 experiences	 of	 other	 minority	
students,	 especially	 religious	 minorities	 such	 as	 the	 Alevis,	 since	 the	 contents	 of	 the	
textbooks	 promote	 the	 Sunni	 interpretation	 of	 Islam,	 though	 some	 information	
regarding	Alevism	 is	now	 included	 in	 the	 textbooks.	Because	 this	 thesis	placed	a	great	
emphasis	on	teachers’	views,	behaviours	and	reactions,	further	research	in	this	field	that	
might	further	examine	teachers’	role	in	the	educational	system	would	be	of	great	help	in	




relationship	 between	 teachers,	 students	 and	 parents	 was	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	
research,	 more	 research	 is	 needed	 to	 develop	 a	 deeper	 understanding	 of	 the	
relationship	between	those	parties.	
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9.7.	Conclusion	
	
In	 this	 chapter,	 the	 research	questions	 and	 the	 structure	of	 the	 thesis	were	discussed	
and	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 research	were	 presented	 in	 line	 with	 the	 research	 questions.	
Furthermore,	the	implications	of	the	findings	for	both	academic	and	political	debates	on	
the	 Kurdish	 Question	 were	 discussed.	 The	 ‘solution	 proposals’	 from	 an	 educational	
perspective	were	mentioned	and	a	discussion	was	had.	Finally,	personal	reflections	and	
suggestions	for	future	research	were	mentioned	at	the	end	of	the	chapter.	



























































10.	Given	the	 fact	 that	 the	only	official	 language	to	be	taught	 in	schools	 is	Turkish,	do	
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-	How	do	you	respond	to	this	as	a	teacher?	
	





















-	 If	 you	 do	 not	 think	 so,	 how	 do	 you	 see	 one	 of	 the	 aims	 of	 the	 Turkish	 national	
education,	 which	 is	 “to	 raise	 a	 generation	 that	 should	 have	 and	 understanding	 of	
Ataturk’s	nationalism	and	Ataturk’s	principles”?	
	









16.	 Previous	 research	 found	 that	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 Kurdish	 participants	 (especially	
Kurdish	 teachers)	 see	 that	 there	 is	a	strong	 link	between	Kemalism	and	nationalism	 in	













18.	 Given	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	 a	 Kurdish	 issue	 in	 Turkey,	 and	 they	 have	 different	
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-	Do	you	teach	this	course	unit?	

























25.	 Have	 you	 ever	 thought	 that	 education	was	 a	 key	 area	which	 enabled	 the	 Turkish	
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APPENDIX	B:	THE	LIST	OF	INTERVIEWEES	
			PSEUDONYMS							AGE,	ETHNICITY,	SEX		 			PROVINCE		 								COURSES	TAUGHT 
Ayşe	 25-30,	Turkish,	F	 Tunceli	 Primary	School	Teacher	
Mete	 25-30,	Turkish,	M	 Diyarbakır	 Social	Studies	
Attila	 30-35,	Turkish,	M	 Van	 Social	Studies	
Beyhan	 25-30,	Turkish,	F	 Batman	 Turkish	
Asena	 25-30,	Turkish,	F	 Bingöl	 Primary	School	Teacher	
Ayhan	 25-30,	Turkish,	M	 Hakkari	 Science	
Tarkan	 30-35,	Turkish,	M	 Diyarbakır	 Primary	School	Teacher	
Ceyda	 25-30,	Turkish,	F	 Diyarbakır	 Primary	School	Teacher	
Melike	 25-30,	Turkish,	F	 Tunceli	 Social	Studies	
Utku	 30-35,	Turkish,	M	 Şırnak	 Maths	
Yılmaz	 30-35,	Turkish,	M	 Hakkari	 Social	Studies	
Ufuk	 25-30,	Turkish,	M	 Bitlis	 Primary	School	Teacher	
Koray	 30-35,	Turkish,	M	 Muş	 Turkish	
Mehmed	Âkif	 25-30,	Turkish,	M	 Bingöl	 Primary	School	Teacher	
Muhammed	 25-30,	Turkish,	M	 Mardin	 Social	Studies	
Ramazan	 25-30,	Turkish,	M	 Batman	 Science	
Abdullah	 30-35,	Turkish,	M	 Bitlis	 Primary	School	Teacher	
Gülten	 30-35,	Kurdish,	F	 Diyarbakır	 Primary	School	Teacher	
Hatice	 25-30,	Kurdish,	F	 Diyarbakır	 Religion	
Emrullah	 25-30,	Kurdish,	M	 Şırnak	 Primary	School	Teacher	
İsmail	 30-35,	Kurdish,	M	 Van	 Primary	School	Teacher	
Zahide	 25-30,	Kurdish,	F	 Ağrı	 Turkish	
Zahir	 25-30,	Kurdish,	M	 Diyarbakır	 Social	Studies	
Şirin	 25-30,	Kurdish,	M	 Siirt	 Social	Studies	
Mehmed	 30-35,	Kurdish,	M	 Muş	 Primary	School	Teacher	
Sami	 30-35,	Kurdish,	M	 Diyarbakır	 Primary	School	Teacher	
Doğan	 30-35,	Kurdish,	M	 Diyarbakır	 Turkish	
Perihan	 25-30,	Kurdish,	F	 Mardin	 Social	Studies	
Murat	 25-30,	Kurdish,	F	 Siirt	 Primary	School	Teacher	
Cemil	 30-35,	Kurdish,	M	 Ağrı	 Maths	
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